Steve said to dmb:
I have always held that Pirsig denies the determinism horn of the old supposed
dilemma. ...Note you also quoted him saying, "In the MOQ this dilemma doesn't
come up." The whole free will/determinism issue is a non-issue for the MOQ.,
since, "The "Laws of Nature' are moral laws."
dmb says:
Right, Pirsig says the dilemma doesn't come up. And in the very next lines he
says, "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of
quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic
Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free." The dilemma WAS between
two mutually exclusive horns, both of which would have devastating
consequences. Determinism would exclude freedom and Free Will would undermine
science and, as a matter of logical necessity, only one of them can stand. The
MOQ avoids this dilemma by saying that our behavior is both free and
controlled. The MOQ does not avoid this dilemma by REJECTING both horns but
rather by saying they are not mutually exclusive options. The MOQ says freedom
and restraint are both empirically known and they're both real to various
extents.
dmb had said:
The laws of cause and effect preclude any freedom or choice. So we can't righty
understand causality AS a pattern of preferences no matter how stable. That's
just not what the word "cause" means.
Steve replied:
And yet I do it anyway as Pirsig says we can... Steve quotes Pirsig: In the
Metaphysics of Quality "causation" is a metaphysical term that can be REPLACED
by "value". To say that "A causes B" or to say that "B values precondition A"
is to say the same thing.
dmb now says:
Right, in the MOQ causation is REPLACED by value. I think it's pretty clear
that the MOQ has "replaced" causation, meaning that something else has been put
in its place. (Just as every empiricist since Hume has said, Pirsig is also
saying that "causation" is a metaphysical term.) You SAY that you've been
denying the deterministic horn but it seems to me that you're converting
"value" back into some kind of determining factor and then use that
misconception to also say freedom of the will is an illusion. I think this
completely undermines the whole reason for Pirsig's replacement. When he says
the two equations mean the same thing, he's saying that they both describe the
same action, they both refer to the same events. The dials and readings in the
laboratory do not change. The difference is the way we talk and think about
those empirical facts. Causality rules out freedom and morality while value
does not. At the same time, replacing causation with value does not undermine sc
ience. The dilemma is averted because we can have BOTH science and morality.
Steve said:
Unless you have any evidence to the contrary, he does NOT say that free will is
needed for morality in the MOQ.
dmb says:
Isn't it simply a matter of logical necessity? If we are controlled by
determining forces, if we have no freedom, it makes no sense to hold anyone
morally responsible. Pirsig concludes this section by also saying that "not
just life, but everything, is an ethical activity". He defines "betterness" as
the "response to Dynamic Quality" in the context of describing the creation of
life itself as something inorganic patterns did because its "better". This
"betterness", he says, "is an elementary unit of ethics upon which all right
and wrong can be based." (Lila 157) "To the extent that one follows Dynamic
Quality", he says, "one's behavior is free". It seems quite obvious to me that
he is connecting freedom and morality in a very intimate relationship here AND
the next page is a new chapter wherein the levels of static quality are
introduced as a moral hierarchy based on evolutionary stages of betterness and
it's no accident that each level offers a wider range of freedom. That's
the main reason why the higher levels are considered more moral. The book is
largely about how morality can be served. There are just too many powerful
reasons. I find your denial completely implausible.
dmb:
Determinism, which is predicated on causality, says that man is not free to
choose and therefore cannot be held responsible. I have quoted the dictionary,
Charlene the James scholar and now Pirsig on this point. (We simply cannot have
an intelligent conversation on the topic unless and until the you use the
central terms properly.)
Steve replied:
I've denied that the MOQ supports determinism all along. You keep thinking that
it's either free will or determinism while the MOQ says, "mu."
dmb says:
But you have denied free will all along and suggested that we can be more
compassionate now that we know moral responsibility is an illusion. That
doesn't sound like a denial of determinism. Quite the opposite. We don't have
any choice about our values, you keep saying, because we are our values. How is
that NOT determinism? This is not "mu" nor is it "both" or "either". To use the
analogy you borrowed from Sam Harris, you've been saying we are as morally
culpable as a tornado. How is that NOT determinism?
I have NOT been saying that it has to be one or the other. In fact, I've been
saying that it is both. My questions and criticism are about YOUR stated
positions. Like I said, the freedom I think you're denying is the freedom to
act or not, the freedom to make choices. And how did you respond?
Steve replied:
...it is meaningless to add the word "free" in claiming "free will." We make
choices. Sure, but what does it mean to say that your choices are free? They
aren't free, they are manifestations of your preferences, and we don't freely
choose our preferences. In the MOQ we ARE our preferences, so the MOQ clearly
denies both horns of the supposed dilemma.
dmb says:
That's the move that free will altogether and thereby converts the MOQ back
into a kind of determinism. See, it's not that I think it has to be one or the
other. I just think you are defending determinism. You say we don't freely
choose our preferences but that's not what Pirsig is saying. He says "moral
judgements are essentially assertions of value and if value is the fundamental
ground stuff of the world, then moral judgements are the fundamental
ground-stuff of the world." What sense does it make to say we have no choice
about "asserting values and making judgements"? Surely it takes a will to
assert anything and what is judgement but a deliberate choice? I think it's
obvious that the MOQ does NOT deny freedom of the will altogether, just as it
does not deny restraint. We are both free and controlled to some extent. The
MOQ does not avoid the dilemma by denying both horns so much as by accepting
both horns in an empirical, non-metaphysical blend of both.
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