Hi Ron --
> Ham, Arlo, > If I may have this dance? > > Ham: > 3. Experience, in turn, is derived from Value which is > sensed incrementally and converted to the experience > of finitude (i.e., relational objects and events). This is > how difference is manifested as existence. In other > words, existential reality (being-aware) is unique for > each organism. [Ron]: > Experience is derived from qualia which is a value response > to stimuli. Value exists in meaning. qualia is meaningful to > survival therefore it has value directly related to experiential > existence. Hmmm, interesting. The word qualia (for values) is akin to desiderata (for desires). I suppose a case could be made for such epistemic specificity, although I think Value is understood by most people as psycho-emotional sensibility. Not sure what you mean by "meaningful for survival", but I like the concept. > Ham: > 4. There is no "before" or "after", "here" or "there", > prior to this intellectualization of experience. All such > dualisms are valuistic representations of the primary > self/other dichotomy. > > 5. All experience has the same fundamental referent -- > value-sensibility that links self to other, subject to object, > awareness to beingness. Thus, objective knowledge has > universality which relates all observers within the > space/time system. At the same time, the value-sensibility > of each observing subject is unique to that individual. [Ron]: > You seem to contradict yourself, how can dualisms not > exist prior to intellection yet be supported by a valuistic > representation of them? Sounds like some creative > supposition to support a greater body of theory used only > to your own convenience of meaning of terms. The sensibility/otherness dualism is primary to self-awareness and intellection, so I guess one might say that it "exists". However, for consistency, I try to hold to the definition of existence as "that which is experienced in space/time". So in that sense there is no existence prior to experience. Moreover, I regard experience as an active (effective) function of the subjective self, while it is commonly thought to be passively receptive. If I have "contrived" anything in my epistemology, it's the concept that experience creates existential reality rather than simply responding to external stimuli. I suspect Mr. Pirsig was also heading in this direction, although, as far as I know, he never specifically defined experience as a creator. [Ron]: > Isn't the self becoming aware of otherness also known > as intellection by your reasoning above? I think that would be stretching the meaning of intellection. Pure sensation, such as an itch or an ache, certainly doesn't have to be intellectualized. It is simply "felt" as a discomfort. Self-awareness probably begins in utero, and its relation to otherness would seem to be a very early, if not the initial, post-partum experience. [Ron]: > How about we all respond to the same stimuli but > interpret qualia differently? I can accept that idea in principle, but "stimuli" is problematic because it suggests specificity where there is yet no specificity. For example, the actual stimulus for pain may be pressure in the intestinal tract. The value (qualia) of pain is sensed as a negative -- Pirsig would say it is "low quality" -- but the experience of pain as a "stomach ache" requires some intellectualization. And if the stimulus is a hot iron or a sharp point, it must be objectivized experientially. [Ron]: > What is this "world we experience" if you posit that it > only exists as intellectual dualism? Self / other is an > intellectual concept. Being/nothingness is also an > intellectual concept as you well stated in your argument > against Arlo. Or as in contrarian style, intellectual > conceptions of dualism only exist when they are > convenient to explain your ontology. Again, I would submit that self/other is pre-intellectual awareness, rather than an intellectual concept. Granted, the premise does support my definition of the individual as value-sensibility, but dualism is a post-facto principle, not a dialectic "convenience". In other words, self/other awareness implies "duality" only to a philosopher or epistemologist who has intellectualized the phenomenon. As usual, you challenge me with good questions, Ron. Let's see what the "experts" have to say about this whole concept. I'd still like to know if Pirsig has said anything definitive concerning experience as the creator of existential reality. Essentially yours, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
