Jesse, thanks for posting the Svoboda and Irvine article as well as all four commentaries (including mine!).
The question of intent may be misplaced here, because the standard for international liability is usually strict, no-fault liability, which would almost certainly apply to SRM in practice. Under this principle, the key issue is causation/attribution, not intent. Attribution will likely be difficult, but not impossible -- methods like Fraction Attributable Risk are making headway on this front. Josh On Wednesday, August 13, 2014 4:00:53 AM UTC-4, Jesse Reynolds wrote: > > My response is one of four to Svoboda and Irvine. In the same issue, there > is also a relevant target article by David Morrow 'Starting a flood to stop > a fire? Some moral constraints on solar radiation management' with five > responses. All are at > http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cepe21/17/2 > > I am unsure of the unstated rules regarding posting articles which are > behind firewalls. [If anyone knows, please clarify.] Here I am attaching > Svoboda and Irvine and its responses. [I hope that this does not overstep > the bounds of sharing.] I would be glad to share David's and those > responses if anyone wishes and it is OK. > > There are a few other recent and forthcoming articles on compensation. I > am working on one. See also > Clare Heyward, "Benefitting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding > Remedial Duties: The Case of Unforeseeable Harms," Journal of Applied > Philosophy, (2014) > http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12075/abstract > > Cheers, > -Jesse > > ----------------------------------------- > Jesse L. Reynolds > European and International Public Law > Tilburg Sustainability Center > Tilburg University, The Netherlands > Book review editor, Law, Innovation, and Technology > email: [email protected] <javascript:> > http://works.bepress.com/jessreyn/ > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] <javascript:> [mailto: > [email protected] <javascript:>] On Behalf Of Andrew Lockley > Sent: 12 August 2014 19:21 > To: geoengineering > Subject: [geo] Response to Svoboda and Irvine, J Reynolds > > Ethics, Policy & Environment > Volume 17, Issue 2, 2014 > > Response to Svoboda and Irvine > > Full access > DOI:10.1080/21550085.2014.926080 Jesse Reynolds Published online: 08 Aug > 2014 > > In this issue, Svoboda and Irvine (Svoboda & Irvine, 20146. Svoboda, T., & > Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges in compensating for > harm due to solar radiation management geoengineering. Ethics, Policy and > Environment, 17(2), 157–174. > [Taylor & Francis Online] > View all references) offer the most in-depth consideration thus far of > possible compensation for harm from solar radiation management (SRM) > geoengineering. This topic is indeed treacherous terrain, pulling together > multiple complex debates, ethical and otherwise. Their description of the > technical challenges to determining damages and causation in particular are > illuminating. The reader cannot help, though, but be left with the sense > that both SRM and compensation are futile efforts, bound to do more harm > than good. > Before proceeding, throughout any consideration of geoengineering, one > must always bear in mind that it is under consideration as a possible > complementary response (along with greenhouse gas emissions reductions—or > ‘mitigation’—and adaptation) to climate change. Climate change poses risks > to the environment and humans, among whom the world's poor are the most > vulnerable. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently > concluded that ‘Models consistently suggest that SRM would generally reduce > climate differences compared to a world with elevated greenhouse gas > concentrations and no SRM …’ > (Boucher et al., 20133. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., Bretherton, > C., Feingold, G., Forster, P., … Zhang, X. Y. (2013). > Clouds and aerosols. In T. F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, S. > K.Allen, J.Boschung… P. M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The > physical science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth > Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. > 571–657). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. > > View all references, p. 575). Therefore, SRM has the potential to reduce > harm to the environment and humans, particularly to already disadvantaged > groups. However, SRM is imperfect. > The primary problem with S&I's analysis is that they treat the > shortcomings of SRM and of compensation for its potential negative > secondary effects as if they were sui generis. In fact, these cited > shortcomings are found among three existing policy domains, which happen to > intersect at the proposed compensation for SRM's harms. The first such > policy domain is socially organized responses to other complex problems, > and the provision of public goods in particular. In a key passage, S&I > write that ‘The potential for SRM deployment to result in an unequal > distribution of harm and benefit among persons raises a serious ethical > challenge. It seems deeply unfair to adopt a climate change strategy that > benefits some at the expense of harming others. This is especially the case > if those harmed bear little or no responsibility for the problem of > anthropogenic climate change’ (pp. > 160–161). One could replace the phrases ‘SRM deployment’ and ‘a climate > change strategy’ (and skip the final specific sentence, for > now) with references to almost any socially organized response to a > complex problem, and the statement would remain valid. Indeed, the primary > function of government is arguably to levy taxes in order to provide public > goods, which are unlikely to be otherwise adequately provided. These public > goods include (but are not limited to) defense from external threats, > police protection to reduce crime, construction of infrastructure, > regulation for safety and environmental protection, generation of knowledge > through research, and standards setting. In each of these cases, some > people benefit more than others, and some pay more than others. Some may be > net losers. Policies in which no one is a net loser (i.e., Pareto > improving) are sometimes possible, but most often are not or are not > pursued. Instead, policies that generate positive total net benefits are > adopted. To compensate net losers, side payments can be made and/or other > issues can be linked. While these arrangements could be called ethically > problematic, they constitute the very core of public policy. In fact, > several of S&I's ethical concerns—including raising revenue from those > opposed to and/or harmed by a policy, arbitrary rules, and the non-identity > problem—could be posed regarding these public goods’ provision. SRM might > be especially complex, in large part because of its global nature, but that > does not make it entirely novel. Other global public goods are promoted > through various international mechanisms (Barrett, 20071. Barrett, S. > (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. Oxford: > Oxford University Press. > > View all references). > The second policy domain posing similar ethical problems is compensation, > particularly in complex situations. Even in a case as simple as accident > liability with a single injurer and a single victim, compensation for > non-economic and irreparable damages is unclear, and compensation clearly > does not grant license for an injurer to harm the victim. In a more complex > example, such as the requested compensation by those born with birth > defects due to their mothers’ use of thalidomide during pregnancy, is it > very uncertain who should pay and how much compensation should be