At 10:35 PM 1/14/2009, you wrote:
I feel a little misunderstood. My own fault really; I wasn't clear.
Marsha you said: Would you like to state that words are not a mental
phenomenon? Plato is not an authority for me, and I do not find his
invention true to my experience. I have no perfect mental image of a bed,
or a horse. And if I did, I do not know how that would translate to
anything physical.
Plato's argument doesn't work for me either; I certainly don't buy any part
of his mental category. It may well be the source of the subject object
division that plagues western thought.
I do have universal concepts of bed's and horses and I think you do too.
Greetings David,
You may have a universal concept of beds and horses. I do not have
access to your mind. I do not.
For me bed and horse are patterns, not a universal, independent
concept. While there is some overlap ,that does not make a universal
concept. We might agree that a bed's function is for sleep (but
maybe not), but that then assumes the sleep pattern and it's assumed
function. I have spent some time meditating on zebra. It seems to
me more accurate to state a pattern equates to
opposite-from-non-zebra than a universal concept
(thing-in-itself). Try it. Bed and horse are more a flowing process
than a universal concept. At least, that would be my experience.
I mean in the sense that Aristotle and the Scholastics meant when they used
the term. We all seem to have a common concept of women that isn't based on
any particular Marsha, Jill, or Amy but is a simpler, perfect, universal
symbol for all women.
Are you kidding? I think I'll just let this nonsense slide away.
I said:>but if the mind is physical the bed and the horse have to be
physical too.
You replied: How did you get to the mind is physical?
How did I get to mind is physical? I couldn't see any other reasonable
option. Mental and spiritual offer zero predictability... so unless you have
a forth option?
I didn't get how you got to the 'mind is physical' option. My
option would be mind is a process. And it seems to me that even your
neuroscientist conceptualize any physicality they think they find.
I said: If you can accept that the electrical energy measurable as it
varies in
>nerve cells and the mechanical energy measurable as it travels through
>air or some other medium are physical, then the words that are the
>effect of these energies on ear drums are as physical as rocks and
>trees.
You replied: I can and do accept this as a conventional truth.
You can and do accept this (the scientific explanation) as a conventional
truth. Well, without conventions we couldn't communicate at all and if you
accept the conventional scientific explanation as a basis for communication,
can you entertain the concept that words only exist in a living being, that
you are creating words with meaning from these electronic images?
Sure I can conventually accept it, as long as I also accept that it
is a provisional, convenient, temporary truth of human invention. Or
better yet, an ever-changing, collection of overlapping, interrelated
and interconnected patterns.
You said: I do not accept, except when convenient, that mind, meaning and
knowledge are physical things.
"Quality is indivisible, indefinable and unknowable in the sense that
there is a knower and a known."
In general, I sense that we agree about many things but I cannot judge
knowledge or truth by convenience and I cannot accept that anything is
unknowable. It insults my concept of humanity.
Do you mean 'humanity' as in the ever-changing, collection of
overlapping, interrelated and interconnected patterns?
You flattered: Life is a dance. And I bet you are good at it.
I enjoy verbal dancing better than fancy footwork. Thanks for this one.
I enjoy the concept of the cosmic dance, thank you.
Marsha
Bo, you said: >Kant did not exactly speak about Quality in the MOQ sense,
but to
>begin with a kind of the beginning. Western philosophy has
>always had SOM as its premises, but then came the discovery of
>the empiricists that all qualities, color, sound, taste, smell, touch
>were produced by the senses - were subjective - Berkeley went as
>far as to claim that there was nothing "out there". everything was
>subjective.
I'm a huge fan of Kant but he didn't get everything right either. I only
wanted to observe that all of his categories are comparative, and the basis
for each comparison is Quality. German idealism is as alien to MoQ as
Plato's realism. I get that, but although I've been a huge fan of Pirsig's
and have read ZMM at least forty times I haven't drank all the Kool Aid yet
and won't until something convinces me that MoQ describes my reality.
By the way, Bishop Berkeley was related to the Irish Swifts and probably one
of my ancestors. His idealism was extreme; it's more likely that Kant was
closer to the truth, the mind interprets "the thing itself".
Then Kant who set out to save reason from this mad "pure reason"
>and claimed there were something he called "forms of perception"
>built into existence itself, not learned FROM experience rather
>what experience was filtered through These were TIME, SPACE
>and CAUSATION that made up OUR experience "das Ding f?r
>Uns" (the world for us) But note that Kant did not shake the
>foundations of SOM, the was still a world out there "das Ding an
>Sich" (the world in itself).
>
>But the MOQ has taken leave of SOM , so I'm a bit surprised that
>some of us keep speaking as if SOM's artificial problems has any
>bearing inside the MOQ with statements like yours
>
> > ... "They continue with the realization that mind is not mental but
> > rather physical, biological, entity and therefore, intentionality can
> > be explained by the laws of physics".
>
>Yes, we know that the SOM struggles with such self-inflicted
>problems stemming from its faulty premises that the S/O split
>being existence's ground. The MOQ's premises however is the
>DQ/SQ split and then the static levels, the said S/O split is
>intellect's STATIC value. Kant's just cemented SOM, but has no
>bearing on the MOQ.
>
Your comments are a puzzle to me. You've given me something to think about,
let me reread Lila and get back to you in a few weeks.
Chris, I wanted to say that anyone who claims that intentionality is a
mental phenomenon is really saying that the actions cause by intentionality
are really cause by magic. It's not much of an explanation. If, however, you
assume that intentionality is a physical phenomenon, you can try for a more
reasonable explanation than "magic". Science is not the final answer but
it's better at explanations than fantasy.
I apologize; I've only been following along for a week or so and don't know
each of your positions. Let me fade back for awhile until I get a better
feel for you guys. - thanks david swift
.
.
The self is an ever-changing, collection of interrelated and
interconnected, inorganic, biological, social and intellectual,
static patterns of value responding to Dynamic Quality .
.
.
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