Dear Tony (and all),

Thank you for your thoughts on my response. Based upon what you wrote here, it 
seems that we have more common ground than I initially thought. My purpose in 
bringing up the wide array of socially organized responses to other complex 
problems was to indicate that the challenges to compensation for harm from SRM 
often also apply to these other responses. What is supposed to follow is that, 
regarding socially organized responses in general, "While these arrangements 
could be called ethically problematic, they constitute the very core of public 
policy" and that "such 'ethical uncertainty' generally neither raises questions 
of ethical permissibility and nor induces paralysis among policy makers in 
other domains such as the provision of public goods, compensation, and 
mitigation and adaptation in response to climate change." [This is not to imply 
that you called for paralysis, but such paralysis could be a reader's 
reasonable response to your ethical problematization of compensation for harm 
from SRM.] I also do not mean to imply that compensation for SRM harm can fall 
into only one of two categories: (1) completely novel, or (2) completely not 
novel. There are clearly points between. Yet I was struck by the fact that, to 
the large extent that these ethical challenges which you cited also apply in 
these other social responses, you limited your focus to compensation from SRM 
harm.

With best wishes,
-Jesse

-----------------------------------------
Jesse L. Reynolds
European and International Public Law
Tilburg Sustainability Center
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Book review editor, Law, Innovation, and Technology
email: j.l.reyno...@uvt.nl<mailto:j.l.reyno...@uvt.nl>
http://works.bepress.com/jessreyn/<http://bit.ly/1pa26dY>
http://twitter.com/geoengpolicy<http://bit.ly/1oQBIpR>

From: Toby Svoboda [mailto:tobysvob...@gmail.com]
Sent: 14 August 2014 22:20
To: geoengineering
Cc: Peter Irvine; J.L. Reynolds
Subject: Re: [geo] Response to Svoboda and Irvine, J Reynolds

Hi All,

Interesting discussion. First, regarding intention, much of what has been said 
above is helpful, and I would second Jesse's recommendation of David Morrow's 
paper<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21550085.2014.926056#.U-0WuWP6eyM>
 on doing/allowing and double effect (full disclosure: David and I are 
coauthors on a separate project.)
I appreciate Jesse's commentary on Peter's and my paper (thanks!), and I wanted 
to address some of the points he raises. Jesse suggests that the main problem 
in our paper is that we treat "the shortcomings of SRM and of compensation for 
its potential negative secondary effects as if they were sui generis." But to 
clarify, it is not our view that SRM compensation is a sui generis problem, nor 
do we state that it is in our paper. It may well be true that the ethical 
challenges faced by SRM compensation are already faced in other domains, such 
as socially organized responses to complex problems, other instances of 
compensation provision, and climate change (to take Jesse's examples).

Our claim was that providing compensation for SRM-related harm faces some 
difficult challenges. If Jesse is right, many or all of these same challenges 
arise in other domains, but he does not specify what is supposed to follow from 
this. Our argument is not undermined by the fact (if it is one) that there are 
parallels among these various domains, for the challenges to SRM compensation 
remain challenges even if they are not unique to SRM. Jesse writes that "SRM 
might be especially complex, in large part of its global nature, but that does 
not make it entirely novel." We can agree with this, because we did not claim 
that SRM is entirely novel. Nonetheless, since the issue of SRM compensation is 
particularly complex, it is worth investigating whether we can disentangle the 
many issues involved and reduce uncertainty regarding them.

Jesse also suggests that we "stack the deck against SRM," but I think this is 
due to a misunderstanding of what our paper aims to do. Although we noted 
throughout the paper that SRM could have many benefits, we did not emphasize 
these potential benefits because the issue under investigation was compensation 
provision for harms due to SRM. Of course, this focus would tend to emphasize 
potential harms, since our primary question was how such harms should be 
remunerated. Given that question, it would be odd to emphasize the potential 
benefits of SRM, although we certainly acknowledge them.

It is important to note that Peter and I were not addressing whether some form 
of SRM should be deployed in the future. As we wrote, "We conclude that 
establishing a just SRM compensation system faces severe difficulties. This 
does not necessarily imply that SRM ought never to be deployed, as there might 
be satisfactory ways to resolve these difficulties. Furthermore, even if these 
difficulties are not fully surmounted, it does not necessarily follow that SRM 
deployment would be impermissible." We certainly don't think the challenges of 
SRM compensation should create "paralysis among policy makers," nor that the 
ethical uncertainty involved provides a decisive reason against deployment, but 
we do think these challenges are worth considering. In some future scenario, it 
might be permissible to deploy some form of SRM (as I have argued in other 
published work--see 
here<http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v017/17.2.svoboda.html>),
 but even then we should try to compensate for harm if we can.

