> Steve said to dmb: > Since the quoted text is from his article "Morality Without Free Will," I > think you'd have a hard time convincing Sam that he is actually arguing that > free will is required for morality. > > dmb says: > That is specious reasoning.
Steve: What is absurd is to say that when Sam Harris argues that moral responsibility does not depend on free will he REALLY means just the opposite. dmb: Like I already pointed out, Sam does not deny that we are responsible for our actions. Steve: Yeah, of course. Thats why I chose him as an example to refute your claim that is logically impossible to deny bit free will while maintaining the notion of moral responsibility. dmb: The "Free Will" that he does deny is a metaphysical notion. Steve: You've insisted that causality is metaphysical notion, and free will is a concept that is based on causality, so I can't see how you can make this move to distinguish a metaphysical versus a non-metaphysical conception of free will. Plus, since you are interpreting Pirsig to be supporting free will as the capacity to respond to DQ, and since DQ is a metaphysical concept, then free will in your take on Pirisg must also be a metaphysical notion. But this is all just sounds like a red herring to try to brush under the rug your claim that Harris somehow actually means the opposite of what he says. dmb: Like I said in the post just sent, the practical, empirical "will" only refers to the this extension of our intentions, goals and desires into the realm of action. That's all it means to have a will. Steve: I agree, and that's the position I've always taken in this discussion. dmb: And the classic dilemma is gone but we are still asking if that will is free or determined. Steve: No, whether this will is free or determined IS the classic dilemma. dmb: But look at the way you've framed the question... > > Steve said to dmb: > ...Harris denies that we are free to choose our actions. He of course does > not deny that obvious fact that we make choices and have intentions and > desires. I have emphasized that point many times over the past few months. > > dmb says: > I don't get it. Harris denies that we are free to choose but of course he > does not deny that we make choices? How is that not just a contradiction? We > are not free to choose but obviously we make choices? Perhaps I failed to > address this point out of kindness. Does the first claim a denial of > metaphysical freedom of the "Free Will" and the second one is an affirmation > of plain, practical free will? As it stands, I can't make any sense of that. Steve: That humans make choices is just a fact. Trying to explain the basis of choice is what the free will/determinism dilemma is about. Are our choices determined or are they free? Harris takes the determinism horn, but maintains that we can still talk about moral responsibility. > Steve said to dmb: > ...The question was never about agency as the mere fact that we make choices > or have will or intentions or moods and desires. It was about _free_ agency. > I have always said that we obviously do make choices. The issue is about > whether we make _free_ choices. > > dmb says: > The question was never about agency as the mere fact, it was about _free_ > agency? Huh? Steve: Yes, that is whatI just said. dmb: Aren't you just inserting that metaphysical nonsense that nobody is talking about again? Steve: No. dmb: How many times do I have to tell you that NOBODY is talking about that kind of entity except you. You projecting that concept into the conversation and it is worse than useless. It has become an obstacle of epic proportions. I really don't understand why you insist on doing this. Steve: Good, because I'm not doing that. dmb: > And isn't it just redundant to say we make choices freely? Steve: If so, then surely free will is also a redundant term. dmb: If we make choices, that's it. That's the freedom. If you can't choose, then you're not free. Same with agency. The meaning of term already contains the notion of freedom. I mean, phrases like "determined agent" and "caused choice" are nonsense for that reason. Steve: Incorrect. That we make choices is a bald fact. We are handed a menu, and we say whether we want sausage of pepperoni on our pizza. That's a choice. The free will question is about whether that is a _free_ choice whether we make the choice we do solely based on factors beyond our control. (Sometimes agency is merely taken to be the capacity to act. In that sense animals have agency. Sometimes agency is taken to mean free will.) > Steve said: > Anyway, if you agree with Harris's view that we can have moral responsibility > while denying free will then we have no argument this at point, so I guess > you can stop saying that my view defies logic, and I hope you'll retract your > many insistences that it would be simply illogical to hold such a view. The > link between free will and moral responsibility is not a logical necessity as > you have been insisting. I'll take your response above as your humble > admission that you were wrong and that you now agree with me that we _can_ > make sense of moral responsibility while denying free will. > > dmb says: > No, sorry. I'm not ready to retract anything just yet. And no, I certainly > think Sam's neurological determinism is just an updated version of classic > horn of determinism and your attempt to grapple with the MOQ's reformulation > by way of his medical materialism and reductionism has created a pretty > awesome mess. > > It was a good try to get Sam to do the work for you, but all of this is about > a simple logical connection. I mean, if Sam denies that we are free to > choose, in what sense are we responsible for those choices? Isn't he saying > people are as morally culpable as a tornado, which is to say not at all? No > agency, no responsibility. If Sam thinks he has found a plausible way around > this, you're definitely going to have to explain it to me. I honestly don't > see it. Steve: Harris notes that if we could put tornados in jail, we would and for the same reason we put serial killers in jail--to keep them from killing. The difference is that tornados don't have intentions. When we talk about moral responsibility, Harris says we are talking about the blameworthiness of those holding bad intentions. Harris wrote, "To say that I was responsible for my behavior is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them." It sounds to me that now that you perhaps understand that Harris was intending to be making the case that moral responsibility _doesn't_ die with free will and not the complete opposite case as you took him to be making on your first (cursory?) reading, your reading comprehension may be better next time. I suggest you try it again. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
