Many thanks for implementing and describing the processing Mauro. If after the interim, the WG wants to pursue mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, and you're okay with it, I propose this example gets documented as an Internet-Draft, so that there is common documentation to follow. Plus it can be further security reviewed, and can exactly specify the key format. Thanks again. -Wei
On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 7:41 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro= [email protected]> wrote: > > > > One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop > experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite > mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512. This choice should be discussed > at the interim Wednesday. > > -Wei > > > Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim: > > I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library > behind Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to > draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07. It is available for interop testing in the > mail-auth playground at https://mail-auth.stalw.art, where you can > generate keys, sign and verify messages with rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256 and > mldsa44-ed25519-sha512. I am happy to share keys and test messages with > anyone who wants to try it against their own implementation. > > On the "implementing your own crypto" concern: I did not have to implement > any primitive myself. ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 come from AWS-LC (and, in a > second backend, from the RustCrypto ml-dsa and ed25519-dalek crates). The > composite part from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs is only the > construction of M' (a fixed prefix, the label, the context length and > context, and the SHA-512 pre-hash) plus splitting and concatenating keys > and signatures. Both backends pass the test vectors in Appendix E of the > LAMPS draft. The one library feature it needs is pure ML-DSA with a > caller-supplied context string, since the LAMPS label is used as the ML-DSA > context. AWS-LC supports that in its C API, although the aws-lc-rs wrapper > does not expose it yet, so I call AWS-LC directly for that step. OpenSSL > has the same building blocks: it has no composite algorithm as such, but > OpenSSL 3.6 signs and verifies pure ML-DSA-44 with a caller-supplied > context string (for example "openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin -p > keyopt context-string:COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512"), so the composite > can be built on it in the same way. Performance is not a concern either: on > my machine a composite signature takes about 46 microseconds to sign and 30 > microseconds to verify with AWS-LC, against about 18 microseconds for an > Ed25519 verification. > > While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open. I > think they need answers whichever PQ algorithm the group picks, because > most of them apply to a plain mldsa44-sha512 as well. > > 1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash > over all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in > Section 12.8 using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg. It signs the hash > with both the "post-quantum" MLDSA-44 algorithm [FIPS-204] and the > PureEdDSA variant Ed25519 (see [RFC8032])." That mirrors Section 3.3 and > does not cite LAMPS; only dns-01 says the algorithm "is specified in" the > LAMPS draft, and lists it as an informative reference. I can see three > readings that do not interoperate: > > a. The LAMPS composite, where its message M is the Section 12.8 signing > input, and the SHA-512 in Section 3.4 is the LAMPS pre-hash computed > outside the signer (LAMPS Section 10.5, External Pre-hashing). The input is > hashed once. > > b. The LAMPS composite, where M is the SHA-512 digest of the Section > 12.8 input, by analogy with Section 3.3. M' then contains > SHA-512(SHA-512(input)). > > c. No LAMPS combiner: plain ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 each sign the digest > and the two values are concatenated. > > I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft > and avoids hashing twice. It is also the "pre-hashed input model" from > Wei's threat model statement, which LAMPS explicitly allows. For a plain > mldsa44-sha512 the equivalent question is whether pure ML-DSA signs the > SHA-512 digest (as Ed25519 does in Section 3.3) or whether HashML-DSA is > meant. Either way, a sentence stating exactly what bytes are passed to the > signature primitive would remove the ambiguity. > > 2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for > the composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use. > Plain ML-DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for > example "DKIM2") for domain separation, or is empty deliberate? > > 3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is the > 1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public key, > not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01 together > with LAMPS Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in dns-01 > Appendix A, it would help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed for the > new key types. > > If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on my > side is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so > there is something to interop against. > > > Best, > Mauro > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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