Hi Steve, > Platt: > >The whole scientific enterprise is accepted on faith. > > Steve: > I don't accept science on faith. I apply the same standards for scientific > claims as to claims made by anyone about anything. Religious faith is the > idea that we should not use our usual standards when evaluating claims made > by The Church. These claims must just be accpeted on faith. > > Now you'll want to say, where do you get these standards? But the only > standards I'm talking about is each person's valuation in terms of > intellectual. > > All I'm saying is that if someone would evaluate a claim based on logical > cohesion or evidence or what ever standards he may have normally have for > intellectual quality, he should apply the same standards to claims made > about, say, the virgin birth of Jesus or Mohammed flying to heaven on a > winged horse.
What I've been trying to get across, apparently without success, is that there is more than one standard involved in intellectual quality besides reason and the standards of science, including an aesthetic standard and a DQ standard (illumination). Also, I've tried to point out that whatever standard you choose, it cannot prove its own validity. Thus, faith plays a role no matter what your standard is -- you ultimately accept that standard on faith. > Platt: > >Science believes the > >scientific method is the only reliable method of establishing truth and > >material entities are the most fundamental things that exist. These are > >philosophical assumptions. They are not provable by the scientific method. > > Steve: > This is true of the SOM scientist. But it is irrelevent to whether faith in > the sense of believing things that run against one's own sense of > intellectual quality is good or bad. If one's sense is the determinant of intellectual quality, then my sense of such quality is as valid as yours. This seems to be the upshot of Pirsig's assertion, worth quoting in toto as it seems relevant to our discussion: "Unlike subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one construction of things- that which corresponds to the "objective" world-and all other constructions are unreal. But if Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until something better comes along. One can then examine intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings in an art gallery, not to find which one is the "real" painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can perceive some to have more quality than others, but that we do so is, in part, the result of our history and current patterns of values. (Lila, 8) > >> Platt: > >> > Patterns of thought are often social patterns as Pirsig explains: > >> > "And, as anthropologists know so well, what a mind thinks is as > >> > dominated by social patterns as social patterns are dominated by > >> > biological patterns and as biological patterns are dominated by > >> > inorganic patterns." (Lila, 12) > >> > >> Steve: > >> Pirsig is not saying that some thoughts are social patterns any more > >> than he is saying that some animals are inorganic patterns. He is saying > >> that ALL thoughts are based on social patterns as all social patterns > >> are based on biological patterns and so on. > > Platt: > >Exactly. You cannot separate thought patterns and consider them independent > > of social patterns as you seem to suggest. > > Steve: > Thought (intellectual) patterns are not independent of social patterns. I > have never suggested that. > > I only corrected your statement that "patterns of thought are often social > patterns." Patterns of thought are intellectual patterns regardless of who > holds the idea. Ideas may support some social patterns or be antagonistic to > some social patterns but they are still ideas, not social pattern > themselves. We disagree on this. There are plenty of static social ideas around IMO, including the idea that religion can tell us something about about reality and morality that reason can't. But, let it rest. > Claims that religions make and say must be accepted on faith are > intellectual patterns and must be considered in terms of intellectual > quality. As I've tried to point out, there is no one right way to judge intellectual quality. > >> >> Steve: > >> >> My point is just that religions do make claims for intellectual > >> >> quality and an example is the Catholic claim that there is no > >> >> conflict between faith and reason. > > Platt: > >I think theology legitimately claims intellectual quality. You seem to > >limit and isolate intellectual quality to the standards of science. > > Steve: > As I've been saying again and again, I don't isolate intellectual quality to > any particular standards. My point has been that when people appeal to faith > they are giving themselves permission to disregard their own standards > whatever they may be. > > Theologians will make a lot of arguments that make a lot of sense > (intellectual quality), but will always fall back on faith when they run > into trouble with their own arguments based on their own standards. As do scientists who cannot prove their own philosophical premises, as previously demonstrated. > >> >> Steve: > >> >> There is no level (type of pattern of value) above intellectual. His > >> >> Code of Art is "a code that isn't a code" and certainly isn't to be > >> >> taken as a static level. > > > Platt: > > > It's not static, but it's a level called "Dynamic morality" and > > > it's the > > > most important level of all. It's where revealed Truth, such as > > > that which > > > motivated the brujo, resides. > >> Steve: > >> Where does he say "it's a level"? He is talking about DQ (experience) > >> which reveals truth and motivated the brujo. > > Platt: > >The context suggests a level. > > Steve: > Pirsig said that everything fits into the four levels plus DQ. He explicity > talks about four static levels a countless number of times. Then you find > one instance where you think the "context suggests a level" to argue that > there are actually five levels in Pirisig's MOQ? Yes. In the past we've had many discussions about a fifth level in the MOQ. > Platt: > >Are you admitting to truth by revelation such > >as some religions claim? > > Steve: > I'm not sure what you mean. In religion, "revelation" means revealed by God. > Is that what you mean? I have never claimed that truth is revealed by God. > > Truths in the MOQ are static patterns of value. DQ is where truth is > revealed means that DQ leaves static patterns in its wake. Religious belief is a static pattern, in many cases left behind by people's experience of DQ. When "DQ all around you (shines) through . . ." some interpret it as supernatural. (I presume science would also consider DQ a supernatural force.) > Platt, you seem to be frequently using a different definition of faith than > the use of the term that I want to criticize. Faith is an attempt to make > certain beliefs immune to criticism through the religions teaching that it > is a virtue to believe certain things uncritically. I am surprised to find > you championing uncritical belief. Not sure what you mean by "uncritical" belief. Do you mean that every belief must be justified by rational argument or other standard approved by science? I hope not. As I've tried to point out, belief in validity of reason and the scientific method cannot be sustained by either. Regards, Platt Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
