On Sun, Oct 25, 2026 at 09:53:47PM -0400, John Levine wrote:

> I still think that we should say "don't use broken algorithms."
> It seems unlikely that DKIM will be a target of PQC unless the PQC is
> extremely cheap, so there's time to tell people to upgrade.

On closer inspection this is an argument against the need for downgrade
protection.  By hypothesis it will be possible to phase out weakened
algorithms before exploiting them becomes cost-effective in DKIM.

Perhaps that's true, but it is a bet that a commitment can avoid.  A
separate selector for DKIM2 key material avoids any cross-protocol
issues with DKIM1.  The signatures are separate in the message, almost
everything else is different about the protocol, with many second system
bells and whistles, it is unclear why the selectors need to be the same.

[ Breaking Bcc privacy by requiring envelope recipient signatures, and
  the "recipe" goop to recover original message content, all in the name
  of replay protection is a bridge too far, but that's a separate set of
  topics. ]

-- 
    Viktor.  🇺🇦 Слава Україні!
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