Magnus, Platt, All --



[Platt]:
Those interested in A.I. will find a recent article by David Gelernter (who
needs no introduction to A.I. fans) at:

http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/gelernter10.1/gelernter10.1_index.html

He points out that human thinking involves a lot more than reason. Perhaps
you'll find his ideas helpful in understanding the MOQ's intellectual level.

I don't think a professor of computer science is the best authority on human thinking. However, for those who don't read this article, this paragraph sums up Gelernter's argument:

"Human beings and animals are conscious and, as the philosopher John Searle has argued (in effect), a scientist must assume that consciousness results from a certain chemical, physical structure-just as photosynthesis results from the chemistry of plants. You can't program your laptop or cellphone to transform carbon dioxide into sugar; computers are made of the wrong stuff for photosynthesis-and the wrong stuff for consciousness."

As I've said many times, the fallacy in relegating human functions like consciousness, intellection, conceptualization, and sensibility to a supra-human domain or level is that it makes man little more than a robot of natural evolution. Of course we can build a machine that duplicates the function of a thinking robot. In his own way, Pirsig's positing of the universe as a "moral system" favors A.I development. His MoQ reduces sentient subjects to mere "quality patterns" driven by nature's universe rather than by their own rationalized value-sensibility. The consequence of this worldview will be a collective society that dismisses individual freedom, creativity, and personal fulfillment as outmoded egoistic "static patterns".

We're halfway there already, aren't we Platt?

Best regards and higher hopes for betterness,
Ham

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