Krimel --
Did you mean "precepts" and concepts? (I don't know what a percept is --
slang for perception, I guess.)
[Krimel]:
But the problem with your approach is that you seem to think
that Value is "out there" waiting to be realized. Well that and you
think that emotion is a response to value. It is not. Emotion is the
value. Emotion tells us immediately whether something is good,
bad or neutral. It motivates us to act.
Value is neither "out there" (the MoQ thesis) nor "in here". It is the
individual's primary sensibility of otherness -- that which is other to the
self. Because we are dependent on the brain and proprioceptive neural
system for sensory information, we are never aware of "Pure Value" which is
the metaphysical source of sensibility. Instead we realize value
relationally as our attachment, desire or affinity for that which transcends
us. Value colors our experience of differentiated things and events, which
is why we tend to attribute value to objects.
Emotion IS a response to value but not Value itself. The response mechanism
is tricky to analyze, and the fact that semantics are largely subjective
compounds the problem. For example, Pirsig describes "experience" as
primary apprehension, whereas I define experience as the actualization of
objective phenomena, which is secondary to value-sensibility and often
involves the intellect. Also, "emotional responses" generally connotes
behavioral manifestations due to hormonal secretions, heart rate, blood
pressure variations, etc. Speaking as a reductionist, the fundamental human
interaction with Value is Sensibility.
But I do agree that Value is only significant to whoever is doing the
evaluation whether it is a zebra being stalked by a lion or a commuter
stuck in traffic. While I agree that Value is not a property of the
external
world I don't think it is a property of the subjective self either. Value
arises from the interaction of the individual with the environment.
Good. Then you agree with me that the realization of Value is subjective,
and that Value is the subject's connection to metaphysical reality (we'll
call it "the environment" for the present).
Value in the way that Pirsig uses it describes well the way that
individuals experience Value. He is starting his "metaphysics" not with
"things" but with "appearances". It is not about "what is" but how things
"seem". This renders his position, especially as pushed by Dave, as purely
phenomenological, purely subjective.
Fine. Experiential existence is the world of appearances. I'm a
phenomenalist, too, so I can buy that. But Pirsig's thesis is confined to
this experiential world. He offers no metaphysical foundation for
evolution's "moving to betterness", and he reduces the human being to a
"collection of interacting patterns". If Quality or Value is fundamental
reality, and its experience is primary, why does he reject man, the
"experiencer", as its agent?
Pirsig is quite right that reality is undefined. It is continuous,
infinitely divisible. Humans are equipped with the capacity to
break that continuous stream into "meaningful" units. This is how
we abstract concepts or definitions from the continuous flux.
Concepts are mental representations or encoding of physical
experience. They are not only valuable they are essential to
human interaction and survival. The problem comes when they
are taken to "be" what they merely represent. OR when they
become so automatic that we can't see past them.
This is a tricky problem that seems really simple but turns out
to be very hard to grasp. I think the distinction James makes
between percepts[?] and concepts really helps to clarify the situation.
I suspect given the number of times these "memes" have been used
since I brought them up about a month ago that others find them
useful as well.
If "percept" is James's special terminology, could you kindly explain its
meaning? Otherwise, I will confuse it with "precept", which is defined as
"a principle intended as a general rule of action." (I see that "percept"
is defined in Webster's as "an impression of an object obtained by use of
the senses." Is that how James defines it?)
The distinction between them is important. A percept arises from the
physical interaction of an organism with the world. Energy is converted
to neural impulses. In this direct interaction we come as close to contact
with an external world as it is possible to come. This kind of interaction
is common to all living things and we can see it spread across the realm
of biology as a variety of strategies that have evolved to capitalize in
it.
Any biological creature sufficiently complex enough to move, develops at
its front end, sensors that detect physical stimuli. They also have the
ability
to discriminate whether those stimuli have Value in terms of should I move
toward or move away from this.
You say "they" have the ability to discriminate; what does "they" refer to?
The way your sentence is constructed, it appears to be the sensors
themselves. If that's your intention, the behavior you're describing is no
more than a simple reflexive response, as in Pirsig's hot stove analogy. It
reduces "value" stimuli to pain, fear, and the survival instinct, hardly
examples of subjective value discrimination.
The rest of your lengthy post is a neuro-physiological analysis of feelings
and emotions which is a bit too specious for my taste. Possibly it was
meant for David, who seems to have an aversion to concepts. But inasmuch as
I don't view Value or its realization as an organic or synaptic process, I
see little point in commenting on it. Besides, the philosophical ground is
covered in the discussion above.
Thanks for your thoughtful response, Krimel, and Happy Independence Day.
--Ham
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