Bo said: ...I simply claim that the MOQ is the metaphysics that has intellect as a subset, consequently it can't be an intellectual pattern. This makes the MOQ a "meta-level". Try logic for a change. ...For the umpteenth time the 4th level is NOT thinking.
Magnus replied: That is flawed reasoning and doesn't take into account that intellectual patterns *are* capable of self-reference, such as thinking about a thought and self-consciousness. ...Since you don't allow for intellectual patterns to reference themselves, you end up having to add a level whenever that happens, and that's just impossible in the long run. No, intellectual patterns are simply able to reference (or mean) *any* pattern, both lower levels, other intellectual patterns and also itself. This is called recursion and is widely used in computer science. And if a metaphysics doesn't take that into account, it simply breaks. dmb says: Yes, Bo's reasoning is flawed (for the umpteenth time). I think the error flows from an essentialist interpretation, as I explained the other day. Apparently, for Bo metaphysical systems are not intellectual descriptions but rather they are reality itself. And I suppose Bo draws this flawed conclusion based on the idea that DQ, the mystical, pre-conceptual reality can't be intellectually described. Of course we can't say DQ is a fifth static level simply because its not static. (This is why Pirsig says the MOQ is a logical impossibility, a contradiction in terms. This is a matter of creating static intellectual descriptions of a dynamic reality, which is degenerate but its also fun so he does it anyway.) The MOQ is an intellectual description and so is SOM, two paintings of reality. Newton and Einstein painted very different pictures but they both used math, logic and intellect. In that sense, they hang in the same gallery and are rivals at the same level. In a sense, the former fits inside the latter and the former still works at the macroscopic scale and so it is with SOM and the MOQ. They're very different pictures but they're both pictures. It seems to me that Bo's whole theory is a result of getting rid of mysticism and trading it in for essentialism, which is approximately the opposite of mysticism. There is also the problem of the levels, the problem of Bo's interpreting the social level as the subjectivity of SOM.... Bo said: ...thinking at the intellectual level is all about arriving at "objective" conclusions. My dictionary says "distancing oneself from emotions and INSTINCTS, but the latter is biology and no one is fooled by that, however EMOTIONS (social level) is the great temptation because SOM has no social level. dmb says: The dictionary is a good place to start but by resting your conclusions on it you've only managed to confused things. This definition suffers from one of the most important flaws of SOM, namely the idea that intellect is supposed to be free of values. Your dictionary puts it in terms of a distance from your instincts and emotions but the MOQ totally subverts the idea that intellect is supposed to be a cold, bloodless calculation. You won't find a dictionary that says intellect is a higher form of morality, for example. You won't find a dictionary that defines intellectual quality in terms of elegance and beauty either. And within the MOQ, the social and intellectual levels are not distinguished in terms of instincts and emotions versus logic. Its more like traditional beliefs versus abstract thinking about those beliefs. Emotions and instincts are both biological so that the dictionary's definition reflects the mind-body distinction and not so much the social-intellectual distinction. Like you said, Bo, SOM has no clear concept of a social level but rather construes the difference as old ideas versus new ideas, which misses the whole point of a discrete level between biology and intellect. There are lots and lots of other things to untangle but I think its Bo's essentialism that really has him stuck. Apparently, most of the other misconceptions follow from that initial mistake. This misinterpretation makes the MOQ look like it needs to be repaired, leads Bo to think that Pirsig's second book undoes his first book when in fact it only clarifies the first book. And of course Bo's SOL theory is the patch needed for the holes opened up by this misinterpretation. Naturally, I think it would be much simpler and easier to get rid of the misinterpretation that it would be to live with Bo's SOLAQI (subject-object logic as quality intellect). It would also make more sense and, intellectually speaking, it would be more elegant and beautiful, like Kate Beckinsale. (Now there's some biological quality that appeals to my instincts!) _________________________________________________________________ Get thousands of games on your PC, your mobile phone, and the web with Windows®. http://clk.atdmt.com/MRT/go/108588800/direct/01/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
