I'm not sure what is relevant to this inquiry, but my web pages related to Husserl and phenomenology are:
<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber7.html>Experience and Subjectivism (Sections I.F-II.D) by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber1.html>The Issue of Naturalism vs. Subjectivism by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber2.html>Naturalism and Subjectivism<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber2.html>: Contents by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber6.html>Edmund Husserl and the Aims of Phenomenology by Marvin Farber Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy Within Nature by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber9/PE-0.html>Contents & Foreword <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber9/PE-mp.html>Marvin Farber on Maurice Merleau Ponty <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber3.html>The Search for an Alternative<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber3.html> I: Subjectivism, Phenomenology, Marxism, and the Role of Alternatives by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber5.html>The Search for an Alternative<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber5.html> 8: The Historical Outcome of Subjectivism by Marvin Farber <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber4.html>The Search for an Alternative<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber4.html> 9: From the Perspective of Materialism by Marvin Farber Phenomenology and Natural Existence: Essays in Honor of Marvin Farber, edited by Dale Riepe <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber8/PNE-0c.html>Contents & Acknowledgements <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/farber8/PNE-0i.html>Introduction by Dale Riepe <http://www.autodidactproject.org/quote/marcuse5.html>The Concept of Essence (Excerpt: Phenomenology) by Herbert Marcuse <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/marcuse7.html>On Science and Phenomenology by Herbert Marcuse <http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/marcuse8.html>Comment on the Paper by H. Marcuse by Aron Gurwitsch <http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/adornohuss.html>Adorno contra Husserl by Ralph Dumain "<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/lifeworld1.html>Life-World within Brackets" by David H. DeGrood "<http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/degrood1.html>The Appearance of Reality and the Reality of Appearance" by David H. DeGrood At 09:29 PM 4/3/2008, CeJ wrote: >JF: > > >>I am interested in them because of my general interest >in the philosophy of science and the broader implications: >culturally, socially and politically of differing >philosophies of science. Concerning the Vienna Circle, >I am in agreement with George Reisch that because of >the peculiarities of the reception of logical empiricism >into the anglophone world, especially in the US, people >have generally failed to understand or appreciate >the broader concerns of the Vienna Circle, so that it was generally >understood in the US as having been mainly about >modern logic and the philosophy of science, whereas >they in fact had much broader interests.>> > >I'm interested in issues in philosophy of social sciences (psycho-, >logico-formal, cognitive, linguistic, social, etc.), but my limited >knowledge of the VC leads me to think (perhaps quite wrongly) there >wasn't much fruitful work done amongst them in such areas. I haven't >had time to search down info. on all the official members listed in >that manifesto. And although Popper never got listed as a VC member >(and was down officially as an opponent of the logical positivists), >they published at least of his books, didn't they? > >Of their contemporaries, I find Husserl and Vygotsky much more >interesting on scientific approaches to the social and psychological >realms. And in education, I would cite Freire and his use of >non-positivistic approaches. (You could say variations of positivism >pervade academic social sciences in the anglophone world and much of >Europe. And that would include the way academia co-opts 'practitioner >sciences' in order to make more high-paying work for itself and to >control certification and indoctrination in education and other >applied and clinical specialities. For example, academic approaches to >'qualitative research' , 'classroom resarch', and 'action research'.) > >Husserl, I believe, is a hugely under-estimated influence on so much >of modern and post-modern philosophy. Directly and indirectly. He got >somewhat dismissed because of anglo-analytic propaganda about Frege. >Popper seems to have got some of his ideas about open society directly >from Husserl, but Popper is a direct product of the logical >positivists/empiricists and Husserl is not. He is a true opposition to >it. You can dismantle Popper with Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. You >can find parallels between late Popper and Piaget. But you can also >demolish Popper using Husserl's analysis of why positivist programs >fail in the 'sciences of man'. > >Interestingly enough Carnap's itinerant education led to his being >taught by a who's who of philosophy, including Husserl, Frege, and >Bruno Bauch, as well as personal correspondence with Russell. Also, >you could say Heidegger's philosophy starts with the teaching of >Husserl. Even Goedel cited Husserl as an influence. I should like to >re-read Wittgenstein on psychology in light of having read more of >Brentano, Husserl and the gestaltists. >Husserl is that rationalist hinge on which so much modern and >post-modern philosophy swings. > >So why did Husserl and Vygotsky refer to a CRISIS in naturalistic and >positivist approach to the 'sciences of man'? (Though it is often >forgotten that to quite an extent positivism originates in attempts to >shift social philosophy into a scientific framework--such as Comte's >sociology.) > >(I think RD has reviews and essays that relate to Husserl (such as >Husserl vs. positivism). Could he post some links and excerpts if he >has time? ) > >Here are some online Husserl and Vygotsky primary sources, typical of >what I have I have been reading off and on for the past two years at >marxists.org. > >1. > >http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/husserl2.htm >(by the way, I have the book, but am citing an online source for list >participants) > >small excerpt >>§61. Psychology in the tension between the >(objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: >the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry >(the psychophysical and that of "psychology based on inner >experience"). > >ALL SCIENTIFIC empirical inquiry has its original legitimacy and also >its dignity. But considered by itself, not all such inquiry is science >in that most original and indispensable sense whose first name was >philosophy, and thus also in the sense of the new establishment