Hi Matt Good points below. But I'd suggest there is a point here that says it is not immoral to dynamically go against patterns preceding patterns. So it is not a sin to take up flying or to kill bacteria. But equally if the higher levels require the support of the lower levels it would seem pretty stupid to say destroy the life support system of the planet. I think this is compatible with MOQ although not what Pirsig emphasises.
David M ----- Original Message ----- From: "Matt Kundert" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2008 6:30 AM Subject: Re: [MD] mindless metaphysics > > > Steve, Platt, > > Steve quoted Sam Harris: > "A rational approach to ethics becomes possible once we realize that > questions of right and wrong are really questions about the happiness and > suffering of sentient creatures." > > Platt said: > A clear statement alright, but arrogant beyond belief -- as if he, Sam > Harris, knows what constitutes happiness and suffering. Whatever happened > to no pain, no gain? > > Matt: > No, come on Platt: nothing in the quote seems to imply any of that. > Unless you've read Harris enough to know better how interpret that > snippet, I think you're jumping a long way from it, at least without the > proper framing. It's not that suffering is always bad, Harris is saying > that ethical questions are questions about happiness and suffering, which > is a reframing of the issue, not a definitive answer in any direction. > Harris is still well within conceptual rights of being able to claim that > pain is sometimes needed for moral development. > > What I suspect you're seeing, Platt, is that "rational approach" is often > code for "objective," as in "there is an objective standard for right and > wrong, for happiness and suffering calculation." This is what > Enlightenment-style atheist philosophers have often said (or maybe even > only construed as saying) to bash down religion. The old superstition vs. > reason dichotomy. There are few stupid utilitarians left, however, and it > is probably bad policy to think anybody would deny that there is not > beauty in pain. (It would be like holding Pirsig to his word in Lila, > that the low value situation of the stove comes before words and > everything else--a seeming disallowance of masochistic enjoyment. But we > know Pirsig doesn't think that.) > > Pragmatists and Pirsigians should have no truck with the traditional > dichotomy between superstition and reason, between "irrational" religious > beliefs and "rational" scientific/philosophical beliefs. In this sense, I > think Platt is right to protest Harris. The problem is that the > implication in Harris' statement here is that we haven't had a rational > approach to ethics yet, and in particular, religion can't offer it (at > least, I imagine those would bare out in Harris' text). This, I think, is > silly because for pragmatists, and here Rorty and Dewey count the same, > being rational is being consistent, it's about being able to trace > inferential lines in your belief system, about having "good reasons" for > your beliefs. What count as "good reasons," of course, is why perfectly > consistent people have different ethical, religious, and political > beliefs. One person's good reason is another's stupid. But all of this > is perfectly consistent with being able to converse and exchange > arguments about ethics and morality, and I think pragmatists and > Pirsigians should not pursue a more rigid definition of rationality (that > being the problem Pirsig had with Plato in ZMM). > > All of the above is still consistent with thinking any of the following > things: > 1) religion is the best teacher of good/right/virtue/ethics > 2) religion is a good teacher, but that is not all it's about > 3) religion is a bad teacher of good/right/virtue/ethics > 4) religion has been a good teacher in the past, and maybe is now, but it > is time to separate God from ethics > 5) religion is as good a teacher as any, but because there are so many > different places that we learn good ethical behavior, we should perceive > these "teachers" neutrally when in forums where we need to discuss ethics > (like politics) > > My point is that I don't think a Pirsigian approach to philosophy, where > value is the root of everything, helps us out all that much when dealing > with the many tangled problems of religion and ethics. What it is good > for is telling us that people like Harris are full of it (and, indeed, > exhibit a bit of philosophical arrogance, as Platt put it) when they say > that they have the key, the answer we've been waiting for--finally, now we > can do ethics as it was meant to be done. What we have are a lot of > conflicting static patterns of value. > > Even sorting out which ones are the social and which ones the intellectual > won't help much. I don't think identifying countries or cultures as > "social" or "intellectual" does any good because people have been making > those kinds of polemical distinctions for ages and ages, and they haven't > helped all that much yet. I am always baffled by the perception of many > that Pirsig is quite novel in this--I'm not sure Pirsig ever thought he > was very novel in this. Novelty aside, it might be a useful sorting > mechanism occasionally, but it doesn't help much in arguing with anybody. > > What I don't think anybody has really explicitly acknowledged (at least in > my acquaintance) is that, while on the one hand Pirsigians enjoy claiming > that Pirsig's philosophy does a great job in clarifying moral conflict, > specifically in its distinction between social and intellectual levels, on > the other hand, Pirsig's notion of "discrete levels" almost completely > demolishes the work desired. The claim is that we should be able to tell > when a social pattern and an intellectual pattern is at work, and when > there's conflict, intellectual wins. But search the analogous situations: > inorganic vs. biological. That's the most clear cut distinction we have > (before arguments about what, exactly, the top two levels are), but how is > it exactly that the two levels come in conflict? When a bird flies? > Sure, the bird is flouting the law of gravity. Sure, we can frame it as a > great contest between the strength of the bird and the ruthless tyranny of > gravity. But by "discrete's" own d > iction, the inorganic level is totally unaware of any conflict and the > bird's struggle against its uncomprehending opponent is better termed > metaphoric than literal. Were we really warring against gravity when we > flew to space? Or was gravity just doing what it does and we were just > doing what we do, albeit we do more things than gravity does? > > There are many definitional problem areas to be sorted out when splitting > up bio-social-intellectual. It can be done, and probably done in any > number of interesting and profitable ways. But whenever it is done, I > think we should own up to the fact that whatever conflict is occurring is > a one-way conflict--one side doesn't know about the conflict and the other > side is doing it, not because it is more moral, but because it can: a bird > flies, we fly, because we can--not because we are more moral than gravity. > > Matt > _________________________________________________________________ > Connect and share in new ways with Windows Live. > http://www.windowslive.com/share.html?ocid=TXT_TAGHM_Wave2_sharelife_012008 > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
