Hi
No need to apologize for the delay, thanks for the reply.
Matt:
> The story so far was roughly that I threw out these definitions of
> "metaphysics":
>
> 1) Metaphysics is the general framework, or understanding, or set of
> assumptions, that people unconsciously (with various degrees of
> self-consciousness) interpret, or see, or live in the world. As an
> activity, it is the attempt to make the unconscious self-conscious
> (this activity is also known in some circles as "philosophy").
>
> 2) Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that attempts to display
> the basic, universal, ahistorical underpinnings of reality (this
> activity is also sometimes known in some circles as "Platonism," and
> in a few circles the acronymic "SOM").
>
> Then I suggested that there was a difference between "using" the
> definitions and "doing" the definitions, such that we could have such
> reflexive contradictions as a person who uses definition 2 (say,
> while criticizing it) who at the same time is doing definition 1. I
> take examples of such people to be many academic pragmatists
> (particularly post-positivistic ones, so-called neopragmatists).
>
> I also suggested that Magnus both used and did the second definition,
> which from here on out I shall call Platonism. My hand is thus
> displayed: because I think a certain kind of definition of
> metaphysics is Platonic, and handily criticized by Pirsig, I was
> suggesting that Magnus was running counter to Pirsig in a major way
> (which should be a problem for a Pirsigian).
First, I'd like to remove the SOM from your 2nd definition above. SOM is
just one of many different such underpinnings of reality (in which the
S/O division is primary), and one which I as a Pirsigian think is
incorrect. Not sure if "Platomism" would follow.?
Second, I may be running counter to Pirsig (in ZMM) by trying to define
a metaphysics, but not more than he does himself in Lila.
> He and I then went through a few clarification rituals.
>
> The first was that I pressured Magnus to distinguish what he was
> saying from the distinction between tigers and talking about tigers
> (rocks and words-about-rocks) and he said, paraphrasing a formulation
> of mine, "I mean something like 'causally-independent-of-physics'".
>
> I'm not sure what's supposed to be causally independent of physics.
> This seems to me to suggest that we cannot give a physical
> description of everything, but I'm pretty sure that if you can't give
> a physical description of a thing, it doesn't exist. But all that
> this physicalism excludes--so far as I can see--are kinds of magic,
> for instance a God that can willy-nilly interrupt the causal order of
> things, so-called miracles. God can exist, because as a pragmatist I
> think that as long as it is useful to talk about God, He exists--and
> we can give a physical description of our talking and writing.
Ok, it seems I need to elaborate on that one a bit more.
First of all, it does seem very logical to assert what you say "that if
you can't give a physical description of a thing, it doesn't exist".
However, the very word "metaphysics" somehow escapes that assertion with
its meta prefix.
To show what I mean, let's take an example from a sister thread where
they discussed different hypothetical universes. The reasoning went that
our particular universe seems so magically fit for life. If just some
constants had been somewhat different, like gravity, or the strong
nuclear force, life "as we know it" wouldn't stand a chance.
This is probably correct, but only if the "as we know it" is included.
Now, here's where my version of metaphysics comes in. These different
universes have different laws of physics. However, they would all have
the same metaphysics. The most important split of each universe is the
DQ/SQ split, i.e. the division of what's always changing and what's
static. They would also have the same static levels as we see here
(which is why I persist using so generic definitions of them).
This hopefully shows better where I place a metaphysics.
(To dig a little deeper, but not really change anything regarding
metaphysics, would be to consider the pre-big-bang quantum flux
existence as a quantum level below the inorganic one. This would cause
our post-big-bang universe to coexist with other universes just as there
are both carbon based life and other types of life based on other flows
of energy. But as I said, the metaphysics would still be at work in the
pre-big-bang existence, it would still underpin it.)
> However, I suspect the main reason you would say something like the
> above is because you would like to say that there is more in this
> world than what science can describe. With this, I can agree, but
> would suggest a different formulation, something like "of course
> there's more in this world than what science can describe because we
> still need more descriptions than scientific ones." It's a fairly
> simple philosophy of science, but it's at the heart of pragmatism.
I can subscribe to that view, as long as it includes an urge to refine
science to describe what currently can't be described. I would never be
content with just sitting down and accept we can never scientifically
describe our reality.
> It's these "reallys" that upset pragmatists. However, being
> conversable fellows that we are, we're willing to go along with
> common sense and say that our hypotheses about how the tent, reality,
> hangs together, works, etc., these hypotheses _do_ tell us how the
> tent is really held up. The trouble with Platonism was always that
> it reduced to, not a set of hypotheses, but a method with which to
> tell the difference between the right ones and the wrong ones. But
> since philosophy kept spinning out different disciplines that worked
> out according to its own particular methods a good from a bad
> hypothesis, philosophy had to look for a job that it could
> do--looking for the way to tell the difference between a hypothesis
> that _worked_ (which is what a non-philosophy discipline would tell
> you) and a hypothesis that was _correct_--a certification procedure
> that had itself nothing to do with, say, what physics, psychology, or
> history did.
This was really good stuff. Makes me appreciate the complexity of what
you're doing. However, I can't help thinking about the degree of
emotional detachment it must entail.
> even if we _had_ found the blueprint. Does it work
> because it is true, or is it true because it works?
> Why is it pointless? Because _how would you tell the difference_?
>
> That's why we suggest the first definition of metaphysics for the
> thing philosophers do.
Point taken. I would say the MoQ answer to that is to ruthlessly demote
what philosophers are currently doing to "philosophology", i.e. to
discuss different philosophies. It simply realizes that it takes a leap
of faith to embrace any metaphysics, regardless of whether it's SOM, the
MoQ, or the logical land where philosophers discuss philosophies.
However, it's still not possible to tell if it's the correct blueprint.
As in science, it's only possible to reject a hypothesis/metaphysics,
which is probably why we here at MD too often end up pointing fingers
and stating how wrong others' points of view are.
Also, I have a few points about the 2 definitions above about metaphysics.
1. As I said above, the "SOM" in the 2nd must go. I hope you agree on this.
2. The first definition either assumes that metaphysics as an activity
is a personal endeavor, or that all people share the same unconscious
assumptions about our reality. The former doesn't sound as something we
should (nor could) discuss with other people, and it doesn't take much
reading here on MD to realize that the latter is false.
Magnus
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