On this topic, is anyone familiar with any steps the Arctic Council has taken toward geoengineering?
Josh On Feb 21, 6:03 pm, [email protected] wrote: > Andrew: > > Your comments are precisely why having the Arctic Council manage it > will help deflect such UN-level chaos. > > No nation is going to try to muscle the Council: they're too powerful. > Let them own the issue, because they have the most at stake. Worry not > about farmers who, in my experience on farms, will blame everything on > the weather (or the government of their own nation). > > Meanwhile, take the high road of rational risk analysis, as John says. > > Gregory > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andrew Lockley <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > > Cc: [email protected]; geoengineering > <[email protected]>; Mark Serreze > <[email protected]> > Sent: Sun, Feb 21, 2010 2:56 pm > Subject: Re: [geo] Re: SRM geoengineering: how to deal with the losers? > > I don't agree with John's reasoning. Whilst a rational and > all-powerful government might use such an approach, this is not likely > to be the case in practice. Realpolitik suggests that people will look > at only the downside of geoengineering when it affects them personally. > If you're a farmer with a failed crop, the benefit of constraining > methane releases won't seem a worthwhile trade off. Your government > may well agree. > > It's the fine detail of the handling of these matters, and proper > governance surrounding them, that will prevent governments 'sinking the > cloud ships', either literally or metaphorically. If these concerns > aren't handled properly, I could even imagine countries deliberately > worsening the greenhouse effect to counteract geoengineering schemes. > Releasing HFCs/CFCs would be a very simple way to do this. > > A > > On 21 February 2010 14:50, John Nissen <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hello Peter, > > To answer your question on cost/benefit, we need to analyse the > balanceof the risks of geoengineering to cool the Arctic against the > risks ofnot geoengineering. This balancing of risks needs to take into > accountthe timescale of processes in the Arctic which give rise to the > risksof not geoengineering. For example, if these processes were > veryunlikely to build up significant positive climate forcing or sea > levelrise over the next few decades, one could be relaxed > aboutgeoengineering. But there is data about the Arctic sea ice > retreat,shown in a single graph, that gives much cause for concern. > The graphhas been reproduced in the Copenhagen diagnosis report [1]. > > The graph is derived from one in this 2007 paper [2], by > Stroeve,Serreze et al, with additions for 2007 and 2008. Note that > this paperwas submitted before the abrupt retreat of sea ice to achieve > a recordlow September 2007. > > In the light of such developments in the Arctic, and revised > timingestimates, we should prepare a risk analysis, but it will be in > aseparate thread. > > Note that, in terms of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [3], we > haverisk defined thus: > > In a PRA, risk is characterized by two quantities: the magnitude > (severity) of the possible adverseconsequence(s), and > the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence. > > Conventional cost-benefit analysis [4] is not quite what we are > lookingfor, because it assumes the status quo is acceptable: > > Cost–benefit analysis is typically used by governments to > evaluatethedesirability of a given intervention. It is heavily used in > today'sgovernment. It is an analysis of the cost effectiveness of > differentalternatives in order to see whether the benefits outweigh the > costs.The aim is to gauge the efficiency of the intervention relative > tothestatus quo. The costs and benefits of the impacts of > aninterventionare evaluated in terms of the public's willingness to pay > for them(benefits) or willingness to pay to avoid them (costs). > > However we can try to "gauge the efficiency of the intervention" > relativeto no intervention in our analysis. We also need to > takeprobabilities and timescale into account, in order to compare > immediateintervention with delayed intervention. Of course, the > "costs" ofintervention must include the risks of adverse consequences. > > Cheers from Chiswick, > > John > > [1] See fig 13 page > 30:http://www.ccrc.unsw.edu.au/Copenhagen/Copenhagen_Diagnosis_LOW.pdf > > [2] Published in Geophysical Research Letters and reproduced > here:http://www.smithpa.demon.co.uk/GRL%20Arctic%20Ice.pdf > > [3]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_risk_assessment > > [4]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost-benefit_analysis > > --- > > p.j.irvine wrote: dear Gregory Benford,It