On Jul 9, 2011, at 8:59 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi Marsha, > > On Sat, Jul 9, 2011 at 3:45 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Hi Steve, >> >> To answer you question specifically, in Chapter 14 Lila states that she >> is not anybody. If this is a rejection of the self, a self that is created >> though >> repeatedly identifying with static patterns of value, my guess would be >> that Lila, the character, does not have "free will." >> >> More generally, from my MoQ point-of-view, whatever that means, my >> answer stands as I neither accept "free will" nor reject "free will" so MU. > > > Steve: > I think that is an excellent answer. Rather than saying that the MOQ > rejects both horns of the dilemma, I should have said, "mu" (as I have > when I was being more careful). The MOQ does not accept either horn > (determinism or free will), but instead it says that neither is right, > and they're not even wrong. The whole question as traditionally posed > is thrown out as based on a premise that the MOQ does not accept. The > MOQ replaces this question with, "to what extent are our actions > static and to what extent are they dynamic?" In this replacement > question about freedom, the term "will" is no where in the picture. > > Best, > Steve
Hi Steve, It seems to me that you have been saying MU, so I agree with you. It does, though, exist as a static pattern of value, a pragmatic illusion. Maybe its outgrown it usefulness? Maybe if Reality were experienced as Quality, such a pattern would no longer be useful. Marsha ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
