Continuing my yesterday's Post commenting on
Krimel's:
Krimel: We should never ask, "Are you sure?"
We should always ask, "How sure are you?"
And in the end, the Quality of the answers we give and
get depends
entirely on the question, "How sure do you need to
be?"
Jorge: quite so. This not only in the context of what
we are discussing here; if we were to use the
self-searching question "How sure am I?" in all our
exchanges with people of opposing views , we'd go a
long way in turning heated discussions into Bohmian
dialogues.
Jorge (previous):
It's a sobering thought that when we say "Energy as
understood by Physics" we actually mean, as understood
by Physics today, which is different than the way we
understood it 200 years ago and, very likely, the way
we'll understand it 100 years from now. The same to be
said for any other of the so-called basic physical
concepts.
[Krimel] :
Science answers the question, "How sure do you need to
be?" by saying,
"As sure as we can be right now!"
The science of the past 50 year differs from the
science of the past because it fully embraces this.
Jorge: Yes, but there is another aspect of this "How
sure do you need to be?" It concerns the so-called
'range of application' of various theories; I
mentioned one example in another Post a propos of
rocks: no need to use Quantum mechanics regarding the
position of a rock in space when Classical mechanics
amply gives an answer within the "how sure do we need
to be".
I wouldn't say though that this is a trait
characteristic of the Science of the past 50 years;
it's an approach extensively used in Science from much
earlier on (150?). We use, for instance, the Laws of
ideal gases in a certain range (knowing quite well
that they are not 'ideal') because they predict with
'satisfactory certainty' gas behavior in that range.
The same may be said of theories of 'ideal ionic
solutions' and many others; when formulating most
theories we introduce 'approximations' at one or other
stage; these are just an expression that there is no
point on breaking our heads with complicated equations
when a simpler one will do job just as well.
Krimel: It is my position that if properly applied the
MoQ is a first step in
providing a metaphysical unpinning to modern science.
It should aspire
to become what Pirsig said it would be: a metaphysics
of randomness.
Jorge: I see that Ron Kulp asked you to clarify on
that paragraph. I'll wait for your clarification
before commenting on what seems to me rather sweeping
claims.
Krimel: A pattern is a relationship or set of
relationships that is consistent over time.
Jorge: If I may amplify again? The above would gain
more generality by saying "relationships consistent
over time and/or space" The most classical of patterns
are thought of as units recurring in space. This
generalization is important because it is, may be,
through patterns, that MOQ could bridge with the ideas
of Rayner and others of the Inclusional Group.
Krimel: We speak of Static patterns in terms of their
degrees of consistency
over time. Dynamic Quality (which I vigorously
maintain is not to be
identified with Quality, regardless of whether or not
Pirsig agrees to their
conflation) is recognized in the degree of
inconsistency within and
among static patterns.
Rocks are more static that clouds. The more static a
cloud becomes the more
rock like it is, until it falls to earth as rain or
hail or snow, which are
all static patterns with differing degrees of
stability. The more dynamic
these drops or stones or flakes are, the more likely
they are to
evaporate and become cloudlike.
Jorge: It seems to me that here you are talking too
many liberties with the senses of "static and
dynamic" . Within the senses given to those words in
common-use English, people would hardly say that hail
or snow conforms to static patterns. As I kept
insisting in the discussion about Patterns, everyone
is free to choose meanings not in common use but then,
for the sake of clarity one should declare explicitly
what the adopted meanings are.
Krimel: Increasingly I think science and I hope the
MoQ, embraces a Heraclitian
Dynamic world in flux.
Jorge: I am not qualified to answer for the MOQ but,
as long as Science is concerned, in my understanding
of it, Science very much deals with a "world in flux".
I can not recall of any equilibrium (static) situation
which may not be described as the result of opposing
processes at differing rates or opposing forces.
Classical examples are chemical equilibrium, planets
in fixed orbits, etcÂ… The very same examples of water
as liquid, solid or vapor, you use, are usually
described as results of opposing rates of
evaporation, condensation and crystallization; even
more: our humble water comes to be a liquid at room
temperature as a result of opposing processes of
clustering and de-clustering which proceed at
different rates in the liquid range.
Krimel: I think Pirig's picture of an indefinable,
unpredictable, uncertain reality composed of patterns
and relationships (SQ)
in flux (DQ) has much to offer but is not generally
understood in these
terms. Instead too much ink is spilled on the four
levels which seem to mean
whatever anyone wants them to mean.
Jorge: regarding the four levels, my feelings as well.
Krimel: For my part I think the most we can make
of them is to understand them in terms of rates of
change and sources
of uncertainty (DQ).
Jorge: But such an approach can be applied only on
the understanding of DQ as uncertainty. If you don't
mind me saying so, you haven't satisfactorily made
your case about such an identity in your Post.
Perhaps I am missing arguments of yours posted
earlier?.
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