Krimel, That's one for the personal archives, great post. Well aimed, to the point. To be brought out whenever the question of better-ness arises. -skoal
-----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Krimel Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2007 9:58 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [MD] subject/object: pragmatism [Platt] Pirsig stated that the world is primarily a moral order: "Because Quality is morality. Make no mistake about it. They're identical. And if Quality is the primary reality of the world then that means morality is also the primary reality of the world. The world is primarily a moral order." (Lila, 7) So to clear up the confusion, do you agree? [Krimel] I agree that there is a sense in which this is true but I suspect we disagree strongly over what that "sense" is. I would say that it is true in the sense that morality is no more definable than Quality. We see morality or The Good in nature to the extent that the perception of them has been programmed into us by evolution. We are biologically prepared to see things as good that promoted the survival of our ancestors. Likewise we tend to see things as bad that would have hindered the survival of our ancestors. I would say this is an idea that unites William James' Functionalism with his Pragmatism. In examining human experience James claimed we should look at the function served by our responses to our experiences. We do not continue to do things that do not serve some end. With his pragmatism he was claiming that the truth of something is measured by its results. Things that work persist. One of the problems for us moderns is that many of the things that are programmed into us are no longer relevant or may be counterproductive. Shermer talks about this at length in his "Science of Good and Evil." [Platt] If efforts to find a specific set of morals in nature have not fared well, what makes you think morals are "natural" and "built into the fabric of the universe?" [Krimel] Built into the fabric of the universe is the somewhat circular notion that Static Forms persist; that the shape of things to come is determined by what has been. Take the stalagmites that "grow" in underground caverns. When water starts to drip from the ceiling of the cave it is determined that the residue in the evaporating water will start to build up on the cave floor. The shape it takes over time is determined but the specific shape varies based on all manner of random effects in the cave. When we look at any given example of a stalagmite we see both the general rule and the specific manifestation. [Platt] Yes. Reminds me of the scientific "consensus" about eugenics in the 1920s. [Krimel] You really like this example don't you. In an ideal sort of way eugenics is a great idea. The principles used to breed animals of a given sort would work just as well on humans. There really is not much doubt about this. The problem is that we really don't know what would be the "best" things to build into an "improved" human species. That and we really do not know of a social viable way to work with selective human breeding partners. On the other hand increases in scientific knowledge may be solving the social part of the problem for us in that we will soon be able to manipulate human DNA in such a way as to accomplish the goal of "improvement" without the social consequences. Of course this will leave us with the biggest half of the problem still unsolved. [Platt] Speaking of puzzling posts, how do cannibalism and burial of the dead both serve the same moral functions? {Krimel] The moral or social function is to deal with the passing of loved ones and to show respect for the dead. In some cultures this is done through burial rituals and in some cultures this may involve consuming a part of the dead person's flesh. The point being that from a purely scientific standpoint the key is identifying the social or biological functions that need to be served. From a moral or ethical point of view the specific practices are the chief concern. I could be wrong here but I think you are expecting to see specific practices morally woven into the fabric of the primary reality. I tend to see specific social practices as individual stalagmites, determined by the natural order but shaped by the random events. This is the point Pirsig seems to miss when he says, "He could invent moral goals for himself, but they are just artificial inventions." Here he is talking about the specific practices which are in large measure arbitrary. This misses the point about the general functions served by the practice and the fact the practices themselves are shaped by and subjected to evolutionary pressures. If they don't serve the function they will be abandoned or modified. And we do not create artificial inventions that serve no function. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
