On Mar 30, 2010, at 1:27 PM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi Marsha, > > >> Dmb got you stumped? > > > Steve: > No. Why do you ask? > > Steve previously: >>> SOM answers to this question vary. Such answers include Locke's notion >>> that there are two types of substances: mental substance (minds) and >>> material substance (objects). Other answers include collapsing >>> everything into material substance or everything into material >>> substance. > > > Marsha: >> ZZzzzzzzz > > Steve: > If you have no interest in what SOM actually is, why would you want to > say that he intellectual level is steeped in SOM?
I am not necessarily convinced there's only one definition of SOM and that it is your interpretation. > Steve: >>> Now, where in all this do you get the notion that the fourth level of >>> that hierarchy is SOM itself? Where are the mental substance and >>> material substance that make up SOM ontology in this description? >>> Nowhere of course. Intellect itself does not require that we postulate >>> such substances. >> > Marsha: >> Intellectual static patterns of value are reified concepts and the rules for >> manipulating them, if not offer some examples. > > Steve: > Your explanation of intellectual patterns has nothing to do with SOM. Maybe to you it doesn't. Okay. As I already said to you, I find no interest in convincing anyone of anything. That would be oh so static... I'm still a relativist, and I cannot understand why you wouldn't think I might approach the MoQ differently. > Steve: >>> We can think without making any assertions about >>> ontology whatsoever. >> > > Marsha: >> The subject is intellectual patterns of value, not intellect which, by the >> way, >> is a reified concept. > > Steve: > Yes, of course subjects and objects are intellectual patterns. That > doesn't make intellect I'm going to ignore your use of 'intellect' and restate that I am talking about Intellectual static patterns of value. > Steve: >>> Most people don't give any thought to >>> metaphysics. They just follow static intellectual patterns of those >>> who came before them, and SOME of these patterns rely on the S/O >>> ontological assumptions. But we can even use the words "subject" and >>> "object" themselves without any ontological implication that these >>> represent two types of fundamental substances that constitute all of >>> reality. It is only when we make this presupposition that we are doing >>> subject-object metaphysics. > > Marsha: >> SOM explanation through and through. > > Steve: > I think you should try to figure out what SOM is before you say that. And I suppose you would like to be the one to determine when I get it right? Nope, Steve, it's not going to work that way. To me SOM is understanding reality as consisting of subjects and objects. > Marsha: >> When a physicist can state that the equation calculating spin "is not >> just mathematics, but Real", RMP might want to rethink his statement >> about mathematics not having objects. > > > Steve: > In the equation "2+2=4" where are the subjects and and where are the objects? It's meaningless dribble if the numbers don't represent some objects. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
