Marsha said: ...
Is cognitive relativism defined as "suspended in language". Is cognitive
relativism clearly defined as "suspended in language?" What do you mean by
language? Are static patterns of value words only? Our oral communications
may be suspended in language, but is that all there is to patterns? Are
memory, thought, understand and selfhood nothing more than language?
dmb says:
Oh, I see. You're confused about the difference between contextualism and
relativism or rather you think they are the same thing. As I tried to explain
already, one can accept contextualism without also being a relativist. Here's
how my computer's wiki puts it...
"ContextualismContextualism describes a collection of views in philosophy which
emphasize the context in which an action, utterance, or expression occurs, and
argues that, in some important respect, the action, utterance, or expression
can only be understood relative to that context.[1] Contextualist views hold
that philosophically controversial concepts, such as "meaning P," "knowing that
P," "having a reason to A," and possibly even "being true" or "being right"
only have meaning relative to a specified context. Some philosophers[2] hold
that context-dependence may lead to relativism;[3] nevertheless, contextualist
views are increasingly popular within philosophy.[4]"
Notice that part where it says, "SOME philosophers hold that context-dependence
MAY LEAD TO relativism"? That's what I'm talking about. To say we are
"suspended in language" means the acceptance of contextualism but not
necessarily of relativism. The former MAY lead you to the latter but it doesn't
have to. That's what I'm talking about. And what kind of contextualism DOES
lead to relativism? The kind that says memory, thought, understanding and
selfhood are nothing more than language and that there is nothing outside of
language. Remember those slogans from postmodern thinkers like "there is
nothing outside the text" and "it's text all the way down" and such? That's why
people like Rorty are criticized as being a kind of linguistic idealist. The
MOQ, by contrast, says that there is non-linguistic experience and there is
something very, very important outside the text, outside of language.
Marsha said:
Where does the MoQ agree with contextualism? I thought the MoQ agreed with
Protagoras' Measure Doctrine. Arbitrary and capricious? Is 'arbitrary and
capricious' your definition of relativism?
dmb says:
The kind of contextualism that leads to relativism would say that our context
was constructed arbitrarily and capriciously but the MOQ says these contexts
have evolved as a response to Quality, which prevents it from being arbitrary
and capricious. Thus contextualism does not lead to relativism. This doesn't
mean that our context is right and true in every way or even in most ways. But
the patterns of culture would not persist unless they had value of some kind,
unless they "worked" on some level. This fits quite nicely with Pirsig's
reading of Protagoras' measure doctrine.
"'Man is the measure of all things'. Yes, that's what he is saying about
Quality. Man is not the SOURCE of all things, as the subjective idealist would
say. Nor is he the passive observer of all things, as the objective idealists
and materialist would say. The Quality which creates the world emerges as a
RELATIONSHIP between man and his experience. He is a PARTICIPANT in the
creation of all things. The MEASURE of all things - it fits. And they taught
rhetoric - that fits. The one thing that doesn't fit...." is relativism.
When we say that our perspective is "relative" to a context, that only means it
is related or exists in relation to. But you're taking that as a definition of
relativism but that's just contextualism. As it so happens there are lots of
philosophers who think one necessarily leads to the other, that it's the only
reasonable place to go with contextualism, but it seems pretty clear that they
can't really reach that conclusion unless they also buy into the basic
assumptions of scientific materialism. In fact lots of them come at the issue
from a Marxist-Freudian point of view, or what's called "critical theory". In
the case of Rorty, this materialism takes the shape of things like "verbal
behaviorism", "eliminative materialism" and "non-reductive physicalism". I
mean, part of the difference between Pirsig and these relativist has to do with
very basic metaphysical assumptions.
Try thinking about this a bit. Look into it. Your passion on this topic seems
to be way out of proportion. This issue has been raging in philosophy since
before Royce accused James of relativism over a hundred years ago and it's been
a very hot topic for 50 years. I'm reading relatively new books about
pragmatism wherein the issue just about steals the show. But when I try to
explain the context of this debate and the positions of the various parties
involved in it, you seem to resent it as an appeal to authority. WTF? When did
"comprehension" become some kind of evil? When did intellectual competence
become a form of oppression? I must have been out sick that day cause I don't
remember that ever happening.
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