Thanks,
Toby Svoboda


On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 1:10 PM, Christopher Preston 
<christopherpreston1...@gmail.com<mailto:christopherpreston1...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:
For those who will be there, there is a session on this issue of intentional 
vs. known/foreseen at CE 14 next week:

INTENTIONAL & UNINTENTIONAL INTERFERENCES IN THE CLIMATE SYSTEM
Conveners:
Harald Stelzer 
(IASS-Potsdam)<http://www.iass-potsdam.de/people/pd-dr-harald-stelzer>
Fabian Schuppert (Queen's University 
Belfast)<http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/InstituteforCollaborativeResearchintheHumanities/StaffProfiles/DrFabianSchuppert/>
Speakers:
David R. Morrow (University of Alabama at 
Birmingham)<http://www.davidmorrow.net/>
Christopher Preston (University of 
Montana)<http://www.humansandnature.org/christopher-preston-scholar-8.php>
Clare Heyward (Warwick 
University)<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/heyward/>
Date:
Wednesday, 20. August 2014 - 9:00 to 10:30
Location:
Pine


On Wednesday, August 13, 2014 7:29:27 AM UTC-6, Josh Horton wrote:
Jesse, thanks for posting the Svoboda and Irvine article as well as all four 
commentaries (including mine!).

The question of intent may be misplaced here, because the standard for 
international liability is usually strict, no-fault liability, which would 
almost certainly apply to SRM in practice.  Under this principle, the key issue 
is causation/attribution, not intent.  Attribution will likely be difficult, 
but not impossible -- methods like Fraction Attributable Risk are making 
headway on this front.

Josh

On Wednesday, August 13, 2014 4:00:53 AM UTC-4, Jesse Reynolds wrote:
My response is one of four to Svoboda and Irvine. In the same issue, there is 
also a relevant target article by David Morrow 'Starting a flood to stop a 
fire? Some moral constraints on solar radiation management' with five 
responses. All are at
http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cepe21/17/2

I am unsure of the unstated rules regarding posting articles which are behind 
firewalls. [If anyone knows, please clarify.] Here I am attaching Svoboda and 
Irvine and its responses. [I hope that this does not overstep the bounds of 
sharing.] I would be glad to share David's and those responses if anyone wishes 
and it is OK.

There are a few other recent and forthcoming articles on compensation. I am 
working on one. See also
Clare Heyward, "Benefitting from Climate Geoengineering and Corresponding 
Remedial Duties: The Case of Unforeseeable Harms," Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, (2014)
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/japp.12075/abstract

Cheers,
-Jesse

-----------------------------------------
Jesse L. Reynolds
European and International Public Law
Tilburg Sustainability Center
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Book review editor, Law, Innovation, and Technology
email: j.l.re...@uvt.nl<mailto:j.l.re...@uvt.nl>
http://works.bepress.com/jessreyn/

-----Original Message-----
From: geoengi...@googlegroups.com<mailto:geoengi...@googlegroups.com> 
[mailto:geoengi...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Andrew Lockley
Sent: 12 August 2014 19:21
To: geoengineering
Subject: [geo] Response to Svoboda and Irvine, J Reynolds

Ethics, Policy & Environment
Volume 17, Issue 2, 2014

Response to Svoboda and Irvine

Full access
DOI:10.1080/21550085.2014.926080 Jesse Reynolds Published online: 08 Aug 2014

In this issue, Svoboda and Irvine (Svoboda & Irvine, 20146. Svoboda, T., & 
Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges in compensating for harm 
due to solar radiation management geoengineering. Ethics, Policy and 
Environment, 17(2), 157-174.
[Taylor & Francis Online]
View all references) offer the most in-depth consideration thus far of possible 
compensation for harm from solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering. 
This topic is indeed treacherous terrain, pulling together multiple complex 
debates, ethical and otherwise. Their description of the technical challenges 
to determining damages and causation in particular are illuminating. The reader 
cannot help, though, but be left with the sense that both SRM and compensation 
are futile efforts, bound to do more harm than good.
Before proceeding, throughout any consideration of geoengineering, one must 
always bear in mind that it is under consideration as a possible complementary 
response (along with greenhouse gas emissions reductions-or 'mitigation'-and 
adaptation) to climate change. Climate change poses risks to the environment 
and humans, among whom the world's poor are the most vulnerable. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently concluded that 'Models 
consistently suggest that SRM would generally reduce climate differences 
compared to a world with elevated greenhouse gas concentrations and no SRM ...'
(Boucher et al., 20133. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., Bretherton, C., 
Feingold, G., Forster, P., ... Zhang, X. Y. (2013).
Clouds and aerosols. In T. F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, S. 
K.Allen, J.Boschung... P. M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The physical 
science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 571-657). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.

