>On Wed, Jan 13, 1999 at 08:23:06PM +1200, Joop Teernstra wrote:
>>
>> Arguably any majority decision may be unrfair. But at least it will be
>> known to be a majority decision, which is an argument in itself.
>> Why is it that you think individual members cannot make good and fair
>> decisions for themselves?
>
>Because history teaches that they don't. Majority voting is
>intrinsically unfair to minorities, and no system will work that
>doesn't have some kind of control over the "Tyranny of the
>Majority".
>
Kent,
That you do not believe that (popular) democracy is a good system is your privilege.
I am glad you spell it out, at least.
Indeed, most systems do have "some kind of control" by a minority over the majority.
This is tolerated, until it gets too badly skewed. Then a good system provides for relief. (loss of office, fresh elections, etc.)
>> With consituencies, arguably 50 registries, 150 registrars and 10 TM
>> interests could outvote
>> 1000 DN holders.
>
>But, arguably, the 210 here have *far* more at stake than the 1000:
>We vote on whether a gladiator will live or die. It's entertainment
>to the crowd; life or death to the gladiator; everybody gets one
>vote. As a potential gladiator, would you agree to that decision
>procedure? As a registry, would you put your business in a position
>where the crowd decides how you run your business? Of course not.
>Nobody who has ever run a business would *ever* agree to such an
>arrangement, and, believe me, the registries are not.
>
Charming analogy. Yet, most utilities operate under contraints of democratic (government) supervision to a degree that is a consequence of their natural monopoly. Arguably , they too may have more at stake than their customers, yet, the public interest prevails.
They have learned to live with it, I think.
And in some cases a single DN holder (say Amazon.co.cc) could have more at stake than a puny TLD registry.
Funny, from our arguments those who wouldn't know might think that *I* am the government official and *you* the businessman, instead of the other way round. <g>
>> >I personally think a "Bill of Rights" model that protects NSI in this
>> >case is the best solution. However, it isn't the solution preferred
>> >by the groups that have concerns -- eg registrars and registries.
>> >And it does have the problem of coming up with the appropriate Bill
>> >of Rights.
>> >
>> A BoR protecting NSI. :-)
>> I had not though of a Bill of Rights in those terms. This is why I asked
>> you to post your Montererrey Paper on a BoR, so that we can see what our
>> idea's of a BoR may have in common.
>> Could you please do it, Kent?
>
>It is appended to this message. I used the term "Constitutional
>Protections", as the "Bill of Rights" terminology is, I think,
>somewhat US-centric.
>
No, Kent, you used the term constitutional protections, because you mean "constituency protections". They have nothing in common with what I think of as a Bill of Rights.
>Note that as things currently stand, the BoR style protections will
>probably be built into contracts between ICANN and the registries.
>All this stuff on the DNSO is purely a sideshow as far as actual
>control over registries is concerned -- the lawyers crafting those
>documents will do the real work.
>
Maybe it is. If so, the DN holders will remain disenfranchised and frustrated.
>> Or course a BoR is a difficult problem for those who do not like to concede
>> rights akin to property rights to DN holders.
>> Yet, investment in Web commerce demands that DN holders cannot be left to
>> the whims of registries.
>
>You are lost in hyperspace without a paddle here. The issue of
>property rights for DN holders is completely orthogonal to the issue
>of a BoR, and can be argued from either side.
>
It is more like we are talking from totally different dimensions, when we use the word Bill of Rights.
Orthogonal indeed. You single out the "at large" constituency to have no constitutional protection and you reserve the CP for the others, so that they will agree to a smaller number of reserved votes.
The BoR that I think of, goes like this:
1. A DN holder shall have legal title to his Domain and shall enjoy all rights and obligations thereof, without hindrance or interference, unless mandated by Law.
2. A DN holder shall have the right of representation in international bodies where regulations are proposed that may affect his ownership.
3. A DN holder shall have the right of Due Process in cases where revocation or deletion of the Domain is proposed by a registry, before such revocation or deletion is effected.
etc.
>[...]
>
>> Yes, everyone would try to secure what they could. But it is better to
>> discuss these rights up front than at a stage when the vested interests
>> have already rigged the structure of the DNSO in their favour.
>
>Since I wrote the appended paper, I have give a fair amount of
>thought to the question of how a BoR would be developed. I don't
>have time to develop the argument now, but it would be a *lengthy*
>process, and it is important to keep one's eye on the ball: the goal
>here is to introduce fair competition in the dns registration
>business. A constituency based system isn't ideal, by a long shot.
>But, given the constraints, it isn't bad.
>
Says CORE/PAB
>> >Consider also that some constituencies, namely the registries and
>> >registrars, really are in a special relationship to ICANN in this --
>> >they will be the ones most heavily impacted by by ICANN policies;
>> >they undoubtedly will be the ones under some form of legal
>> >obligation to ICANN.
>> >
>> So? Does this mean that they need a voting advantage over the DN holders
>> who are equally impacted by ICANN policies but who are even more impacted
>> by registries policies?
>
>Initially, ICANN will have very little control over registry
>policies. It may grow with time, but only if a relationship with
>registries is established to begin with.
>
If ICANN will have so little influence over registry policies, are you suggesting that the DN holders are wasting their time here? The "relationships" will rule the day, in the end?
>>From the registries perspective your position is that the users
>should have absolute control over their businesses -- that is the
>direct implication of a flat representation model. No business
>person would agree to that, unless at the point of a gun. ICANN
>doesn't have a gun, and neither do you.
>
I thought only Bob would talk in those terms.<g>
BTW, are you challenging the unborn ICANN already?
We have talked about registry co-operatives before. Besides these, there is room for honest business too.
<main body of paper snipped, see Kent's previous posting and my comments above>
>(*) It is inevitable because, when you think about it, very
>unbalanced representational models create a strong force for some
>kind of guarantees for the rights of those not so well represented.
On this point we agree. Pity that you relegate it to a footnote.
Joop Teernstra LL.M.
Democratic Association of Domain Name
Owners
