I'm sorry if I was unclear. Intent and attribution are of course independent of each other, but both would be relevant to attempts to secure compensation for post/mid-CE weather disasters. Of the two, intent will be the far easier one to determine.
> Again: Are there fundamental differences in the compensation issue between > climate change that is produced intentionally versus climate change that is > produced knowingly? If we go by historical and legal parallels, yes. If your action triggers a harmful result that you knew was a possibility and took reasonable measures to prevent, the punishment is usually less than if you ignored/discounted that possibility, and far less than if you intended that harmful result. In most scenarios the potentially-provable accusation would be of negligence, not assault with a climate weapon. But again, intent is comparatively simple to determine. Attribution will be the much more difficult task, and the one most likely to cause a political crisis. Proving legally that Weather Disaster X was caused primarily by climate engineering will be extremely difficult; proving it politically, conversely, will be (unfortunately) quite simple. -Jamais On Aug 12, 2014, at 2:53 PM, Ken Caldeira <[email protected]> wrote: > How does whether the intervention was intentional vs. merely knowing affect > the attribution problem? > > Attribution of effects to causes in physical systems is independent of > motivations. > > In either case, damaging third parties was not the goal. In both cases > (intentionally vs knowingly causing climate change), someone is will to > damage (or risk damaging) third parties to achieve some other goal. > > In what ways do the compensation to the third party depend on the details of > what the other goal might have been? > > Again: Are there fundamental differences in the compensation issue between > climate change that is produced intentionally versus climate change that is > produced knowingly? > > If I emit CO2 with the intent of changing climate versus the intent of > driving to work, does that change anything relevant to compensation or > attribution issues? > > > > > _______________ > Ken Caldeira > > Carnegie Institution for Science > Dept of Global Ecology > 260 Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305 USA > +1 650 704 7212 [email protected] > http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab > https://twitter.com/KenCaldeira > > Assistant: Dawn Ross <[email protected]> > > > > On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 11:56 AM, Jamais Cascio <[email protected]> > wrote: > Level and intentionality of contribution is one component. Provable > attribution is another, which is also relevant to climate engineering: if > Weather Disaster X happens six months after the onset of SRM, how can it be > proven that WDX was (or was not) triggered by SRM? > > It may be useful to look at the legal history of lawsuits brought against > tobacco companies for broadly parallel complexities. > > -Jamais Cascio > > > > > > On Aug 12, 2014, at 11:24 AM, Ken Caldeira <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> How and why do the challenges of compensation for solar geoengineering >> damage fundamentally differ from the challenges associated with >> compensation for damages associated greenhouse gas or tropospheric aerosol >> emissions that are byproducts of industrial activity? >> >> The main differences that I see is that inadvertent climate change likely >> involves more actors (i.e., solar geoengineering will probably be limited to >> state actors) and inadvertent climate change is caused knowingly but not >> intentionally. >> >> Does the issue of compensation fundamentally differ depending on whether the >> climate change was caused intentionally versus merely knowingly? >> >> (By the way, paper is behind a paywall that Stanford libraries does not >> tunnel through, so I am operating solely on the basis of the text below.) >> >> _______________ >> Ken Caldeira >> >> Carnegie Institution for Science >> Dept of Global Ecology >> 260 Panama Street, Stanford, CA 94305 USA >> +1 650 704 7212 [email protected] >> http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab >> https://twitter.com/KenCaldeira >> >> Assistant: Dawn Ross <[email protected]> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 10:20 AM, Andrew Lockley <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Ethics, Policy & Environment >> Volume 17, Issue 2, 2014 >> >> Response to Svoboda and Irvine >> >> Full access >> DOI:10.1080/21550085.2014.926080 Jesse Reynolds >> Published online: 08 Aug 2014 >> >> In this issue, Svoboda and Irvine (Svoboda & Irvine, 20146. Svoboda, >> T., & Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges in >> compensating for harm due to solar radiation management >> geoengineering. Ethics, Policy and Environment, 17(2), 157-174. >> [Taylor & Francis Online] >> View all references) offer the most in-depth consideration thus far of >> possible compensation for harm from solar radiation management (SRM) >> geoengineering. This topic is indeed treacherous terrain, pulling >> together multiple complex debates, ethical and otherwise. Their >> description of the technical challenges to determining damages and >> causation in particular are illuminating. The reader cannot help, >> though, but be left with the sense that both SRM and compensation are >> futile efforts, bound to do more harm than good. >> Before proceeding, throughout any consideration of geoengineering, one >> must always bear in mind that it is under consideration as a possible >> complementary response (along with greenhouse gas emissions >> reductions--or 'mitigation'--and adaptation) to climate change. Climate >> change poses risks to the environment and humans, among whom the >> world's poor are the most vulnerable. The Intergovernmental Panel on >> Climate Change recently concluded that 'Models consistently suggest >> that SRM would generally reduce climate differences compared to a >> world with elevated greenhouse gas concentrations and no SRM ...' >> (Boucher et al., 20133. