Hi dmb,
> Steve said dmb: > Of course I would never say that are follows laws. The laws of physics are > intellectual patterns of value, and the fact that we can predict the behavior > of things in no way impedes choice. This is why I thought you were talking > about predetermination. I can't see how the fact that we can predict what > will happen has anything to do with the possibility of choosing. > dmb says: > Other than the last sentence, I can't tell what you're trying to say. BUT, if > you can't see how causality precludes moral responsibility then there are > many, many explanations available for your edification and amusement. Nobody > has to take my word for it. Steve: No, I don't take your word for it, but you've given me nothing more than that. If causality is understood in MOQ terms as a stable pattern of preference, then obviously causality is no threat to moral responsibility. > Steve said to dmb: > > Again, the MOQ does not replace causality, it explains it. What it does is > answer Hume's question about whether causality is empirical. In short, Hume > asked, we see ball A hit ball B and move away, but did we see ball A CAUSE > ball B to move? No we did not, so causality in the mechanistic interpretation > is not empirically known. But of course preference is known empirically. > dmb says: > Well, no. Causality and preference are rival ways to think about the same > empirical facts. Steve: Well, no. And again, I don't accept your say so. I don't see Pirsig anywhere saying that we ought to throw away the word "cause" in describing our experience. All I see him doing is saying what "cause" may mean in MOQ terms. If you have textual evidence, please provide it. dmb: In Pirsig's alternative, our ability to express preferences is the starting point and then it's extrapolated downward. In determinism, the law-like behavior of physical nature is extrapolated upward. Both are equally plausible but one of them, yours, is a moral nightmare wherein freedom and responsibility are meaningless concepts. Steve: To my knowledge Pirsig never talks about responsibility, but he does talk about freedom. In fact in his preface to ZAMM he describes freedom as merely a negative and therefore a lousy goal, and he describes ZAMM itself as offering a positive alternative to freedom that can serve as a positive goal, namely Quality. Pirsig: The hippies had in mind something that they wanted, and were calling it “freedom,” but in the final analysis “freedom” is a purely negative goal. It just says something is bad. Hippies weren’t really offering any alternatives other than colorful short-term ones, and some of these were looking more and more like pure degeneracy. Degeneracy can be fun but it’s hard to keep up as a serious lifetime occupation. This book offers another, more serious alternative to material success. It’s not so much an alternative as an expansion of the meaning of “success” to something larger than just getting a good job and staying out of trouble. And also something larger than mere freedom. It gives a positive goal to work toward that does not confine. That is the main reason for the book’s success, I think. Steve: You see? The freedom you think I am undermining is something that Pirsig thinks is a negative rather than THEE foundation for moral responsibility, and he even hangs his hat on having offered us a positive alternative for freedom. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
