It appears that Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]> said: >Therefore, the signal can only be in the DNS datra for the indicated >selector, which needs to commit to a *set* of signature algorithms. > >The validator can then expect all those signature algorithms to be >present, and can validate any desired subset of the ones it supports. > >This is a "soft" AND, in that the validator MAY choose to check them all >(and consider the message unsigned if any are invalid), or MAY choose to >check whichever subset it considers strong enough, while ignoring weaker >signatures. > >Validators that don't support a given algorithm simply ignore that >signature, and check some subset of the signatures they support.
That seems reasonable, but ... >For this to work the DNS record needs to be modified to carry a >commitment to multiple key algorithms, the simplest approach is >to support multiple TXT records in the response RRset: We would really like to keep the DNS records for DKIM2 backward compatible and DKIM only has one key per selector. The current plan is for the DKIM2-Signature header to allow multiple selectors to do multiple signatures, but that still allows the rewrite using broken algorithms. On the other hand, if the recipient only handles the broken one and hasn't been updated to handle a new strong one, we're still in the same place. I still think that we should say "don't use broken algorithms." It seems unlikely that DKIM will be a target of PQC unless the PQC is extremely cheap, so there's time to tell people to upgrade. R's, John _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