seems that there is an > assumption that cooling the arctic isessential and trumps any potential > impacts in other parts of theworld.I'm not sure how it would be > achieved but I believe that an in-depthcost-benefit assesment of any > proposed geoengineering scheme isessential. For example, If the > suspected impact of an arcticintervention was a cooling of the arctic > but also a change inhydrology in another part of the world; surely to > justify theintervention it would have to be proved that the overall > effect waspositive?I can imagine their are a lot of tricky things to > quantify, theimpacts of runaway climate change for tundra melt, the > subjectivevalue of any predicted change in the climate, etc. (and a lot > ofunquantifiable things besides) but I believe the principle > shouldremain.Do you agree that this principle of a calculated or > expected positiveglobal impact should be satisfied before any > geoengineeringintervention s undertaken? The alternative seems to > justify regions orcountries modifying regional climate for their > benefit regardless ofdetrimental impacts elsewhere.regards,Pete > IrvineOn Feb 20, 4:44 pm, [email protected] wrote: All:Stephen, > this transfer function is for tropospheric spraying, yes? Thestrato > cases are not nearly so predictable. I'd expect the tropo spraysdon't > propagate far, anyway.National legislation to protect geo experiments > from lawsuits iscrucial. As David says, international treaties will > help, but I'destimate they will take far longer, and delay is our > enemy. I'd behappy with the Arctic Council defending their experiments, > as they haveclout and standing.Gregory Benford-----Original > Message-----From: David Schnare <[email protected]>Cc: > geoengineering <[email protected]>Sent: Sat, Feb > 20, 2010 7:56 amSubject: Re: [geo] SRM geoengineering: how to deal with > the losers?Pete: My sense is that who will be a winner or loser is an > unknowableunknown. While I agree with Professor Salter that we could > take a stabat it, and indeed others on this list have made some > preliminaryattempts to look at precipitation issues, the sad reality is > thatmodels are dreadfully inadequate for regional analyses and > greatercomputing power will not be enough to make them much more > useful. In the absence of quality information, humankind has used a > best guess,iterative approach, achieved through international treaty. > Mysuspicion is that will be what will have to happen here to > addresswinners and losers. I am concerned, however, that such an > approachwill not work if potential "losers" demand stipulated > reparations. SchnareOn Sat, Feb 20, 2010 at 9:38 AM, > p.j.irvine<[email protected]> wrote:It is likely that any > SRM geoengineering intervention will createwinners and losers and some > nations may always be against anyintervention whatsoever.Gregory > Benford raised the issue of reaching agreement on the globalscale and > how problematic it would be. If for example the arcticcouncil of > nations agreed to initiate a decade-long field trial tocool the arctic > by 1 C, how could they deal with complaints fromnations who felt that > this experiment had induced a negative change intheir climate?In any > given year there are floods, droughts, heatwaves, etc. butduring this > field trial a fraction of these events would be attributed(rightly or > wrongly, partially or fully) to the intervention. Twoquestions > arise:Could it be determined if any changes in the climate (outside of > thetarget area) had occurred as a result of the intervention during a > 10year trial?How would aggrieved nations or peoples seek reparations > for perceivednegative impacts (scientifically proven or otherwise)?best > regards,Pete IrvinePhD studentSchool of Geographical SciencesUniversity > of Bristol--You received this message because you are subscribed to the > GoogleGroups "geoengineering" group.To post to this group, send email > to [email protected] unsubscribe from this group, send > email [email protected] more options, > visit this group > athttp://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en.--DavidW. > SchnareCenter for Environmental Stewardship--You received this message > because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "geoengineering" > group.To post to this group, send email to > [email protected] unsubscribe from this group, send > email [email protected] more options, > visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "geoengineering" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group > athttp://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "geoengineering" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group > athttp://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. 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