Hi Wei,

Yes, I'm okay with that. If the group decides to go with 
mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, documenting the processing in an Internet-Draft makes 
sense.

Unfortunately I wasn't able to join the interim meeting, but I'll catch up with 
the emails on the list now.


Best,
Mauro

> On 21 Oct 2026, at 06:46, Wei Chuang <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
> Many thanks for implementing and describing the processing Mauro.  If after 
> the interim, the WG wants to pursue mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, and you're okay 
> with it, I propose this example gets documented as an Internet-Draft, so that 
> there is common documentation to follow.  Plus it can be further security 
> reviewed, and can exactly specify the key format.  Thanks again.
> -Wei
> 
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 7:41 AM Mauro De Gennaro 
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> > One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop 
>> > experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite 
>> > mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512.   This choice should be 
>> > discussed at the interim Wednesday.  
>> > -Wei
>> 
>> 
>> Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim:
>> 
>> I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library 
>> behind Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to 
>> draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07. It is available for interop testing in the 
>> mail-auth playground at https://mail-auth.stalw.art 
>> <https://mail-auth.stalw.art/>, where you can generate keys, sign and verify 
>> messages with rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256 and mldsa44-ed25519-sha512. I am 
>> happy to share keys and test messages with anyone who wants to try it 
>> against their own implementation.
>> 
>> On the "implementing your own crypto" concern: I did not have to implement 
>> any primitive myself. ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 come from AWS-LC (and, in a 
>> second backend, from the RustCrypto ml-dsa and ed25519-dalek crates). The 
>> composite part from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs is only the 
>> construction of M' (a fixed prefix, the label, the context length and 
>> context, and the SHA-512 pre-hash) plus splitting and concatenating keys and 
>> signatures. Both backends pass the test vectors in Appendix E of the LAMPS 
>> draft. The one library feature it needs is pure ML-DSA with a 
>> caller-supplied context string, since the LAMPS label is used as the ML-DSA 
>> context. AWS-LC supports that in its C API, although the aws-lc-rs wrapper 
>> does not expose it yet, so I call AWS-LC directly for that step. OpenSSL has 
>> the same building blocks: it has no composite algorithm as such, but OpenSSL 
>> 3.6 signs and verifies pure ML-DSA-44 with a caller-supplied context string 
>> (for example "openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin -p
>>  keyopt context-string:COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512"), so the composite 
>> can be built on it in the same way. Performance is not a concern either: on 
>> my machine a composite signature takes about 46 microseconds to sign and 30 
>> microseconds to verify with AWS-LC, against about 18 microseconds for an 
>> Ed25519 verification.
>> 
>> While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open. I 
>> think they need answers whichever PQ algorithm the group picks, because most 
>> of them apply to a plain mldsa44-sha512 as well.
>> 
>> 1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash 
>> over all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in 
>> Section 12.8 using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg. It signs the hash 
>> with both the "post-quantum" MLDSA-44 algorithm [FIPS-204] and the PureEdDSA 
>> variant Ed25519 (see [RFC8032])." That mirrors Section 3.3 and does not cite 
>> LAMPS; only dns-01 says the algorithm "is specified in" the LAMPS draft, and 
>> lists it as an informative reference. I can see three readings that do not 
>> interoperate:
>> 
>>    a. The LAMPS composite, where its message M is the Section 12.8 signing 
>> input, and the SHA-512 in Section 3.4 is the LAMPS pre-hash computed outside 
>> the signer (LAMPS Section 10.5, External Pre-hashing). The input is hashed 
>> once.
>> 
>>    b. The LAMPS composite, where M is the SHA-512 digest of the Section 12.8 
>> input, by analogy with Section 3.3. M' then contains SHA-512(SHA-512(input)).
>> 
>>    c. No LAMPS combiner: plain ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 each sign the digest 
>> and the two values are concatenated.
>> 
>>    I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft and 
>> avoids hashing twice. It is also the "pre-hashed input model" from Wei's 
>> threat model statement, which LAMPS explicitly allows. For a plain 
>> mldsa44-sha512 the equivalent question is whether pure ML-DSA signs the 
>> SHA-512 digest (as Ed25519 does in Section 3.3) or whether HashML-DSA is 
>> meant. Either way, a sentence stating exactly what bytes are passed to the 
>> signature primitive would remove the ambiguity.
>> 
>> 2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for 
>> the composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use. 
>> Plain ML-DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for 
>> example "DKIM2") for domain separation, or is empty deliberate?
>> 
>> 3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is the 
>> 1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public key, 
>> not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01 together 
>> with LAMPS Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in dns-01 
>> Appendix A, it would help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed for the 
>> new key types.
>> 
>> If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on my 
>> side is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so there 
>> is something to interop against.
>> 
>> 
>> Best,
>> Mauro
>> 
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