Greetings Ham, On Feb 6, 2010, at 3:04 PM, Ham Priday wrote:
> On 2/6/2010, 2:31 PM, DMB wrote (to Marsha): > >> As I understand it, the MOQ agrees with contextualism >> (we're suspended in language) and it agrees that these contexts >> are constructed (analogy upon analogy) but it says these contexts >> are not constructed arbitrarily (Quality is not arbitrary or >> capricious) and the pragmatic theory of truth does not abandon >> empirical restraints (it has to agree with experience and function >> in experience). These non-linguistic constraints distinguish the >> MOQ from this relativism. > > Marsha replied: >> Where does the MoQ agree with contextualism? I thought >> the MoQ agreed with Protagoras' Measure Doctrine. >> Arbitrary and capricious? Is 'arbitrary and capricious' your >> definition of relativism? > > DMB explains: >> All of the stuff I put in parentheses references Pirsig quotes. >> I can't tell you what page it is where Pirsig agrees with the notion >> that "we're suspended in language", where Pirsig says our world >> is built of analogies, where Pirsig says that Quality is "not arbitrary >> or capricious". But you've seen them. You know they're in there. >> And how can you ask about the measure doctrine as if I hadn't >> just quoted Pirsig on that? He said virtue "was absolutely central >> to their teaching, but how are you going to teach virtue if you teach >> the relativity of all ethical ideas?" and "QUALITY! VIRTUE! >> DHARMA! THAT is what the Sophists were teaching! >> NOT ethical relativism."? >> >> But anyway, around here truth is the pragmatic truth. >> It's provisional, self-correcting and grounded out in actual >> experience. Truth and falsity are what happens to an idea >> in the course of experience. It's contextual and perspectival >> but reality, which is to say experience, has a way of keeping us >> honest and that's what prevents the MOQ from being a relativism. > > Gav asks: >> Isn't this splitting hairs? I mean if truth is contextual and perspectival >> isn't that a form of relativism? 'Truth is relative'... another way of >> saying that [it] might be 'context-dependent'. >> >> Plato: good is relative; truth is absolute >> Pirsig: truth is relative; good is absolute >> Is this summary accurate? > > David is, indeed, splitting hairs. But so is Pirsig, by making Plato's > Virtue a different sort of "good" than pragmatic or empirical truth. > > This whole discussion, in my opinion, hinges on what one believes is the > nature of Experience. David says "reality, which is to say experience, has a > way of keeping us honest and that's what prevents the MOQ from being a > relativism." But that's because he believes Experience=Reality (in the > universal or objective sense). I suspect that Marsha and Gav believe that > Experience is subjective, which makes "man the measure" of Goodness, hence > supporting the relativity (or provisional nature) of empirical truth. Marsha: Static patterns of value (conventional truth) is experienced differently relative to individual history and context (perhaps as karma (Forgive or correct me Khoo if I am way off track.)) as quoted in the SODV paper. I see static patterns of value as being equivalent to conventional truth, or form, and Quality being equivalent to Absolute Truth, or Emptiness. But then "form is emptiness; emptiness is form". Marsha > > The argument that "we're suspended in language" is begging the question. It's > not the context of language that determines the validity of truth; it's > experience. And experience is not universal but relative to the individual. > What "keeps us honest" in our precept of experiential truth is the > universality of empirical principles. The question we need to ask is: are > Quality, Goodness and Virtue "absolute truths"? Plato says no, Pirsig says > yes. But if Experience=Reality, then Quality (moral or esthetic goodness) > cannot be absolute because experience is relative to the individual. > > There is no "contextual" way around the fact that the reality of experience > is relational. THAT is an empirical truth. If you want or need to believe > that there's Absolute Truth, you have to extend your belief system beyond > experiential existence. In other words, you have to accept the metaphysical > concept that the source of experiential reality is absolute and > unconditional. Be forewarned, however. Because such a belief transcends > subject/object perspectives of Truth -- including the truth of Quality itself > -- it contradicts the fundamental premise of Pirsig's MoQ. > > Essentially speaking, > Ham > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
