[Platt]
Am I correct in thinking that you see Quality and morality as attributes
solely of human beings and are irrelevant concepts as far as the lower
animals and the laws of physics are concerned?
In regards to survival, Pirsig asked: "But why do the fittest survive? Why
does any life survive?" (Lila, 11) Do you agree with his answer?
[Krimel]
I think that we tend to regard Quality and morality in terms of ourselves;
in terms of what we do and what we ought to do. I think we can see how our
systems of morality emerge from and are related to other species and we can
describe the behavior of the animate and inanimate in moral terms, as Pirsig
does. But I think this is dangerously close to anthropomorphism and really
isn't particularly helpful.
As for Pirsig's Chapter 11, I have written at length about it several times.
I find it very disappointing and if it accurately reflects Pirsig's views
then I certainly don't share them. I am inclined to give him some benefit of
the doubt and say that he was just oversimplifying. After all it is not an
area where he claims to have much expertise. But if you use that Chapter as
authoritative you are going to be misled and to be misleading. But that's
just my opinion.
There is nothing that requires life to continue. It does not continue
because it is morally right for it to do so. It continues because it can. I
would claim that our own morality centers around continuation.
[Platt]
About James' pragmatism, Pirsig wrote: "The idea that satisfaction alone is
the test of anything is very dangerous, according to the Metaphysics of
Quality. There are different kinds of satisfaction and some of them are
moral nightmares. The Holocaust produced a satisfaction among Nazis. That
was quality for them. They considered it to be practical. But it was a
quality dictated by low level static social and biological patterns whose
overall purpose was to retard the evolution of truth and. Dynamic Quality.
James would probably have been horrified to find that Nazis could use his
pragmatism just as freely as anyone else, but Phaedrus didn't see anything
that would prevent it." (Lila, 29) Do you agree?
[Krimel]
Yes. But you also have to take a longer view. Did the Nazi program survive?
Does it continue, expect among neo-cons? No.
Also, as I have mentioned the traits we have today evolved because the
helped our ancestors survive. This does not mean that they will help us to
survive. For example, the most common phobias are of snakes, vermin and
heights. These were highly adaptive in the past. But in the modern world few
are phobic of cars or guns which are much more threatening today. Also in
the distant past overeating in times of plenty and the storage of energy in
the form of fat was highly adaptive. Today it is a major health problem.
I think this is rather like Hume's point that while the past can be a
indicator of what the future will be like, it is not a guarantee.
> [Krimel]
> Built into the fabric of the universe is the somewhat circular notion that
> Static Forms persist; that the shape of things to come is determined by
> what has been. Take the stalagmites that "grow" in underground caverns.
> When water starts to drip from the ceiling of the cave it is determined
> that the residue in the evaporating water will start to build up on the
> cave floor. The shape it takes over time is determined but the specific
> shape varies based on all manner of random effects in the cave. When we
> look at any given example of a stalagmite we see both the general rule and
> the specific manifestation.
[Platt]
I'm confused. Is this an example of natural morals?
[Krimel]
I think the point is that yes you could see it that way but it isn't
particularly useful to do so.
[Platt]
My point is simply that consensus among scientists (or any other group)
isn't always reliable.
[Krimel]
But I think science recognizes this and has built in corrective features to
either avoid or over come it. Of course this is not unique to science but I
think it is more central to science.
> {Krimel]
> The moral or social function is to deal with the passing of loved ones and
> to show respect for the dead. In some cultures this is done through burial
> rituals and in some cultures this may involve consuming a part of the dead
> person's flesh.
>
> The point being that from a purely scientific standpoint the key is
> identifying the social or biological functions that need to be served.
> From a moral or ethical point of view the specific practices are the chief
> concern.
[Platt]
So is your position that from a purely scientific standpoint, the functions
to be served have nothing to do with morals?
[Krimel]
I would say it moral that the function be served and immoral if it isn't.
The social patterns that evolve to serve the function are somewhat
arbitrary. Take marital practices for example. It is moral to rear healthy
children. It matters little whether this is served through monogamy or
polygamy. Which one is used and how effective it is likely to be determined
by a host of other factors.
But let me ask you. Do you see Pirsig referring to morality as a set of
general functions or as specific patterns of behavior?
[Krimel]
> I could be wrong here but I think you are expecting to see specific
> practices morally woven into the fabric of the primary reality. I tend to
> see specific social practices as individual stalagmites, determined by the
> natural order but shaped by the random events.
[Platt]
How is the specific practice of burial determined by the "natural order?"
[Krimel]
Burial practices appear to be very ancient and universal. This suggests that
they serve an evolutionary function; perhaps removal of the health hazard of
a rotting corpse or consolation of the survivors. What specific practices
and rituals are used is a matter of evolution at a different level. Call it
the social level. But those practices are subject to evolutionary factors of
a different sort. People who live in certain terrains may not be able to dig
holes. Or they may incorporate cremation or cannibalism or whatever else
they chose for any number of reasons.
[Platt]
When you speak of "evolutionary pressures" and "natural order" do you
believe they result from moral forces?.
[Krimel]
I think you could call it that but doing so waters down the term "moral" to
the point that it is a virtually useless concept. In order to understand
evolutionary pressures as moral I think you would need a more sophisticated
view of evolutionary pressure.
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