Krimel:
Thanks for answering my questions. I think I have a pretty good idea of
your assumptions about how the world works. (I'll ignore the crack about
neo-cons.) Sometime if the spirit moves you might let me know what you
find in the MOQ of value. I'm still somewhat puzzled about what attracted
you to it. .
I answer your question to me below.
> [Platt]
> Am I correct in thinking that you see Quality and morality as attributes
> solely of human beings and are irrelevant concepts as far as the lower
> animals and the laws of physics are concerned?
>
> In regards to survival, Pirsig asked: "But why do the fittest survive? Why
> does any life survive?" (Lila, 11) Do you agree with his answer?
>
> [Krimel]
> I think that we tend to regard Quality and morality in terms of ourselves;
> in terms of what we do and what we ought to do. I think we can see how our
> systems of morality emerge from and are related to other species and we can
> describe the behavior of the animate and inanimate in moral terms, as Pirsig
> does. But I think this is dangerously close to anthropomorphism and really
> isn't particularly helpful.
>
> As for Pirsig's Chapter 11, I have written at length about it several times.
> I find it very disappointing and if it accurately reflects Pirsig's views
> then I certainly don't share them. I am inclined to give him some benefit of
> the doubt and say that he was just oversimplifying. After all it is not an
> area where he claims to have much expertise. But if you use that Chapter as
> authoritative you are going to be misled and to be misleading. But that's
> just my opinion.
>
> There is nothing that requires life to continue. It does not continue
> because it is morally right for it to do so. It continues because it can. I
> would claim that our own morality centers around continuation.
>
> [Platt]
> About James' pragmatism, Pirsig wrote: "The idea that satisfaction alone is
> the test of anything is very dangerous, according to the Metaphysics of
> Quality. There are different kinds of satisfaction and some of them are
> moral nightmares. The Holocaust produced a satisfaction among Nazis. That
> was quality for them. They considered it to be practical. But it was a
> quality dictated by low level static social and biological patterns whose
> overall purpose was to retard the evolution of truth and. Dynamic Quality.
> James would probably have been horrified to find that Nazis could use his
> pragmatism just as freely as anyone else, but Phaedrus didn't see anything
> that would prevent it." (Lila, 29) Do you agree?
>
> [Krimel]
> Yes. But you also have to take a longer view. Did the Nazi program survive?
> Does it continue, expect among neo-cons? No.
>
> Also, as I have mentioned the traits we have today evolved because the
> helped our ancestors survive. This does not mean that they will help us to
> survive. For example, the most common phobias are of snakes, vermin and
> heights. These were highly adaptive in the past. But in the modern world few
> are phobic of cars or guns which are much more threatening today. Also in
> the distant past overeating in times of plenty and the storage of energy in
> the form of fat was highly adaptive. Today it is a major health problem.
>
> I think this is rather like Hume's point that while the past can be a
> indicator of what the future will be like, it is not a guarantee.
>
> > [Krimel]
> > Built into the fabric of the universe is the somewhat circular notion that
> > Static Forms persist; that the shape of things to come is determined by
> > what has been. Take the stalagmites that "grow" in underground caverns.
> > When water starts to drip from the ceiling of the cave it is determined
> > that the residue in the evaporating water will start to build up on the
> > cave floor. The shape it takes over time is determined but the specific
> > shape varies based on all manner of random effects in the cave. When we
> > look at any given example of a stalagmite we see both the general rule and
>
> > the specific manifestation.
>
> [Platt]
> I'm confused. Is this an example of natural morals?
>
> [Krimel]
> I think the point is that yes you could see it that way but it isn't
> particularly useful to do so.
>
> [Platt]
> My point is simply that consensus among scientists (or any other group)
> isn't always reliable.
>
> [Krimel]
> But I think science recognizes this and has built in corrective features to
> either avoid or over come it. Of course this is not unique to science but I
> think it is more central to science.
>
>
> > {Krimel]
> > The moral or social function is to deal with the passing of loved ones and
> > to show respect for the dead. In some cultures this is done through burial
> > rituals and in some cultures this may involve consuming a part of the dead
> > person's flesh.
> >
> > The point being that from a purely scientific standpoint the key is
> > identifying the social or biological functions that need to be served.
> > From a moral or ethical point of view the specific practices are the chief
> > concern.
>
> [Platt]
> So is your position that from a purely scientific standpoint, the functions
> to be served have nothing to do with morals?
>
> [Krimel]
> I would say it moral that the function be served and immoral if it isn't.
> The social patterns that evolve to serve the function are somewhat
> arbitrary. Take marital practices for example. It is moral to rear healthy
> children. It matters little whether this is served through monogamy or
> polygamy. Which one is used and how effective it is likely to be determined
> by a host of other factors.
>
> But let me ask you. Do you see Pirsig referring to morality as a set of
> general functions or as specific patterns of behavior?
I see Pirsig referring to morality as reality, quality, goodness and
betterness. So he pretty much covers the waterfront. Personally I like
that he has released the term "morality" from the confines of culture and
built a rational metaphysics on the basis of that's its better to exist
than not.
> [Krimel]
> > I could be wrong here but I think you are expecting to see specific
> > practices morally woven into the fabric of the primary reality. I tend to
> > see specific social practices as individual stalagmites, determined by the
> > natural order but shaped by the random events.
>
> [Platt]
> How is the specific practice of burial determined by the "natural order?"
>
> [Krimel]
> Burial practices appear to be very ancient and universal. This suggests that
> they serve an evolutionary function; perhaps removal of the health hazard of
> a rotting corpse or consolation of the survivors. What specific practices
> and rituals are used is a matter of evolution at a different level. Call it
> the social level. But those practices are subject to evolutionary factors of
> a different sort. People who live in certain terrains may not be able to dig
> holes. Or they may incorporate cremation or cannibalism or whatever else
> they chose for any number of reasons.
>
> [Platt]
> When you speak of "evolutionary pressures" and "natural order" do you
> believe they result from moral forces?.
>
> [Krimel]
> I think you could call it that but doing so waters down the term "moral" to
> the point that it is a virtually useless concept. In order to understand
> evolutionary pressures as moral I think you would need a more sophisticated
> view of evolutionary pressure.
Again, thanks.
Platt
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