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., >> Bretherton, C., Feingold, G., Forster, P., ... Zhang, X. Y. (2013). >> Clouds and aerosols. In T. F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, >> S. K.Allen, J.Boschung... P. M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The >> physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth >> Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change >> (pp. 571-657). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. >> >> View all references, p. 575). Therefore, SRM has the potential to >> reduce harm to the environment and humans, particularly to already >> disadvantaged groups. However, SRM is imperfect. >> The primary problem with S&I's analysis is that they treat the >> shortcomings of SRM and of compensation for its potential negative >> secondary effects as if they were sui generis. In fact, these cited >> shortcomings are found among three existing policy domains, which >> happen to intersect at the proposed compensation for SRM's harms. The >> first such policy domain is socially organized responses to other >> complex problems, and the provision of public goods in particular. In >> a key passage, S&I write that 'The potential for SRM deployment to >> result in an unequal distribution of harm and benefit among persons >> raises a serious ethical challenge. It seems deeply unfair to adopt a >> climate change strategy that benefits some at the expense of harming >> others. This is especially the case if those harmed bear little or no >> responsibility for the problem of anthropogenic climate change' (pp. >> 160-161). One could replace the phrases 'SRM deployment' and 'a >> climate change strategy' (and skip the final specific sentence, for >> now) with references to almost any socially organized response to a >> complex problem, and the statement would remain valid. Indeed, the >> primary function of government is arguably to levy taxes in order to >> provide public goods, which are unlikely to be otherwise adequately >> provided. These public goods include (but are not limited to) defense >> from external threats, police protection to reduce crime, construction >> of infrastructure, regulation for safety and environmental protection, >> generation of knowledge through research, and standards setting. In >> each of these cases, some people benefit more than others, and some >> pay more than others. Some may be net losers. Policies in which no one >> is a net loser (i.e., Pareto improving) are sometimes possible, but >> most often are not or are not pursued. Instead, policies that generate >> positive total net benefits are adopted. To compensate net losers, >> side payments can be made and/or other issues can be linked. While >> these arrangements could be called ethically problematic, they >> constitute the very core of public policy. In fact, several of S&I's >> ethical concerns--including raising revenue from those opposed to >> and/or harmed by a policy, arbitrary rules, and the non-identity >> problem--could be posed regarding these public goods' provision. SRM >> might be especially complex, in large part because of its global >> nature, but that does not make it entirely novel. Other global public >> goods are promoted through various international mechanisms (Barrett, >> 20071. Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply >> global public goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. >> >> View all references). >> The second policy domain posing similar ethical problems is >> compensation, particularly in complex situations. Even in a case as >> simple as accident liability with a single injurer and a single >> victim, compensation for non-economic and irreparable damages is >> unclear, and compensation clearly does not grant license for an >> injurer to harm the victim. In a more complex example, such as the >> requested compensation by those born with birth defects due to their >> mothers' use of thalidomide during pregnancy, is it very uncertain who >> should pay and how much compensation should be provided. >> The third existing policy domain is climate change. In the key passage >> cited above, 'SRM deployment' could be replaced with 'mitigation,' >> 'adaptation,' and/or 'compensation for climate change damages' and the >> statement would remain valid. Any climate policy will 'result in an >> unequal distribution of harm and benefit among persons,' and under all >> feasible policies, those who 'bear little or no responsibility for the >> problem of anthropogenic climate change' will experience some harm. >> Specifically, aggressive mitigation would be expensive and, though it >> offers some co-benefits, it would hinder economic development, >> including in poor countries.1 >> 1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse >> gases emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions. >> Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development. >> Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering >> economic development in poor countries.View all notes >> The cause of the 'ethical uncertainty' is not SRM but climate change >> and greenhouse gas emissions, whose ethics is discussed thoroughly in >> the literature. Because of this, no responses to climate change will >> be impervious to accusations of being unjust. However, S&I's implicit >> ethical divorce of SRM from climate change has the effect of laying >> the ethical challenges from climate change at the feet of SRM. >> An additional problematic aspect of S&I is that, to some degree, they >> stack the deck against SRM. Regarding its benefits, they fail to >> emphasize that SRM appears to hold the potential to greatly reduce >> climate change risks to the environment and people, particularly to >> the world's poor. Regarding SRM's costs, they cite four