Hey Matt,
Matt said: ... With the first part in the background, this is where I slap you on the wrist for Platonism. And, I think, this is largely what divided me from Bo--stop thinking Platonism/SOM is a _tool_. The tool metaphor itself should help us see what is wrong with this line of thinking: a tool is what it is because it is defined as being separate from the user of the tool. Ron said: It is that capacity in which I meant the term. Tools are wielded by individuals not the other way around. Matt: I'm not so sure you did--or rather (conceding you your intentions), I don't think you get to say both this and what you say later without heaving paradoxical tension on your terms. Ron: For any tool to function it's use must be conceived of. A tool is every bit an extension of the will of the user . Matt said: So, in my view, saying "Platonism is a tool" is a Platonic sin, is a step backwards from the position Pirsig was hoping to leave us in at the end of ZMM. _Plato_ left us a lot of amazing tools in his writings, writings that can be mined almost indefinitely, and profitably even by anti-Platonists--but _Platonism_ is a different beast, not a tool but a philosophy, a set of assumptions with which we use tools to carry out. Ron said: But those assumptions are tools also which was RMP's point. The main assumption he challenged was it's absoluteness in regard to certainty. The conflagration of assumptions with reality itself. This is the bogeyman of any metaphysical system. Just calling it SOM makes the distinction that it is an intellectual pattern and not intellect itself. Matt: I'll grant you that assumptions are used for things, that we have the assumptions (beliefs) we do because they function in some manner for something. But my spade is turned on this: I think it is absolutely paramount, in sorting out the good, bad and the ugly in philosophy, in particular philosophies like Platonism, that we make a distinction between intellectual patterns and "intellect itself." The idea is that we can carry out an investigation into the kinds of concepts that we could not function without and see how they in fact function (this is so-called transcendental philosophy). But, in my view, given the set of texts I've read (Pirsig, Rorty, Eric Havelock, Bernard Williams), I believe with some assurance that whatever it is that intellect is, it wasn't something unqualifiedly created by Plato. I've always thought Pirsig's assertion that that was what happened in Greece to be a little weird all by itself, without a bit more detail on what he's talking about, about what he's picking out with the term "intellect." Ron: What Plato and those before him did was use the axioms of geometry in language to create a formal grammar. The rules of conducting a logical argument. Nouns must stand for entities was the first axiom. I think this is where Pirsig points out the origin of how we think and conduct business today in the western world. The Sophists used the double meaning of abstract/concrete in terms to their advantage, Plato blocked that by insisting on an ontology or an agreed meaning of terms. He argued successfully that terms should represent reality not emotions when establishing truths. Plato popularized the rules but they were forged by many hands over a period of time from the sophists to the dialectic to Platonic ontology. Intellect emerges from society and symbiotically form their complexity together. Therefore intellect is passed through society linguistically while the rules that govern it are a matter of intellectual construct. Or so I believe. Matt: The basic contention is that, whatever Pirsig's term "SOM" picks out, what it does not pick out is something basic to the functioning of humanity. Splitting things up into subject and objects is one thing--_that's_ a useful tool, but the "metaphysics" is what gives the game away: that's a philosophy, one that's dispensable, or rather, replaceable. Ron: One would seem to embody the other. What Pirsigs SOM picks out is just this ontological method of the treatment of nouns representing static entities. Ron said: I think you make an important distinction between using the concepts of Platonism and Platonism itself as a belief system. But to have it stand for SOM itself leaves out Aristotelianism and even Sophism to a large degree which challenged the traditional Greek cultural myths as well as Plato and Aristotles concept of "the good " and the thought that ethics are based on reason, and that there were logical reasons for behaving virtuously. This contrasted with the moral relativism of the sophists, who argued that many different behaviors could be seen as ethical by different societies. In many ways they can be credited for skeptic tradition. Matt: Well, again, I would deny that making a "distinction between using concepts of Platonism and Platonism itself" is what _I_ was doing. That's what you want to do. I want to make a distinction between Plato's writings and a tradition stemming from those writings, a kind of tradition of interpretation, if you will. Ron: well geez Matt is'nt that what I said? Matt: On the narrowness of my term "Platonism," that is largely ameliorated because the sense of "Platonism" I am using is the sense Heidegger gave it, which is the sense Whitehead was talking about when he said (as Pirsig mentions), "Philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato." It doesn't leave out Aristotle, because as Pirsig says, Aristotle was inevitable after Plato set his foot on the path. Ron: As it applies to the conversation I think Plato's theory of forms contrasts greatly with Aristotles golden mean. Which is one of your central contentions of Platonism that truth