Hi Matt
Sorry about the delay. Got busy with taxes but also took a few days "off" to
slow down a little.
Matt Kundert wrote:
Hey Magnus,
I believe you've misunderstood my intentions. For one, you say, "didn't we
say that we would try finding the 'correct' division of the static levels?"
Oh, no, no, no. Remember? There are no criteria available for that to be
applicable? All that stuff? The difference between the two of us is, still
apparently, that you think you are doing something different than I am in
talking about all this levels stuff, but the only major difference is that
you think you are looking for the "correct" division between levels.
I was referring to our exchange 27/4:
> Magnus:
> you say that DQ is betterness as opposed to correctness. Then it's not very
> far-fetched to claim that SQ (since it *is* opposed to DQ) has quite a few
> similarities with correctness.
> Matt:
> I thought about continuing on in that direction, so since you've also thought
> the same thing, it might make sense to explore it.
Perhaps I mistook you for meaning that we should explore a possibly correct
version of the levels? Wishful thinking on my part?
Which is just as well, because the problem for me has always been that I
become bored far too quickly with this kind of conversation. I became bored
while I rewrote my old classifications. You say they're too anthropocentric,
but I'm not sure what else a description of human evolution is supposed to
be.
Here's a clue. You are trying to make a "description of human evolution", while
I'm trying to make the levels fit the whole universe.
But frankly, aren't they supposed to describe our *reality*? Not just the
fraction of it called "human evolution"?
I tried to really read what you were saying, but I just don't see it. I
just don't get excited about sensation.
I hope I'm not wrong in assuming at least some people here have some interest in
pursuing other disciplines than just philosophy?
If we're supposed to describe some system that describes the most general
aspects of our reality, isn't it prudent to first of all learn as much as
possible about the specifics of that reality, and then generalize from there?
I try to make an effort to follow your (often quite interesting, to a point)
descriptions about the history of philosophy and how we may prove anything about
anything. But I'm frankly not sure I'm able to contribute anything there. On the
other hand, I think I *am* able to contribute something about how a level system
may look like, and I thought this was the thread to do it in, the name you
picked *does* imply that.
So, if I may, I would suggest a more open minded attitude towards the different
specific sciences. Philosophy is often called "the first science", but it would
have nothing to do if it weren't for the others, so it's a very symbiotic
relationship between them.
Your argument about the Quality
event is interesting, but I'm not sure why you've either 1) construed Pirsig
as saying that a single Quality event creates a single subject and a single
object or 2) barring fidelity, why you would want to suggest that. I think
that that part requires some firming up on your part.
Huh? How would you describe the quality event? That's how Pirsig describes it in
ZMM, and he doesn't really talk about it much in Lila.
And without it, you
lose your particular way to interpret Pirsig's definition of what a level is:
a "unique _way to_ experience reality," as opposed to the way I think most
everyone else interprets it, as something like a "unique _kind of_
experience/reality."
Sure, "kind of" is better than "way to". My mistake, I'm Swedish.
As I see it, you have at least two major tasks: 1) establish your "Quality
event" premise and 2) explain why your interpretation of a level doesn't
reintroduce the subject/object problem that Pirsig avoided by making
experience synonymous with reality. In your interpretation, the "experience"
and "reality" are separated by a space, but in the one I would attribute to
Pirsig, the two are connected by a slash. As I see it, Pirsig collapsed the
experience/reality distinction to collapse the knower/known distinction, but
that seems to me exactly what you are resurrecting, placing "how we know
reality" at the center again, which was the problem with SOM in the first
palce.
No, I don't separate "reality" and "experience". What made you think I did?
And I don't see how I reintroduce the s/o problem. I just use the quality event
as Pirsig used it, I have just moved it into a level context.
Magnus said: Don't you realize the *realness* of such level borders? It's not
an ad-hoc border that I just made up one day to solve some thought
experiment, it's simply the real deal.
Matt: Sure, I'm talking about reality, too. Most of what we are talking
about is real. It has to be and we run no real risk of not. However, you do
need to explain _why_ we should split things up the way you do.
Because they are orthogonal
Because there are no fuzzy borders
Because they have that strict level dependency that the MoQ say they should have
Because they show how the history of the universe have played out according to
these different planes of existence.
But since you and most others here get bored when I try to talk about these
things, I guess there's no point in doing it.
People claim over and over, like a mantra, that Pirsig's philosophy, his
model of reality, the Metaphysics of Quality, is better than other models
available. How so? That's _not_ a dismissive challenge: it is simply the
challenge that must be faced
Actually, it doesn't *have* to be faced. If enough scientists are convinced,
they will start incorporating the MoQ into their daily work, and if just one
reaches some breakthrough result that wouldn't be possible without the MoQ,
people will start taking the MoQ seriously.
Magnus
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