Hi Platt --
> You are like Pirsig in being more of a valuist than a semioticist? > I presume this means that you agree with Pirsig that experience > comes prior to language and therefore concepts. However, Pirsig > equates experience with value which I thought you deny. > So how does your being a "valuist" agree with Pirsig? I agree that experience comes before concepts and language. However, I believe that because the core self is "value-sensibility", sensibility precedes awareness, which is a departure from Pirsig. But, insofar as experiential reality is concerned, Pirsig and I are in agreement that it is reducible to Value. Note, though, that I do not equate experiential reality with ultimate reality (Essence). [Ham. previously]: > I don't see the "division of subject/object" in this analysis [of Pinker]. [Platt]: > Right. The analysis talks about a "cast of basic concepts," among which > are > the ones mentioned. I didn't take the author to mean the ones mentioned > were exclusive. [Ham]: > I take [the analysis] to mean simply that we are all aware of change > as a continuum of connected events and exercise some control over them. > ....We observe reality from an infinitesimal point in space/time and > ascribe > dimensionality to it. This illusory perspective is partly due to the > limitations > of organic sensibility. But I believe it has more to do with the primary > division of sensibility from its source, which is at the root of all > differentiation. [Platt]: > Yes, exactly my point. You would include in the cast of basic concepts the > primary division of subject from object. In fact, that is the primary > concept. My understanding of "basic" here is that of "commonly held" concepts -- those that everybody perceives from experience. The primary division that forms the self/other dichotomy is an ontological concept which is intuitive rather than gleaned from experience. It involves more than an ability to distinguish one's self from objective experience, and I doubt that most people acknowledge or even understand this ontology. [Platt]: > The only reason I brought up Pinker is that many intellectuals bow > at his feet. Neither you nor I necessarily agree with 90 percent of what > he claims. But, I thought his notion of hard-wired basic concepts fit > with your innate, intuitive awareness/of something division. Commonly held concepts, such as change, movement, identity, space, and matter, are the brain's way of integrating sensory experience. I don't see them as "hard-wired" in the Kantian 'a priori knowledge' sense. [Platt]: > My only problem is that logically you have to have a whole > before you can slice it in half. It makes sense to me that the > whole is "Quality" as explicated to my satisfaction (mostly) in the MOQ. That's where we disagree. What happens to Quality when you take away sensible awareness? If Quality depends upon a piece of the whole to exist, it cannot be the whole you refer to. Essentially yours, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