of a >philosophy or science since the Renaissance. Not all scientific >empirical inquiry grew up as a partial function within such a science. >Yet only when it does justice to this sense can it truly be called >scientific. But we can speak of science as such only where, within the >indestructible whole of universal philosophy, a branch of the >universal task causes a particular science, unitary in itself, to grow >up, in whose particular task, as a branch, the universal task works >itself out in an originally vital grounding of the system. Not every >empirical inquiry that can be pursued freely by itself is in this >sense already a science, no matter how much practical utility it may >have, no matter how much confirmed, methodical technique may reign in >it. Now this applies to psychology insofar as, historically, in the >constant drive to fulfil its determination as a philosophical, i.e., a >genuine, science, it remains entangled in obscurities about its >legitimate sense, finally succumbs to temptations to develop a >rigorously methodical psychophysical - or better, a psychophysicist's >empirical inquiry, and then thinks that it has fulfilled its sense as >a science because of the confirmed reliability of its methods. By >contrast to the specialists' psychology of the present, our concern - >the philosopher's concern - is to move this "sense as a science" to >the central point of interest - especially in relation to psychology >as the "place of decisions" for a proper development of a philosophy >in general - and to clarify its whole motivation and scope. In this >direction of the original aim toward - as we say - "philosophical" >scientific discipline, motifs of dissatisfaction arose again and >again, setting in soon after the Cartesian beginnings. There were >troublesome tensions between the [different] tasks which descended >historically from Descartes: on the one hand, that of methodically >treating souls in exactly the same way as bodies and as being >connected with bodies as spatio-temporal realities, i.e., the task of >investigating in a physicalistic way the whole life-world as "nature" >in a broadened sense; and, on the other hand, the task of >investigating souls in their being in-themselves and for-themselves by >way of "inner experience" - the psychologist's primordial inner >experience of the subjectivity of his own self - or else by way of the >intentional mediation of likewise internally directed empathy (i.e., >directed toward what is internal to other persons taken thematically ) >. The two tasks seemed obviously connected in respect to both method >and subject matter, and yet they refused to harmonise. Modern >philosophy had prescribed to itself from the very beginning the >dualism of substances and the parallelism of the methods of mos >geometricus - or, one can also say, the methodical ideal of >physicalism. Even though this became vague and faded as it was >transmitted, and failed to attain even the serious beginnings of an >explicit execution, it was still decisive for the basic conception of >man as a psychophysical reality and for all the ways of putting >psychology to work in order to bring about methodical knowledge of the >psychic. From the start, then, the world was seen "naturalistically" >as a world with two strata of real facts regulated by causal laws. >Accordingly, souls too were seen as real annexes of their physical >living bodies (these being conceived in terms of exact natural >science); the souls, of course, have a different structure from the >bodies; they are not res extensae, but they are still real in a sense >similar to bodies, and because of this relatedness they must also be >investigated in a similar sense in terms of "causal laws," i.e., >through theories which are of the same sort in principle as those of >physics, which is taken as a model and at the same time as an >underlying foundation. << > >2. http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/crisis/psycri11.htm > > >>What a trifle! Psychology wanted to be a natural science, but one >that would deal with things of a very different nature from those >natural science is dealing with. But doesn't the nature of the >phenomena studied determine the character of the science? Are history, >logic, geometry, and history of the theater really possible as natural >sciences? And Chelpanov, who insists that psychology should be as >empirical as physics, mineralogy etc., naturally does not join Pavlov >but immediately starts to vociferate when the attempt is made to >realize psychology as a genuine natural science. What is he hushing up >in his comparison? He wants psychology to be a natural science about >(1) phenomena which are completely different from physical phenomena, >and (2) which are conceived in a way that is completely different from >the way the objects of the natural sciences are investigated. One may >ask what the natural sciences and psychology can have in common if the >subject matter and the method of acquiring knowledge are different. >And Vvedensky (1917, p. 3) says, after he has explained the meaning of >the empirical character of psychology: "Therefore, contemporary >psychology often characterizes itself as a natural science about >mental phenomena or a natural history of mental phenomena." But this >means that psychology wants to be a natural science about unnatural >phenomena. It is connected with the natural sciences by a purely >negative feature the rejection of metaphysics and not by a single >positive one. > >James explained the matter brilliantly. Psychology is to be treated as >a natural science that was his main thesis. But no one did as much >as James to prove that the mental is "not natural scientific." He >explains that all the natural sciences accept some assumptions on >faith natural science proceeds from the materialistic assumption, in >spite of the fact that further reflection leads to idealism. >Psychology does the same it accepts other assumptions. Consequently, >it is similar to natural science only in that it uncritically accepts >some assumptions; the assumptions themselves are contrary [see pp. 9 >10 of Burkhardt, 1984]. > >According to Ribot, this tendency is the main trait of the psychology >of the 19th century. Apart from this he mentions the attempts to give >psychology its own principle and method (which it was denied by Comte) >and to put it in the same relation to biology as biology occupies with >respect to physics. But in fact the author acknowledges that what is >called psychology consists of several categories of investigations >which differ according to their goal and method. And when the authors, >in spite of this, attempted to beget a system of psychology and >included Pavlov and Bergson, they demonstrated that this task cannot >be realized. And in his conclusion Dumas [1924, p. 1121] formulates >that the unity of the 25 authors consisted in the rejection of >ontological speculation. << > >CJ _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
