Well Ham, your words thrill me and I agree with every word. You put it most excellently as well. I just can't understand how anybody would choose to not understand such plain and well-written rhetoric.
Yours, John On Sun, May 1, 2011 at 12:36 PM, Ham Priday <hampd...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Marsha (Steve quoted) -- > > On Sat, Apr 30, 2011 at 6:13 AM, MarshaV <val...@att.net> wrote: > > Isn't free will dependent on causation, and isn't causation, >> in the MoQ, an explanatory extension of a pattern? >> > > [Steve]: > >> Yes, causation is understood as a stable pattern of preference, >> B routinely values precondition A. Further, B literally IS a set >> of such preferences. >> > > [Marsha, on 5/1]: > >> I un-ask the question. Wherever those preferences lie, >> they do not inherently exist. >> > > Whoa! Hold on there, Marsha. You have a valid point that deserves a > better answer than Steve provided. The causation argument is superficial at > best, besides which cause-and-effect is only man's way of interpreting > events as sequential in time. As a consequence, you have been led to the > depressing conclusion that preference is deterministic. > > Nothing could be further from the truth. The very fact that the primary > source (God, DQ or Essence) is hidden from us and regarded as "undefinable" > supports the principle of Free Will. > [Read the 'Hiddenness' essay on my Values Page at > www.essentialism.net/balance.htm] > Look at it this way: If you were suddenly granted total knowledge of past > and future events -- including your ultimate destiny -- what freedom would > you have? What choices would you make? > > If you think about it, it becomes obvious that in order to exercise free > will, you must be "innocent" of Absolute Truth. That's why we humans are > denied empirical evidence of metaphysical reality, proof of God's existence, > or knowledge of the meaning and purpose of our existence. Such > understanding would subvert and prejudice our role as the free agents of > value. > > Moreover, we do affect the world we live in. The laws of nature are only a > compilation of principles based on what has happened in the past, including > events that our decisions and choices have produced or influenced. What we > do now and in the future is a microcosm of these laws. Pirsig called > experience "the cutting edge of reality", by which he meant that the reality > we create for ourselves is actualized by experience within the parameters of > universal order. To say that everything is fixed as "predetermined patterns > of Quality" is to ignore that we constantly remake the world in accordance > with our value preferences. > > So ask Steve to put away those causal syllogisms. Free Will Lives! And > you and I are living examples of this freedom. > > Thanks and best regards, > Ham > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > > From: "Steven Peterson" <peterson.st...@gmail.com> > > > Hi Marsha, > When Pirsig says, A causes be can be thought of as B values > precondition A. I added that there is nothing more to B (whatever the > collection pattern being thought about) > than such preferences since preference is another word value and > since in the MOQ everything identifiable is thought of as a pattern of > value or collection of patterns. > > Best, > Steve > > > On Sat, Apr 30, 2011 at 7:19 AM, MarshaV <val...@att.net> wrote: > >> >> On Apr 30, 2011, at 7:04 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: >> >> >> HI Steve, >> >> I don't understand the last part of your statement: "Further, B literally >> IS a >> set of such preferences." Could you please elaborate. >> >> Thank you. >> >> >> Marsha >> > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
