Hi, Steven Peterson
> Free will seems to arise to distinguish how our consciousness operate as
> opposed to the more mechanical sorts of causation, as with Aristotle's
> moving cause.
But does it really do any explanatory work with regard to "how our
conscious operate[s]"?
None at all. I'm saying it's basically an emotive thing, it's a reaction to
the horrifying-to-some prospect that we are electrochemical robots. Reminds
me of how some parentally abused people get out of the abusive household and
go wild on freedom for a brief skyburst time. Then the aftereffects catch up
with them and their light fades. (Maybe Lila was one of them, at the cusp?)
Or does it just propose un uncaused causer that itself needs explanation?
Rand tries to get around this by making free will equal an irreducible
choice to think or not to think. I'm not sure where that leaves science and
reason in her system. As I once heard someone say at my little Episcopal
Church of Reason, St John's, about one of the vitalists (Hand Driesch) -
"Here's where he stops being a scientist."
Alan Watts tried a different tack - he said that perfect determinism would
feel like perfect freedom. Leave to A.W. to relax tensions. : )
MRB
http://www.fuguewriter.com
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