Magnus, Magnus said: Inorganic value are what we usually mean by "the forces of nature", gravity, electromagnetism, the weak and strong nuclear force. An atom is held together by a combination of those forces, so we don't need any other explanation than inorganic value to explain why it sticks together.
Biology uses the molecules created by the inorganic level to make a new type of value, the senses. The most basic, and oldest, senses are based on the 3-dimensional fitness of different molecules. If a molecule fits well with the molecules of a sensory organ, like a tongue, it tastes good and is likely to be fit for use in that body. That 3-dimensional fitness is also the basis for the self-replicating DNA molecule. However, biological value are senses, it's not more than that. An ant *is* not a biological pattern. It *uses* biological value to decide what is edible. Social value is the goodness of being together. It starts with two molecules with a good 3-d fit. If those two molecules work well together, we call it symbiosis, but if the fit is too static, we may call it a crystal. A good example of symbiosis is the cell Pirsig describes in Lila. A cell isn't held together by gravity, it falls apart when it dies. It's also not held together by biological value, that's just how it once started. I'm sure the parts of the cell could let go of each other and find better "tasting" stuff outside, but it doesn't, because it's held together by social value. Just as humans keep paying their tax instead of moving to Monaco which may seem fancier at first glance. Matt: A nice taxonomy. I guess my question would be what the use would be of extending social patterns all the way down to cells. The trouble with the levels is that Pirsig created four out of simplicity, but the more we think about them, particularly when fitting in non-human animals, the more being limited to just four seems pernicious. And the trouble with discussing them is that there are few rules for figuring out what the best way is to go on them. Once we toss fidelity to Pirsig overboard, what's the criteria for success in drawing up a set of explanations like this? I would always suggest to people that if they are going to tinker with Pirsig, particularly with the levels, to be as explicit as you can about _why_ you suggest the things you do, why you would say that biological patterns _are_ senses, which on its face seems a little anthropomorphic, or why cells have social patterning. We can use the categories well enough, as you did, but why would we use them? They are a little counter-intuitive, to both common sense and Pirsigian common sense, so the question should be faced, "Why take this understanding, as opposed to others?" You might sense it as better, but not everyone may have that sense. For instance, I suggested it was a little odd for you to say that ants are _not_ held together by gravity since they obviously are, and you replied flatly "False." You then went into your descriptions of why that is the case, but truth and falsity are odd concepts to wield at this level of abstraction, for what we are dealing with are entirely different languages of splitting up phenomena. Claims of truth and falsity occur inside those languages. Think of Pirsig's analytic knife at the beginning of ZMM: saying a movement of the knife is false or true doesn't seem to apply. Now, within your pattern of thinking, what I said was false. On the other hand, my little comment was designed to cast doubt on your approach, because it often seems like you're saying that ants don't have inorganic value. It seemed like you were sitting phenomena squarely inside a single level, which Pirsig doesn't do, and in fact I think his not doing that is specifically designed to combat some pernicious kinds of reductionism. Implicit in my comment was this explicit prodding: hey, careful or you'll toss over hard-won insights of Pirsig's. When describing the levels, I think the first thing we should do is isolate the least common denominator of the level, the "DNA" of the level, so to speak. Listing examples only goes part of the way because a definition/description of the levels need to list how it includes what it includes and how it _doesn't_ include other things--differentiation from the other levels needs to be in the forefront because that is the most pressing problem with the very notion of levels. Pirsig's general project is based on at least two assumptions: 1) reality is evolving and 2) it occasionally evolves new pieces that cannot be understood in the terms of the older pieces. This isn't a new project with Pirsig. One of the things that I think Pirsig added some insight to was that 1) not only does the new piece evolve out of the old, but the new piece rests on the older ones--it is not a separate piece, like a rock and an orange, but something that requires the other pieces, like the American government and the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. And 2) the older levels don't recognize the existence of the newer levels. This second proves, I find, to be a particularly difficult axiom to understand, and produces varied interpretations, but I think it is very important. My basic problem with the social/intellectual distinction is that it doesn't make a lot of sense with the notion of DQ as pre-intellectual experience. Does that mean DQ is social/biological/inorganic experience? No, of course not, but it does show a little equivocation on the terminology Pirsig was wielding and I think Pirsig relied on some of that equivocation to get the philosophical effects he wanted. 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