is a universal. While Aristotle maintained truth was contextual and subjective. Lumping them is a platonic move on your part. you may slap your own wrist if you wish. Matt: It does, however, leave out the Sophists to a certain degree, which I take to be a good thing. On the other hand, I will grant that Platonism is in a certain sense different than SOM, but that's because I think Platonism is the wider paradigm, the real enemy that Pirsig found that created the later, more narrow (modern) paradigm of SOM. You only get SOM after you've passed through the lens hammered out by post-Cartesian philosophers. Ron: You get SOM with Platonic ontology. You get the mind matter problem from analytic tradition which uses the ontology. There is no enemy save the arrogance of the assumption that the ontology represents reality absolutely. Matt: Also, I question the notion that the Sophists were moral relativists, at least in a recognizably modern sense. They were the progenitors for many different trains of thought, but I think Pirsig, for one, might balk at the notion that they didn't think ethics were based on reasons. I think that was basic to Greek heritage, to a certain extent. Ron: they thought they were based on reasons but they said that those reasons were relative to the specific culture. Ron said: What Pirsig does is restructure the entire edifice of SOM by simply swapping out ontology, specifically the treatment of nouns in sentences comprising philosophical statement from subject/object to dynamic/static. the ontology is to treat all nouns not as entities but patterns of value. distinguished by dynamic/static aspects. Pirsig supports this ontology with the Metaphysic of Quality which leans in the Aristotelian tradition of the formation of "the Good" while keeping the sophists contextual moral relativistic reservations in mind. Coupled with the support by physical cosmology as it relates to Quantum physics. The metaphysical reason Pirsig basis his ontology on is the physical cosmological theory that all reality is dynamic relative and ultimately uncertain. He solves this with Descartes certainty in being offering A James-ion empiricism in the style of the continental philosophers as a basis for a reason and logic. Matt: That is a very compact, dense series of assertions and inferences. It looks interesting. If you were going to write an essay, I'd take ten pages to articulate everything on up there. Ron said: When I say embrace SOM I mean to incorporate it into our metaphysical theory, it provides the anti-thesis to our thesis. I feel it is important to define and understand it in order to define just what it is we are talking about with the MoQ. Matt: Well, I don't know about "incorporate it into our metaphysical theory," but I think it is important to incorporate it into our history. In other words, I think it is very important for philosophers (something they've not always felt partial to) to tell a story about the history of philosophy as a means to contextualize their own philosophy. (I might even say it might be the only non-Platonic way forward.) And, in this sense, I absolutely have incorporated SOM into my philosophical work. Ron said So in short, if we understand these concepts we should be able to have Quality discussions without charges of Platonism deflecting the meaning of the dialog. It should be a non-issue unless you are truly dealing with a subscriber to the absoluteness of SOM. Matt: Nah. 2500 years of philosophy have seen people trying to deflect Platonism only to fail. Think if Descartes had told you to back off with charges of Platonism (when you point out that he was using a very Greek distinction in episteme and opinio) by pointing out that he explicitly is trying to break with Plato and the Greeks. Would you believe him? Well, even if you do, you shouldn't. Trying doesn't make it so. The Hegelian dialectic of history is a series of back and forth movements, and I absolutely think it requires vigilance to the next appearance of resurgent Platonism. Ron: Wow, just cause you are paranoid doesn't mean that Platonism isn't out to get you huh? you are using platonic ontology with analytic method of reason when you cite Hegelian dialectic as a reason for vigilance against the rise of Platonism. Careful with witch hunts, they frequently lead to your own doorstep. Matt: Some say this is my own peculiar, Rortyan disease. I'm just not sure how one is to judge whether or not "you are truly dealing with a subscriber to the absoluteness of SOM" unless you run them through the gauntlet. It all hinges on "truly," and why should we trust a person's own self-perception? Psychologists and common sense don't, so why should philosophers? Ron: I think the tell tale sign is their openness to alternative ways of thinking. If they are close minded and absolute in their beliefs that their way of thinking is THE way, then you have a SOMite on your hands. I can usually pick this out after a polite conversation. Then you can refer them to Plato to wit the common response- eh? play-dough? what does THAT have to do with it? : no, Plato, the Greek philosopher. wasn't he gay? : don't know, Socrates was the one who spoke of man-boy love. well homosexuality is wrong :that's not what I'm trying to say what are you trying to say? :forget it, how 'bout them Bears? huh? hell of a season they're hav'n. stay away from me you fag you people are ruining the American family. : sigh, oh piss off! oh! sissy boy getting touchy is he? : look back off or you'll be talking out the otherside your arse! you'd just looove that wouldn't ya! pansey boy : bartender! nother round and a baseball bat please. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