ways in which >> some might be harmed, each of which is likely to be less severe than >> they imply. First, SRM would compensate for temperate and >> precipitation changes unevenly. Yet almost all modeling of SRM's >> probable effects are not optimized but instead use a determined SRM >> intensity or one that would return global average temperature to a >> preindustrial value. Citing them as indicating certain likely harms >> would require that significantly suboptimal SRM policies be adopted. >> The one model that does balance temperature and precipitation across >> regions of the globe found that population-weighted Pareto optimal, >> globally uniform SRM could compensate for 93% of temperature changes >> and 56% of precipitation changes (Moreno-Cruz, Ricke, & Keith, 20124. >> Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple >> model to account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of >> solar radiation management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649-668. >> [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> View all references, p. 660). Second, S&I point to ocean >> acidification, but this is not caused by SRM but instead by elevated >> atmospheric carbon dioxide. It is simply unaddressed by SRM. Third, >> they note possible damage to stratospheric ozone. However, this would >> be caused by only one proposed SRM technique (stratospheric aerosol >> injection) using one proposed material (sulfate aerosols); other >> methods and materials are possible. Furthermore, recent research >> indicates that this impact would be small and the harmful consequences >> (increased ultraviolet radiation) would be almost entirely offset by >> the screening of incoming light by the aerosols (Pitari et al., 20145. >> Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., Cionni, >> I., ... Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to sulfate >> geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison >> Project (GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, >> 119(5), 2629-2653. >> [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> View all references). Fourth, if SRM were to suddenly stop, then the >> subsequent rapid climate change would be very harmful. But it is not >> only SRM which poses risks if not implemented properly. For example, >> society could intend optimal mitigation and adaptation yet fail to >> implement them, resulting in dangerous climate change. In fact, >> contemporary society maintains numerous complex operations whose >> cessation would result in harm. For example, the well being of almost >> all people relies upon continued global trade powered by fossil fuels, >> yet we generally do not worry about a sudden cessation of trade and >> fossil fuel extraction. Lastly, even if SRM were to stop, the benefits >> might still outweigh the costs (Bickel & Agrawal, 20132. Bickel, J. >> E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of aerosol >> geoengineering. Climatic Change, 119(3-4), 993-1006. >> [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> View all references). Nevertheless, the authors emphasize that SRM >> 'could result in substantial harm' (p. 160). This is true in that SRM >> would pose risks, but S&I emphasize only the misses while downplaying >> the hits. >> Both SRM and the compensation for its negative secondary effects are >> ethically complex. Yet such 'ethical uncertainty' generally neither >> raises questions of ethical permissibility and nor induces paralysis >> among policy makers in other domains such as the provision of public >> goods, compensation, and mitigation and adaptation in response to >> climate change. SRM is indeed complex and challenging but S&I fail to >> indicate why its case should be fundamentally different from these >> others. A more pragmatic approach, which asks what policies and >> avenues of research would be most likely to offer the greatest >> benefits, as opposed to one which seeks only what is problematic, may >> be more productive. >> >> Notes >> >> 1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse >> gases emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions. >> Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development. >> Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering >> economic development in poor countries. >> >> References >> >> 1. Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global >> public goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. >> 2. Bickel, J. E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of >> aerosol geoengineering. Climatic Change, 119(3-4), 993-1006. >> [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> 3. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., Bretherton, C., Feingold, G., >> Forster, P., ... Zhang, X. Y. (2013). Clouds and aerosols. In T. >> F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, S. K.Allen, J.Boschung... P. >> M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. >> Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the >> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 571-657). Cambridge: >> Cambridge University Press. >> 4. Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple >> model to account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of >> solar radiation management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649-668. >> [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> 5. Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., >> Cionni, I., ... Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to >> sulfate geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model >> Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: >> Atmospheres, 119(5), 2629-2653. [CrossRef], [Web of Science (R)] >> 6. Svoboda, T., & Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges >> in compensating for harm due to solar radiation management >> geoengineering. 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