Thanks Mauro.  As I recall the main direction
<https://meetecho-player.ietf.org/playout/?session=IETF-DKIM-20261021-2000>
seems to be supporting multiple signatures for handling the composite
structure.  How that would be done wasn't resolved.  I suspect this will
all come back for another round of discussion at IETF-127.
-Wei

On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 10:46 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro=
[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi Wei,
>
> Yes, I'm okay with that. If the group decides to go with
> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, documenting the processing in an Internet-Draft
> makes sense.
>
> Unfortunately I wasn't able to join the interim meeting, but I'll catch up
> with the emails on the list now.
>
>
> Best,
> Mauro
>
> On 21 Oct 2026, at 06:46, Wei Chuang <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> Many thanks for implementing and describing the processing Mauro.  If
> after the interim, the WG wants to pursue mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, and
> you're okay with it, I propose this example gets documented as an
> Internet-Draft, so that there is common documentation to follow.  Plus it
> can be further security reviewed, and can exactly specify the key format.
> Thanks again.
> -Wei
>
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 7:41 AM Mauro De Gennaro <mauro=
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop
>> experiment with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite
>> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or mldsa44-sha512.   This choice should be discussed
>> at the interim Wednesday.
>> > -Wei
>>
>>
>> Some implementation experience that may help before Wednesday's interim:
>>
>> I have implemented mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 in mail-auth, the Rust library
>> behind Stalwart's DKIM2 support, as part of updating it to
>> draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07. It is available for interop testing in the
>> mail-auth playground at https://mail-auth.stalw.art, where you can
>> generate keys, sign and verify messages with rsa-sha256, ed25519-sha256 and
>> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512. I am happy to share keys and test messages with
>> anyone who wants to try it against their own implementation.
>>
>> On the "implementing your own crypto" concern: I did not have to
>> implement any primitive myself. ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 come from AWS-LC
>> (and, in a second backend, from the RustCrypto ml-dsa and ed25519-dalek
>> crates). The composite part from draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs is only
>> the construction of M' (a fixed prefix, the label, the context length and
>> context, and the SHA-512 pre-hash) plus splitting and concatenating keys
>> and signatures. Both backends pass the test vectors in Appendix E of the
>> LAMPS draft. The one library feature it needs is pure ML-DSA with a
>> caller-supplied context string, since the LAMPS label is used as the ML-DSA
>> context. AWS-LC supports that in its C API, although the aws-lc-rs wrapper
>> does not expose it yet, so I call AWS-LC directly for that step. OpenSSL
>> has the same building blocks: it has no composite algorithm as such, but
>> OpenSSL 3.6 signs and verifies pure ML-DSA-44 with a caller-supplied
>> context string (for example "openssl pkeyutl -sign -rawin -p
>>  keyopt context-string:COMPSIG-MLDSA44-Ed25519-SHA512"), so the composite
>> can be built on it in the same way. Performance is not a concern either: on
>> my machine a composite signature takes about 46 microseconds to sign and 30
>> microseconds to verify with AWS-LC, against about 18 microseconds for an
>> Ed25519 verification.
>>
>> While implementing it I found some points the current texts leave open. I
>> think they need answers whichever PQ algorithm the group picks, because
>> most of them apply to a plain mldsa44-sha512 as well.
>>
>> 1. What is signed. Section 3.4 of -07 says the algorithm "computes a hash
>> over all the Message-Instance and DKIM2-Signature fields as described in
>> Section 12.8 using SHA-512 [FIPS-180-4] as the hash-alg. It signs the hash
>> with both the "post-quantum" MLDSA-44 algorithm [FIPS-204] and the
>> PureEdDSA variant Ed25519 (see [RFC8032])." That mirrors Section 3.3 and
>> does not cite LAMPS; only dns-01 says the algorithm "is specified in" the
>> LAMPS draft, and lists it as an informative reference. I can see three
>> readings that do not interoperate:
>>
>>    a. The LAMPS composite, where its message M is the Section 12.8
>> signing input, and the SHA-512 in Section 3.4 is the LAMPS pre-hash
>> computed outside the signer (LAMPS Section 10.5, External Pre-hashing). The
>> input is hashed once.
>>
>>    b. The LAMPS composite, where M is the SHA-512 digest of the Section
>> 12.8 input, by analogy with Section 3.3. M' then contains
>> SHA-512(SHA-512(input)).
>>
>>    c. No LAMPS combiner: plain ML-DSA-44 and Ed25519 each sign the digest
>> and the two values are concatenated.
>>
>>    I implemented (a), which matches Richard's pointer to the LAMPS draft
>> and avoids hashing twice. It is also the "pre-hashed input model" from
>> Wei's threat model statement, which LAMPS explicitly allows. For a plain
>> mldsa44-sha512 the equivalent question is whether pure ML-DSA signs the
>> SHA-512 digest (as Ed25519 does in Section 3.3) or whether HashML-DSA is
>> meant. Either way, a sentence stating exactly what bytes are passed to the
>> signature primitive would remove the ambiguity.
>>
>> 2. Context string. Neither draft specifies an application context, so for
>> the composite the LAMPS default (empty) applies, and that is what I use.
>> Plain ML-DSA also takes a context string. Should DKIM2 define one (for
>> example "DKIM2") for domain separation, or is empty deliberate?
>>
>> 3. Key encoding. I publish the raw composite public key in p=, that is
>> the 1312-byte ML-DSA-44 public key followed by the 32-byte Ed25519 public
>> key, not a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure, which is how I read dns-01
>> together with LAMPS Sections 4.1 and 5. Given the RSA format errata in
>> dns-01 Appendix A, it would help to say explicitly whether SPKI is allowed
>> for the new key types.
>>
>> If the interim decides to go with plain ML-DSA-44 instead, adding it on
>> my side is a small change, and I will add it to the playground as well so
>> there is something to interop against.
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Mauro
>>
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