Steve said dmb:
Of course I would never say that are follows laws. The laws of physics are
intellectual patterns of value, and the fact that we can predict the behavior
of things in no way impedes choice. This is why I thought you were talking
about predetermination. I can't see how the fact that we can predict what will
happen has anything to do with the possibility of choosing.
dmb says:
Other than the last sentence, I can't tell what you're trying to say. BUT, if
you can't see how causality precludes moral responsibility then there are many,
many explanations available for your edification and amusement. Nobody has to
take my word for it.
Steve said to dmb:
Again, the MOQ does not replace causality, it explains it. What it does is
answer Hume's question about whether causality is empirical. In short, Hume
asked, we see ball A hit ball B and move away, but did we see ball A CAUSE ball
B to move? No we did not, so causality in the mechanistic interpretation is not
empirically known. But of course preference is known empirically.
dmb says:
Well, no. Causality and preference are rival ways to think about the same
empirical facts. In Pirsig's alternative, our ability to express preferences is
the starting point and then it's extrapolated downward. In determinism, the
law-like behavior of physical nature is extrapolated upward. Both are equally
plausible but one of them, yours, is a moral nightmare wherein freedom and
responsibility are meaningless concepts.
And yes, empiricists since Hume have considered causality to a be a
metaphysical concept, not an empirical one.
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