On Wed, 1 Nov 2000, Derek D. Martin wrote:
> > 1) Security through Obscurity has it's place in any well-defined
> > security model. It is by no means the best or most effective measure,
> > but making things hard to find or even annoyingly hard to manuver is a
> > first-tier deterant.
>
> Like the Club. A pro can easily get it off, but it takes more time... so
> if there's another car just like yours a row or two up that doesn't have
> one, (in theory) he'll go after that one instead, because it's easier.
Oops, wasn't done. What I meant to point out is that this is actually a
counter-example. it will stop the script kiddies, but not the pros. One
of the reasons the pros do it is for the challenge. They'll try to get in
without setting off your bells and whistles, and leave your system without
a trace of their presence.
If you take appropriate precautions, you should be able to prevent them
from achieving their goals. If you rely on one system to be secure
though, you haven't done enough. If you're really paranoid, you'll want
to do things like log to a second system connected by serial port with no
means of being accessed from the first system (in theory -- they are
connected via serial link so it is theoretically possible they'd find a
way in through that).
I'm kinda rambling here but the main point is that no system which is
connected to another system is ever completely secure. The best you can
do is manage your level of risk.
--
We sometimes catch a window, a glimpse of what's beyond
Was it just imagination stringing us along?
------------------------------------------------
Derek Martin | Unix/Linux geek
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | GnuPG Key ID: 81CFE75D
Retrieve my public key at http://pgp.mit.edu
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