Krimel asked dmb:...Who says the "probability distribution" is cannot be a philosophical term? You? Why not?
dmb says: Seriously? Well, your apparent inability to detect such a distinction would seem to confirm my previous accusations. It's funny that we keep saying, "No, you're confused" at each other. At least one of us is. Maybe both of us. But look at this statement of yours, for example: You said, "The term preference agrees with the data to the extent that it is synonymous with 'probability distribution'." [Krimel] So this is your response? If you really think this is Pirsig's position, don't you think it deserves a better defense. I showed how probability makes things look differently from the bottom up and the top down. I showed that we have an innate ability to perceive and respond to probability. I showed how philosophy has always used mathematical terms and engaged mathematical ideas. You leave these unanswered and settle on this? [dmb] Now, if the probability distribution is "a description of a collection of outcomes", then it IS the empirical data. [Krimel] No, Dave, outcomes are empirical data. Probability is a way of describing the data. [dmb] Then we can make philosophical claims about that data. The claims have to agree with the data, but they say something beyond that about how to understand it, adding context and meaning to the raw numbers. [Krimel] Seeing things probabilistically does all that. It agrees with the data and says something about how to understand the data and it is a way of interrelating data across fields of knowledge. Evolution, quantum mechanics, economics, sociology, marketing, insurance, gambling and public relations are all united in their common goal of expressing and understanding things probabilistically. Probability is a way of conceiving concepts. It allows us carves continuous data into discrete units and evaluate the efficacy of those units. It allows us to conceptualize conceptions. [dmb] Thus, the "probability distribution" is not a philosophical term. It's a data set that quantifies empirical observations. The term "preference" asks us to understand that data in a certain way, thus it is a philosophical term. [Krimel] Well as I said not only is probability a philosophical term it is a metaphysical term. It is not data it is a description of data, a way of conceiving of data, a way of understanding data. And by data I mean empirical experience. Krimel said: You have not shown how the addition of volition at the inorganic level contributes to our understanding. ...I don't see how volition adds anything to the analysis. ...But again where is the volition? ...But again I ask where is the volition? ... But again I ask where is the volition? dmb says: I think you must be confused again, because "volition" is not in the data. It's just an idea about the data. It unifies the inorganic level with the other three levels, which is nice for the internal structure of the MOQ, and it helps to solve some classic problems. But now I'm just repeating myself. [Krimel] It nice? Before it was pretty now it's nice. What does "volition" say about rocks? We can feel kinship with them because they want to be where they are. This isn't solving any problems it is just happy talk. What you have not repeated or even stated is what volition says about that data. [dmb] It's just no good to mix philosophy and science the way you do. It's a real conversation stopper. [Krimel] Who says it's not good? Not Plato or Aristotle. Not Descartes or Locke or Hume or Kant. In fact neither do James or Pirsig. I guess it just depends on who you want to talk to. Look Dave, I understand that your position is weak but really... Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
