On Jun 29, 2013, at 12:26 AM, Ali-Reza Anghaie <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 29, 2013 at 1:52 AM, Alireza Mahdian > <[email protected]> wrote: >> I really hope all your other facts are not based on this link you sent. as >> Matt rightfully put it we don't know the kind of cipher that was used it >> could have been a very primitive one. you are making a very bold statement >> based on a very incomplete data. it is as if you are claiming that if one > > Actually the link and data do not say - nor was it her assertion - > that they attacked the crypto itself. And that goes back to the whole > of her original response (which was a broader call to arms / > perspective). Many are often missing the broader picture on how these > systems are attacked by capable bodies and Governments if that is, > indeed, one of the adversary bodies you've identified. > >> pointed out that it does not even aim for it. As the creator of MyZone I did >> not felt the need for unlinkability as deniability is provided to a needed >> degree. You probably are not going to give my app even a try but I would >> certainly give your "Bullet proof" solution if it ever sees the light of the >> day a try and read its documentation in full before criticizing it. I have > > I think you're jumping to conclusions much the same way you suggest > any question to you is. Your first response to any input was "this is > to prevent modifications that would render it as a malware" in regards > to the Open Source aspect. Which makes no sense - at all. It's not > even defensible. You could include a license with your codebase that > has nothing to do with the offered service as-is. > > So take a step back and, seriously, ask yourself did you want input or > did you just want praise? ******* This is a very unfair thing to say that's all I am going to respond to your message. Cheers Ali. >> tried SO MANY of these solutions that you mentioned in a very restrictive >> environment (I come from Iran and I have first hand experience on whatever >> you are mentioning here) and trust me they are often so slow (you have to >> consider dial up bandwidth) that you prefer to avoid them in the first >> place. I will consider any "constructive" criticism of my work and >> appreciate it very much but telling me that I have solved the "wrong" >> problem is just your opinion. I certainly wouldn't consider my self such >> expert enough in the field to make a blunt statement like that towards >> anybody's work. I will not respond to any of your comments from this point >> on until I see reasonable signs that you have read my thesis and at the very >> least understand my design choices. I owe you a thank you for the time you >> have put to write those emails regarding my work. > > Wait - are you telling someone not to make such bold statements while > making.. wait for it.. a number of your own? > > Also - as an Iranian transplant with continued involvement I'm not at > all sure you can relate those circumstances as comprehensive to the > rest of the world. Actually - I'd say you flat-out can't. It's not > even that homogenous within Iran anymore. > > Usability is a BIG debate point on the list - often - with some of us > (myself included) feeling that falling within a broken system and > being covered by regular "noise" is often better than an unusable > system. > > However - going back to what you started with - you asserted a context > within current events and against Government. That has a big weighty > goal attached to it and raises hackles. > > So let's all start over. > > Hello Alireza. I'm.. err. Ali-Reza. Congratulations on your recent > Doctorate and welcome to Libtech. > > Cheers, -Ali > > >> >> On Jun 28, 2013, at 11:28 PM, Matt Johnson <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Well that is good news, thanks for the pointer! >> >> Now all we need is for the court to report what cipher and which >> encryption tools were used... >> >> -- >> Matt Johnson >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Eleanor Saitta <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> Hash: SHA256 >> >> On 2013.06.29 01.18, Matt Johnson wrote: >> >> " Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap for the first time >> ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for non-intelligence domestic US >> wiretaps), and has only ever worked five times." >> >> What are you referring to? Do you have a pointer to more >> information? I am very curious. >> >> >> http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx#sa5 >> >> E. >> >> - -- >> Ideas are my favorite toys. >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >> Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) >> >> iF4EAREIAAYFAlHObssACgkQQwkE2RkM0wpJvgD9FMiYpwatSomo+sCOr2JQxPnU >> nUC3+yZzHJ1Uyh1+23gA/0tijTIRQnh5kZzIP9Fw6uUm9JiweuRXSv4mHhhPC/Gq >> =Lw8s >> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >> >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> >> >> -- >> Alireza Mahdian >> Department of Computer Science >> University of Colorado at Boulder >> Email: [email protected] >> >> >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by > emailing moderator at [email protected] or changing your settings at > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Alireza Mahdian Department of Computer Science University of Colorado at Boulder Email: [email protected]
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