Quoting Arlo Bensinger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > [Arlo had said] > This "useful convention" (the "self") is a stable part (and result) > of collective activity. > > [Platt] > I assume "collective" is also a "useful convention." > > [Arlo] > Of course it is. At best, "collective" points to the concentric > spheres of activity, beginning with the smallest microgenetic > activity on up to large socio-cultural activity. It points to both > symbolic and psychomotor activity.
Would you mind translating that in plain English? > [Platt] > It seems the Chinese "cultural system" with its emphasis on the value > of "collective activities" made the country easily susceptible to the > siren call of communism. > > [Arlo] > Chinese cultural notions of "self" likely transcend and are rooted in > the long historical Chinese traditions and culture. Of course, I > expected you to pander to the great right-wing boogeyman, if not toss > in a little patriotic masturbation. And all this is based on the Big > War, where it is "Glorious Individual" versus "Evil Collectives". > Because of this, you fail to grasp that the Chinese (and other > cultural notions of self around the world) are rooted not in this > ridiculous Holy War Dichotomy, not in the notions that "individual" > and "collective" are polar, opposing forces, but in the recognition > that they are interwoven and mutually emergent phenomenon. It is the > "individual-embedded-in-community", rather than promoting an > "individual-against-community" or "community-enslaving-individuals". > In other words, recognizing "interdependence" rather than the myth of > "independence". Tell all that to the victims of Mao's "Great Leap Forward." > But I found this today, while I haven't fully digested the entire > article, the introduction sums up some of this nicely. > > http://elies.rediris.es/Language_Design/LD2/morillas.pdf I found the article an indigestible piece of postmodern relativistic nonsense. Take for example the sentence: "Phenomenologically speaking, the self is not a tangible entity, but rather an inferred abstraction from phenomenological experience." Given that all words like "self" are abstractions from experience, (no big news there), that which I term my self is most tangible indeed when it sits on a hot stove, experiences pain, jumps off and says "Ouch." Anyway, since the basic concept of self is "universally found in all languages and cultures" I would say that's pretty good evidence that it's not something in fairy land we're talking about. Finally, some people are impressed by big words in complex sentences favored by academics. I'm not. I much prefer Pirsig's down-to-earth plain English style that says in 10 words what academics say in ten paragraphs. Platt > > "The self is a culturally-constituted category. It is generally > viewed as a functional whole with a composite nature: mind, body, > emotions, and personality. However, the unitary or compartmentalized > functional composition of the self very much depends on the cultural > psychology of a culture (Morris, 1994; Cohen, 1994), especially as > regards the individualistic-collectivist distinction and its > attendant analytic or holistic cognitive styles (Triandis, 1990). > Again, the concept of self is contingent upon the ecological, > cosmological, social and moral orders permeating the culture. .... > > In like manner, important social and individual consequences follow > from a culture's concept of self as regards an individual and his/her > social life: the gendered relations (the concepts of masculinity and > femininity), socialization of children, the conception of the body, > the relationship with the natural world, the normative and moral > order (do's and don't's, ought's and ought not's), etc. > Phenomenologically speaking, the self is not a tangible entity, but > rather an inferred abstraction from phenomenological experience. Nor > is it a unitary concept, for it conjures up a composite, > multi-faceted, many-layered phenomenon. Again, although universally- > categorized, different cultures conceive it in different ways > (Geertz, 1983; Shweder and Bourne, 1984). > > Because of the intangible, composite, quasi-ineffable and > relativistic nature of self, humans have developed culture-bound > conceptual-linguistic categories representing its properties, > attributes and traits in order to think and talk about it. Through > talk people signal the pragmatic indexes of the > culturally-constituted categories permeating a culture. Hence talking > about the self (describing its attributes, ascribing properties and > qualities to it, and evaluating it) is an index of both the > subjective- and intersubjectively-constituted categories making up > the mental and cultural models of a culture's members. ... > > In our search for a cognitive-cultural framework of analysis for the > concept of self, we should bear in mind a number of points. Firstly, > although universally found in all languages and cultures, it is > nevertheless a culture-bound, many-faceted category. Different > cultures hold different conceptions about its nature, structure and > functions, and have proposed ways of conceptualizing it, often at > odds with one another. This means that we are dealing with a > relativist conception of a cognitive-cultural category. > > Secondly, as a non-natural kind category, its categorization is > 'constituted', in the sense of Searle, 1995. ... As a constituted > sign, the categorization of selfhood may encode or reflect some > general or even universal properties, but most saliently, it is > likely to display the particular way in which a given people or > culture conceives of it. There is no question that each culture > possesses a distinctive concept of self, one that only partially > overlaps with another culture's. The degree of overlap is likely to > be the result of a host of historical, social, and psychological > causes. By and large, cultures with a common axiological and > historical tradition are likely to share most of their concept of self." > > Thirdly, it is important to specify at which level of language > experience our categorial analysis is to be framed. We may in > principle distinguish between the following models of self: Reflexive > models, which are for the most part encapsulated in the views passed > down to us by the great religious and philosophical traditions since > Antiquity; Expert models, which seek to provide us with a scientific > or principled account of man's nature, as offered by the fields of > psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy; Folk models, > which convey the phenomenologically-based, tradition-bound, > commonsense view that we find encapsulated in the way members of a > given culture talk about persons." ------------------------------------------------- This mail sent through IMP: http://horde.org/imp/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
