Can you add Fran Parker as an individual please.
Thanks.
Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
Added. Thank you!
NK
On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 10:18 PM, Martin Johnson<[email protected]>wrote:
GreatFire.org would like to sign. Thanks very much for doing this.
Martin Johnson
Founder
https://GreatFire.org - Monitoring Online Censorship In China.
https://FreeWeibo.com - Uncensored, Anonymous Sina Weibo Search.
https://Unblock.cn.com - We Can Unblock Your Website In China.
On Sat, Jan 19, 2013 at 8:56 AM, Nadim Kobeissi<[email protected]> wrote:
Amazing :)
Thanks for your support, everyone!
NK
On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Petter Ericson<[email protected]>wrote:
Hi!
Good work :)
First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should
probably lose the hyphen.
Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this
letter :)
Best regards
/P
On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote:
Okay everyone,
the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious
collaboration
of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your
signature there (or add it!)
http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
We'll be publishing next week.
NK
On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget<[email protected]>
wrote:
We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first
but Reporters
Without Borders<http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it.
Best,
Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit :
Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process
of
reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take
what you
said into consideration.
NK
On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian<
[email protected]>wrote:
You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government
surveillance section:
As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it
may
now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being
headquartered
in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication
provider,
Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive
practice of
National Security Letters.
You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the
people
signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have
access to
real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so,
say that,
and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it
doesn't
specify under what situations the government can perform an
interception,
Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance
practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't
require
a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications
metadata). I
would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance
law
does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US
persons,
and in particular, the government can intercept such communications
without
even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically,
non-US
persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008
section 702
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified
as 50
U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of
non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering
intelligence for a
period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains
restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may
not
intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to
be
located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney
General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order
("mass
acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint
authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a
procedure by
which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from
FISC for
their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is
designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the
United
States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify
targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider
individualized
probable cause determinations or supervise the program.
(from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/)
While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to
sign
on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU.
On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi<[email protected]>
wrote:
Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists,
I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to
Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as
signatories:
http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome.
Thank you,
NK
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New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias
Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières
@fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr
GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE
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Telecomix Sleeper Jellyfish
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