Message: 2 Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2009 03:14:01 -0500
From: MarshaV <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [MD] the meaning Hobbes's meaning To: [email protected] Message-ID: <20090303081410.icde21772.mta31.charter....@imp11> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed At 07:59 PM 3/2/2009, you wrote: >Marsha, > > > >Mon, 02 Mar 2009 01:27:35 you posted: > > > > > > > >Marsha said to David Swift: Philosophizing indeed, and with such a > >distinguished list as Hobbes, Hume, Locke and Kant. It's hard to > >believe there would be exact agreement between these philosophers, > >especially in regards to a word like 'feeling' with its many > >definitions and multiple layers of connotation. Maybe you can offer > >some quotes as evidence to establish their agreement of usage and > >definition. ...'Feeling' like all sq is sometimes conventionally > >useful and >has a beauty of its own. > > > > > > > > >dmb says: I think that's right. Feelings and instincts would probably > >be a static biological response to DQ. Hume was an empiricist and so > >is Pirsig but there is an important distinction between the > >traditional forms of empiricism and the radical empiricism of the > >MOQ. The former is also called sensory empiricism because it holds > >that the external objective world comes to us through the senses, > >through the sense organs, and it does so from within the assumptions > >of subject-object metaphysics. The radical empiricism of William > >James, which is adopted by the MOQ, differs from this by both > >rejecting the metaphysical assumptions and by expanding the notion of > >what counts as empirical evidence. In traditional empiricism we > >experience reality through the >senses but in radical empiricism experience is reality. > > > > > > > > >DS says: Thanks for making the distinction. Are you all in agreement > > >that TiTs don't exist in MoQ? Have you gone completely over to the > > >idealism of Schopenhauer? If so what sense do you make of the > >inorganic SQ >level? > > > >Greetings David, > >For me there are no TiTs, not even on the Inorganic Level. Not rocks, >not mountains, not atoms are discreet entities. No phenomenon, no >static patterns of value have inherent existence. I am not a >Materialist or an Idealist. Rocks, mountains and atoms exist >conventionally, but are empty of inherent existence. > > >Hello Marsha, > >This a puzzling development. How can the first static quality level >exist without TiTs? And how can anything be conventional and how can we >talk to each other without the third level? David, I do not understand the underlying assumptions of your question. There are no independent patterns (entities). There are no patterns (entities) not dependent on causes and condition. There are no patterns (entities) not in the constant state of change. There are no patterns (entities)without aggregates. Patterns (entities) known are conceptual constructs. Patterns (entities) are ever-changing, interrelated and interconnected processes. Marsha Marsha: So if the inorganic level is purely conceptual are we purely conceptual too? It's hard to believe that nothing, not even us, are real? -david swift Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
