Hi dmb, Dan, > dmb says: >...If we say that our actions are the effects of preconditions beyond our >control, then we've still formulated these actions as the effects of causes. >The main idea of saying B values precondition A (instead of saying A causes B) >is to replace causality with the expression of preference. This formulation >gets rid of determinism and causality even at the inorganic level, even in >physics. At this level we then can say that even the so-called "laws" of >nature are better described as extremely persistent patterns of preference.
Steve: I don't think Pirsig is replacing causality so much as explaining it in MOQ terms. And few think of nature as following laws so much as laws are descriptions of what nature does. dmb: > With each level the patterns of preference become increasingly less > persistent and more varied. By the time we get the question of free will, > we're talking about a person's capacity to express preferences. The > biological, social and intellectual levels are even less law-like, less > determined, and this is where it makes sense to talk about human freedom and > responsibility. > > We don't say subatomic particles have moral responsibility, of course. But in > Pirsig's very broad notion of morality, even the molecules that hold a chair > together are seen as a moral order. Steve: Has Pirsig ever used the term "moral responsibility"? dmb: > What concerns me is simply put. Determinism is a moral nightmare. It > precludes moral responsibility and denies freedom altogether. I'm fairly > certain that Sam Harris and Steve are wildly at odds with the MOQ and with > pragmatism on this one. If I tried to express Steve's determinism in MOQ > terms, this view would say that we are a complex forest of evolved static > patterns (so far, so good) and static patterns both proceed from and follow > natural laws. Steve: Of course I would never say that are follows laws. The laws of physics are intellectual patterns of value, and the fact that we can predict the behavior of things in no way impedes choice. This is why I thought you were talking about predetermination. I can't see how the fact that we can predict what will happen has anything to do with the possibility of choosing. dmb: >Unlike the MOQ, this view does not replace causality with patterns of >preference and it does not include the most vital ingredient: Dynamic Quality. >What we have in Steve's determinism is simply a return to amoral, scientific >objectivity, where nothing is right or wrong. It just functions like machinery. Steve: Again, the MOQ does not replace causality, it explains it. What it does is answer Hume's question about whether causality is empirical. In short, Hume asked, we see ball A hit ball B and move away, but did we see ball A CAUSE ball B to move? No we did not, so causality in the mechanistic interpretation is not empirically known. But of course preference is known empirically. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
