Re: [geo] Re: SRM geoengineering: how to deal with the losers?

[John Nissen]

Hello Peter, To answer your question on cost/benefit, we need to analyse the balance of the risks of geoengineering to cool the Arctic against the risks of not geoengineering.  This balancing of risks needs to take into account the timescale of processes in the Arctic which give rise to the risks of not geoengineering.  For example, if these processes were very unlikely to build up significant positive climate forcing or sea level rise over the next few decades, one could be relaxed about geoengineering.  But there is data about the Arctic sea ice retreat, shown in a single graph, that gives much cause for concern.  The graph has been reproduced in the Copenhagen diagnosis report [1].  The graph is derived from one in this 2007 paper [2], by Stroeve, Serreze et al, with additions for 2007 and 2008.  Note that this paper was submitted before the abrupt retreat of sea ice to achieve a record low September 2007.  In the light of such developments in the Arctic, and revised timing estimates, we should prepare a risk analysis, but it will be in a separate thread. Note that, in terms of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [3], we have risk defined thus: In a PRA, risk is characterized by two quantities: the magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence(s), and the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence. Conventional cost-benefit analysis [4] is not quite what we are looking for, because it assumes the status quo is acceptable: Cost–benefit analysis is typically used by governments to evaluate the desirability of a given intervention. It is heavily used in today's government. It is an analysis of the cost effectiveness of different alternatives in order to see whether the benefits outweigh the costs. The aim is to gauge the efficiency of the intervention relative to the status quo. The costs and benefits of the impacts of an intervention are evaluated in terms of the public's willingness to pay for them (benefits) or willingness to pay to avoid them (costs).  However we can try to "gauge the efficiency of the intervention" relative to no intervention in our analysis.  We also need to take probabilities and timescale into account, in order to compare immediate intervention with delayed intervention.  Of course, the "costs" of intervention must include the risks of adverse consequences. Cheers from Chiswick, John [1] See fig 13 page 30: http://www.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/Copenhagen/Copenhagen_Diagnosis_LOW.pdf [2] Published in Geophysical Research Letters and reproduced here: http://www.smithpa.demon.co.uk/GRL%20Arctic%20Ice.pdf [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_risk_assessment [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost-benefit_analysis --- p.j.irvine wrote: dear Gregory Benford, It seems that there is an assumption that cooling the arctic is essential and trumps any potential impacts in other parts of the world. I'm not sure how it would be achieved but I believe that an in-depth cost-benefit assesment of any proposed geoengineering scheme is essential. For example, If the suspected impact of an arctic intervention was a cooling of the arctic but also a change in hydrology in another part of the world; surely to justify the intervention it would have to be proved that the overall effect was positive? I can imagine their are a lot of tricky things to quantify, the impacts of runaway climate change for tundra melt, the subjective value of any predicted change in the climate, etc. (and a lot of unquantifiable things besides) but I believe the principle should remain. Do you agree that this principle of a calculated or expected positive global impact should be satisfied before any geoengineering intervention s undertaken? The alternative seems to justify regions or countries modifying regional climate for their benefit regardless of detrimental impacts elsewhere. regards, Pete Irvine On Feb 20, 4:44 pm, xbenf...@aol.com wrote: All: Stephen, this transfer function is for tropospheric spraying, yes? The strato cases are not nearly so predictable. I'd expect the tropo sprays don't propagate far, anyway. National legislation to protect geo experiments from lawsuits is crucial. As David says, international treaties will help, but I'd estimate they will take far longer, and delay is our enemy. I'd be happy with the Arctic Council defending their experiments, as they have clout and standing. Gregory Benford -----Original Message----- From: David Schnare <dwschn...@gmail.com> Cc: geoengineering <geoengineering@googlegroups.com> Sent: Sat, Feb 20, 2010 7:56 am Subject: Re: [geo] SRM geoengineering: how to deal with the losers? Pete:   My sense is that who will be a winner or loser is an unknowable unknown.  While I agree with Professor Salter that we could take a stab at it, and indeed others on this list have made some preliminary attempts to look at precipitation issues, the sad reality is that models are dreadfully inadequate for regional analyses and greater computing power will not be enough to make them much more useful.   In the absence of quality information, humankind has used a best guess, iterative approach, achieved through international treaty.  My suspicion is that will be what will have to happen here to address winners and losers.  I am concerned, however, that such an approach will not work if potential "losers" demand stipulated reparations.    Schnare On Sat, Feb 20, 2010 at 9:38 AM, p.j.irvine &lt;p.j.irv...@googlemail.com&gt; wrote: It is likely that any SRM geoengineering intervention will create winners and losers and some nations may always be against any intervention whatsoever. Gregory Benford raised the issue of reaching agreement on the global scale and how problematic it would be. If for example the arctic council of nations agreed to initiate a decade-long field trial to cool the arctic by 1 C, how could they deal with complaints from nations who felt that this experiment had induced a negative change in their climate? In any given year there are floods, droughts, heatwaves, etc. but during this field trial a fraction of these events would be attributed (rightly or wrongly, partially or fully) to the intervention. Two questions arise: Could it be determined if any changes in the climate (outside of the target area) had occurred as a result of the intervention during a 10 year trial? How would aggrieved nations or peoples seek reparations for perceived negative impacts (scientifically proven or otherwise)? best regards, Pete Irvine PhD student School of Geographical Sciences University of Bristol -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. -- David W. Schnare Center for Environmental Stewardship -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to geoengineering@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to geoengineering+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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