View all references, p. 575). Therefore, SRM has the potential to reduce harm 
to the environment and humans, particularly to already disadvantaged groups. 
However, SRM is imperfect.
The primary problem with S&I's analysis is that they treat the shortcomings of 
SRM and of compensation for its potential negative secondary effects as if they 
were sui generis. In fact, these cited shortcomings are found among three 
existing policy domains, which happen to intersect at the proposed compensation 
for SRM's harms. The first such policy domain is socially organized responses 
to other complex problems, and the provision of public goods in particular. In 
a key passage, S&I write that 'The potential for SRM deployment to result in an 
unequal distribution of harm and benefit among persons raises a serious ethical 
challenge. It seems deeply unfair to adopt a climate change strategy that 
benefits some at the expense of harming others. This is especially the case if 
those harmed bear little or no responsibility for the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change' (pp.
160-161). One could replace the phrases 'SRM deployment' and 'a climate change 
strategy' (and skip the final specific sentence, for
now) with references to almost any socially organized response to a complex 
problem, and the statement would remain valid. Indeed, the primary function of 
government is arguably to levy taxes in order to provide public goods, which 
are unlikely to be otherwise adequately provided. These public goods include 
(but are not limited to) defense from external threats, police protection to 
reduce crime, construction of infrastructure, regulation for safety and 
environmental protection, generation of knowledge through research, and 
standards setting. In each of these cases, some people benefit more than 
others, and some pay more than others. Some may be net losers. Policies in 
which no one is a net loser (i.e., Pareto improving) are sometimes possible, 
but most often are not or are not pursued. Instead, policies that generate 
positive total net benefits are adopted. To compensate net losers, side 
payments can be made and/or other issues can be linked. While these 
arrangements could be called ethically problematic, they constitute the very 
core of public policy. In fact, several of S&I's ethical concerns-including 
raising revenue from those opposed to and/or harmed by a policy, arbitrary 
rules, and the non-identity problem-could be posed regarding these public 
goods' provision. SRM might be especially complex, in large part because of its 
global nature, but that does not make it entirely novel. Other global public 
goods are promoted through various international mechanisms (Barrett, 20071. 
Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all references).
The second policy domain posing similar ethical problems is compensation, 
particularly in complex situations. Even in a case as simple as accident 
liability with a single injurer and a single victim, compensation for 
non-economic and irreparable damages is unclear, and compensation clearly does 
not grant license for an injurer to harm the victim. In a more complex example, 
such as the requested compensation by those born with birth defects due to 
their mothers' use of thalidomide during pregnancy, is it very uncertain who 
should pay and how much compensation should be provided.
The third existing policy domain is climate change. In the key passage cited 
above, 'SRM deployment' could be replaced with 'mitigation,'
'adaptation,' and/or 'compensation for climate change damages' and the 
statement would remain valid. Any climate policy will 'result in an unequal 
distribution of harm and benefit among persons,' and under all feasible 
policies, those who 'bear little or no responsibility for the problem of 
anthropogenic climate change' will experience some harm.
Specifically, aggressive mitigation would be expensive and, though it offers 
some co-benefits, it would hinder economic development, including in poor 
countries.1
1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse gases 
emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development.
Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering economic 
development in poor countries.View all notes The cause of the 'ethical 
uncertainty' is not SRM but climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, whose 
ethics is discussed thoroughly in the literature. Because of this, no responses 
to climate change will be impervious to accusations of being unjust. However, 
S&I's implicit ethical divorce of SRM from climate change has the effect of 
laying the ethical challenges from climate change at the feet of SRM.
An additional problematic aspect of S&I is that, to some degree, they stack the 
deck against SRM. Regarding its benefits, they fail to emphasize that SRM 
appears to hold the potential to greatly reduce climate change risks to the 
environment and people, particularly to the world's poor. Regarding SRM's 
costs, they cite four ways in which some might be harmed, each of which is 
likely to be less severe than they imply. First, SRM would compensate for 
temperate and precipitation changes unevenly. Yet almost all modeling of SRM's 
probable effects are not optimized but instead use a determined SRM intensity 
or one that would return global average temperature to a preindustrial value. 
Citing them as indicating certain likely harms would require that significantly 
suboptimal SRM policies be adopted.
The one model that does balance temperature and precipitation across regions of 
the globe found that population-weighted Pareto optimal, globally uniform SRM 
could compensate for 93% of temperature changes and 56% of precipitation 
changes (Moreno-Cruz, Ricke, & Keith, 20124.
Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple model to 
account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of solar radiation 
management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649-668.
[CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)]
View all references, p. 660). Second, S&I point to ocean acidification, but 
this is not caused by SRM but instead by elevated atmospheric carbon dioxide. 
It is simply unaddressed by SRM. Third, they note possible damage to 
stratospheric ozone. However, this would be caused by only one proposed SRM 
technique (stratospheric aerosol
injection) using one proposed material (sulfate aerosols); other methods and 
materials are possible. Furthermore, recent research indicates that this impact 
would be small and the harmful consequences (increased ultraviolet radiation) 
would be almost entirely offset by the screening of incoming light by the 
aerosols (Pitari et al., 20145.
Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., Cionni, I., ... 
Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to sulfate
geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project 
(GeoMIP). Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, 119(5), 2629-2653.
[CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)]
View all references). Fourth, if SRM were to suddenly stop, then the subsequent 
rapid climate change would be very harmful. But it is not only SRM which poses 
risks if not implemented properly. For example, society could intend optimal 
mitigation and adaptation yet fail to implement them, resulting in dangerous 
climate change. In fact, contemporary society maintains numerous complex 
operations whose cessation would result in harm. For example, the well being of 
almost all people relies upon continued global trade powered by fossil fuels, 
yet we generally do not worry about a sudden cessation of trade and fossil fuel 
extraction. Lastly, even if SRM were to stop, the benefits might still outweigh 
the costs (Bickel & Agrawal, 20132. Bickel, J.
E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of aerosol geoengineering. 
Climatic Change, 119(3-4), 993-1006.
[CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)]
View all references). Nevertheless, the authors emphasize that SRM 'could 
result in substantial harm' (p. 160). This is true in that SRM would pose 
risks, but S&I emphasize only the misses while downplaying the hits.
Both SRM and the compensation for its negative secondary effects are ethically 
complex. Yet such 'ethical uncertainty' generally neither raises questions of 
ethical permissibility and nor induces paralysis among policy makers in other 
domains such as the provision of public goods, compensation, and mitigation and 
adaptation in response to climate change. SRM is indeed complex and challenging 
but S&I fail to indicate why its case should be fundamentally different from 
these others. A more pragmatic approach, which asks what policies and avenues 
of research would be most likely to offer the greatest benefits, as opposed to 
one which seeks only what is problematic, may be more productive.