provided. > The third existing policy domain is climate change. In the key passage > cited above, ‘SRM deployment’ could be replaced with ‘mitigation,’ > ‘adaptation,’ and/or ‘compensation for climate change damages’ and the > statement would remain valid. Any climate policy will ‘result in an unequal > distribution of harm and benefit among persons,’ and under all feasible > policies, those who ‘bear little or no responsibility for the problem of > anthropogenic climate change’ will experience some harm. > Specifically, aggressive mitigation would be expensive and, though it > offers some co-benefits, it would hinder economic development, including in > poor countries.1 > 1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse > gases emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions. > Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development. > Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering > economic development in poor countries.View all notes The cause of the > ‘ethical uncertainty’ is not SRM but climate change and greenhouse gas > emissions, whose ethics is discussed thoroughly in the literature. Because > of this, no responses to climate change will be impervious to accusations > of being unjust. However, S&I's implicit ethical divorce of SRM from > climate change has the effect of laying the ethical challenges from climate > change at the feet of SRM. > An additional problematic aspect of S&I is that, to some degree, they > stack the deck against SRM. Regarding its benefits, they fail to emphasize > that SRM appears to hold the potential to greatly reduce climate change > risks to the environment and people, particularly to the world's poor. > Regarding SRM's costs, they cite four ways in which some might be harmed, > each of which is likely to be less severe than they imply. First, SRM would > compensate for temperate and precipitation changes unevenly. Yet almost all > modeling of SRM's probable effects are not optimized but instead use a > determined SRM intensity or one that would return global average > temperature to a preindustrial value. Citing them as indicating certain > likely harms would require that significantly suboptimal SRM policies be > adopted. > The one model that does balance temperature and precipitation across > regions of the globe found that population-weighted Pareto optimal, > globally uniform SRM could compensate for 93% of temperature changes and > 56% of precipitation changes (Moreno-Cruz, Ricke, & Keith, 20124. > Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple model to > account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of solar radiation > management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649–668. > [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] > View all references, p. 660). Second, S&I point to ocean acidification, > but this is not caused by SRM but instead by elevated atmospheric carbon > dioxide. It is simply unaddressed by SRM. Third, they note possible damage > to stratospheric ozone. However, this would be caused by only one proposed > SRM technique (stratospheric aerosol > injection) using one proposed material (sulfate aerosols); other methods > and materials are possible. Furthermore, recent research indicates that > this impact would be small and the harmful consequences (increased > ultraviolet radiation) would be almost entirely offset by the screening of > incoming light by the aerosols (Pitari et al., 20145. > Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., Cionni, I., > … Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to sulfate > geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison > Project (GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 119(5), > 2629–2653. > [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] > View all references). Fourth, if SRM were to suddenly stop, then the > subsequent rapid climate change would be very harmful. But it is not only > SRM which poses risks if not implemented properly. For example, society > could intend optimal mitigation and adaptation yet fail to implement them, > resulting in dangerous climate change. In fact, contemporary society > maintains numerous complex operations whose cessation would result in harm. > For example, the well being of almost all people relies upon continued > global trade powered by fossil fuels, yet we generally do not worry about a > sudden cessation of trade and fossil fuel extraction. Lastly, even if SRM > were to stop, the benefits might still outweigh the costs (Bickel & > Agrawal, 20132. Bickel, J. > E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of aerosol > geoengineering. Climatic Change, 119(3–4), 993–1006. > [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] > View all references). Nevertheless, the authors emphasize that SRM ‘could > result in substantial harm’ (p. 160). This is true in that SRM would pose > risks, but S&I emphasize only the misses while downplaying the hits. > Both SRM and the compensation for its negative secondary effects are > ethically complex. Yet such ‘ethical uncertainty’ generally neither raises > questions of ethical permissibility and nor induces paralysis among policy > makers in other domains such as the provision of public goods, > compensation, and mitigation and adaptation in response to climate change. > SRM is indeed complex and challenging but S&I fail to indicate why its case > should be fundamentally different from these others. A more pragmatic > approach, which asks what policies and avenues of research would be most > likely to offer the greatest benefits, as opposed to one which seeks only > what is problematic, may be more productive. > > Notes > > 1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse > gases emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions. > Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development. > Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering > economic development in poor countries. > > References > > 1. Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global > public goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. > 2. Bickel, J. E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of > aerosol geoengineering. Climatic Change, 119(3–4), 993–1006. > [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] > 3. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., Bretherton, C., Feingold, G., > Forster, P., … Zhang, X. Y. (2013). Clouds and aerosols. In T. > F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, S. K.Allen, J.Boschung… P. > M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. > Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the > Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 571–657). Cambridge: > Cambridge University Press. > 4. Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple model > to account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of solar > radiation management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649–668. > [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] > 5. Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., Cionni, > I., … Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to sulfate > geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison > Project (GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: > Atmospheres, 119(5), 2629–2653. [CrossRef], [Web of Science ®] 6. Svoboda, > T., & Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges in compensating > for harm due to solar radiation management geoengineering. Ethics, Policy > and Environment, 17(2), 157–174. > [Taylor & Francis Online] > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "geoengineering" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. 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