dmb,
> dmb says: >...Pirsig's statement is about the extent to which one's behavior is >controlled or free. ...He's talking about the extent to which people are free >or not within the terms of the MOQ. Steve: That's right, but what is behavior possibly controlled BY and what could it possibly be free FROM? These questions take on a very different character from the traditional SOM free will/determinism debate when we are asking them within the MOQ. There are two very different yet analogous problems here: Under SOM that question is formulated as free will/determinism which is to ask (1) to what extent one's choices are based on the will of the subject and to what extent choices are determined by external objective causes. This is an SOM problem that gets dissolved in the MOQ, but the MOQ results in a new analogous problem--a new MOQ Platypus. Probably THEE MOQ Platypus. That question is, (2) to what extent is behavior a static response to patterns of value and to what extent is behavior a response to dynamic quality? He doesn't actually tell us, as you say, "the extent to which people are free or not within the terms of the MOQ" where freedom is associated with DQ and constraint associated with static quality. That what led Matt in the past to say that DQ is a compliment we pay after the fact. > Steve said: > ...The above interpretation makes it sound like the MOQ is just some > wishy-washy middle ground between the S and the O in SOM (it's a little of > each!!!) rather than a rejection of the fundamental premise of SOM which > underlies the tradition free will/determinism debate. Is the quality in the > subject or the object? Is the locus of control for human actions internal to > the subject or externally imposed by objects? Its pretty much the same false > choice that the MOQ was invented to dissolve rather than mediate. > > dmb says: > Well, no. Obviously the MOQ is not framing freedom and restraint as a matter > of subjectivity and objectivity but in terms of static and Dynamic, which is > the quality of order and the quality of freedom respectively. And this is not > some wishy-washy middle ground on this particular dilemma but the MOQ's first > and most central distinction, as well as a description of what we are. Steve: And if the MOQ formulates the problem so differently, why insist that it is even the same problem? > dmb says: > I think your position is wildly incoherent. It seems you don't even > understand the problem, let alone the solution. Sure, we make choices but > they are determined? That idea simply defies the meaning of the term > "choice". If our actions are determined they are, by definition, without > choice. Steve: I'm sorry but it must be you who doesn't have a strong enough grasp on the ancient free will/determinism debate concerned with subjective versus objective control if you can't see how it is different from the MOQ problem of recognizing the extent to which we are following static or dynamic quality. They are analogous problems in a way, but they are certainly NOT the same. SOM free will/determinism is not about the presence or absence of choice. Of course we make choices. The SOM free will/determinism question is about the _basis_ of choice. It is to ask whether choices are objective or subjective. Likewise, the analogous MOQ question is about the _basis_ of preferences. Sure we have preferences, and everything we do is a manifestation of such preferences. No one would ever deny that. But the MOQ problem is to ask, are our preferences responses to dynamic or static quality? If they are responses to DQ, we may regard them as "free" in a sense. Otherwise, we can regard them as "constrained" in the sense of being static patterns. To call this an MOQ support of the ancient notion of free will is quite a stretch indeed. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