Notes

1 Developing countries account for the majority of current greenhouse gases 
emissions and the large majority of projected future emissions.
Fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic development.
Aggressive mitigation would reduce fossil fuel combustion, hindering economic 
development in poor countries.

References

1. Barrett, S. (2007). Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public 
goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Bickel, J. E., & Agrawal, S. (2013). Reexamining the economics of aerosol 
geoengineering. Climatic Change, 119(3-4), 993-1006.
[CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)]
3. Boucher, O., Randall, D., Artaxo, D., Bretherton, C., Feingold, G., Forster, 
P., ... Zhang, X. Y. (2013). Clouds and aerosols. In T.
F.Stocker, D.Qin, G. -K.Plattner, M.Tignor, S. K.Allen, J.Boschung... P.
M. Midgley (Eds.), Climate change 2013: The physical science basis.
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (pp. 571-657). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
4. Moreno-Cruz, J. B., Ricke, K. L., & Keith, D. W. (2012). A simple model to 
account for regional inequalities in the effectiveness of solar radiation 
management. Climatic Change, 110(3), 649-668.
[CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)]
5. Pitari, G., Aquila, V., Kravitz, B., Robock, A., Watanabe, S., Cionni, I., 
... Tilmes, S. (2014). Stratospheric ozone response to sulfate geoengineering: 
Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP). Journal 
of Geophysical Research:
Atmospheres, 119(5), 2629-2653. [CrossRef], [Web of Science (r)] 6. Svoboda, 
T., & Irvine, P. (2014). Ethical and technical challenges in compensating for 
harm due to solar radiation management geoengineering. Ethics, Policy and 
Environment, 17(2), 157-174.
[Taylor & Francis Online]

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Toby Svoboda
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Fairfield University
1073 N. Benson Rd.
Fairfield, CT 06824

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