DMB, Matt, Bo said
"I have a similar feeling regarding people's preoccupation with
radical empiricism once they allegedly have become moqists. Empiricism
and/or pragmatism was instrumental for Pirsig's escaping SOM, but
inside the MOQ it's counterproductive."
Exactly. My "post-Prsigian" point better expressed. Interesting part
of the process, but not the main event consequentially.
Ian
On 10/12/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Matt and Multitude.
>
> (before my subscription were fixed this has grown mildewed, but
> ...)
>
> You said to S/A:
>
> > I don't struggle with radical empiricism per se. The part that
> > strikes me as odd is how the notion of "pure experience" even
> > survives once one becomes a pragmatist/radical empiricist.
>
> I don't know if you received my (private) letter regarding your
> post of September 14 (that DMB's of 2 Oct. made me aware of).
> Anyway I find your recent posts interesting. You say you don't
> struggle with radical empiricism's and see it as odd that "the
> notion of pure experience even survives once one becomes a
> pragmatist/radical empiricist". I have a similar feeling regarding
> people's preoccupation with radical empiricism once they
> allegedly have become moqists. Empiricism and/or pragmatism
> was instrumental for Pirsig's escaping SOM, but inside the MOQ
> it's counterproductive.
>
> > If we follow Dewey in thinking there's no difference between
> > experience and reality (which I take to be the purest articulation
> > of the contention of radical empiricism), then how does one wedge in
> > a difference between pure and unpure experience/reality, one that
> > doesn't look like the appearance/reality distinction? But more
> > importantly, what would that distinction do if it wasn't leaning on
> > the A/R distinction?
>
> James and Dewey aren't mentioned in ZAMM, Poincaré is the
> one who Pirsig (Phaedrus at least) saw as an ally.
>
> "Poincaré then hypothesized that this selection is made
> by what he called the ``subliminal self,'' an entity that
> corresponds exactly with what Phædrus called
> preintellectual awareness."
>
> but I guess James' "aesthetic continuum" is another name for this
> pre-intellectual awareness that's neither subjective nor objective.
> But what does the dividing? Neither James nor Poincaré
> identified any SOM. The genius of Pirsig is that he saw "intellect"
> as the S/O prism. (ZAMM):
>
> "Reality is always the moment of vision before the
> intellectualization takes place. There is no other reality.
> This preintellectual reality is what Phædrus felt he had
> properly identified as Quality. Since all intellectually
> identifiable things must emerge from this preintellectual
> reality, Quality is the parent, the source of all subjects and
> objects."
>
> At this point the (final) MOQ wasn't launched thus it sounds as if
> the above "Quality Event" is universal - that Stone Age
> humamankind also split experience the subjective/objective way -
> but that is not so - it's a 4th level value. However, let me not
> delve into that, the point is that if Pirsig had transferred the S/O-
> intellect (that emerged in his first proto-moq) into the final MOQ it
> would have been perfect.
>
> Another manifestation of Pirsig's genius is that he pin-pointed the
> emergence of the metaphysical base of the S/O with the early
> Greek philosopheres, "truth/opinion" with Socrates,
> "ideas/appearance" with Plato and "substance/form" with
> Aristotles ("Reality/Appearance" in general) what evolved into our
> "objective/subjective" or "matter/mind".
>
> > The gist is that if you have a notion of "pure experience," then you
> > are going to need a notion of "unpure experience" because that's how
> > contrasts work. In Pirsig, pure is DQ, which means unpure is
> > static.
>
> Pirsig's initial position was that DQ was pure while all
> metaphysical splittings were unpure, thus the DQ/SQ is as bad
> as the S/O. Later he modified this by declaring Quality identical
> to the DQ of the MOQ, which means that the DQ/SQ is an
> aggregate - like the S/O is - you can't have one
> without the other.
>
> >The question
> > is what the role of "unpure" is in describing static patterns of
> > value. If experience and reality coincide as in Dewey's radical
> > empiricism, then the old idea of experience having various levels of
> > contact with reality (more or less direct/pure/etc.) should be out
> > the window. I would have thought. But there still exists in
> > Pirsig, and James, what seems to me a survival of an older
> > philosophical vision that they are otherwise out to displace.
>
> As said, Pirsig doesn't see DQ as pure and SQ as unpure, he
> never mentions Dewey, and does not embrace empiricism -
> radical or otherwise. What he found familiar with James' was that
> he saw the "man the measure" sentence confirmed by him (the
> squirrel example). But because this sentence is what has
> smuggled subjectivism into the MOQ, empiricism is a double-
> edged sword.
>
> > The importance of this issue resides in Pirsig's insistence in
> > coalescing Dynamic Quality with both "direct/pure experience" and
> > "betterness" (not to mention "immediate"). The fact that I see it
> > as problematic is a whole other thing.
>
> A whole other thing .. yes. Nice talking to you.
>
> Bo
>
>
>
>
>
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