There is a way to make this, understandable. Language results from thinking, thinking results from awareness, awareness results from dualism, dualism results from quality, quality results from Quality, Quality results from language.
Mark On Aug 3, 2011, at 12:25 PM, Arlo Bensinger <[email protected]> wrote: > [Marsha] > I have the 'activity of thinking' connected to language, which would be but > one type of mental fabrication within consciousness. > > [Arlo] > In your opinion, is language something we "think with", or is thinking itself > the very use of language? > > [Marsha] > There are all types of mental experiences that fall outside of this > definition. > > [Arlo] > Well, that was my question, a way to differentiate between "thinking" and > "non-thinking" states, a definition that allows you to say "that is thinking, > but this other thing is not thinking". > > You mention thinking being "connected" to language, I'm wondering if you > could elaborate on the nature of that connection? Are they synonyms? Can you > ever have one without the other? Can you have thought without language? What > about language without thought? > > [Marsha] > Within the MoQ, I think 'the activity of thinking' included within both the > social and intellectual levels. > > [Arlo] > Well this is definitional, if you define "thinking" in such a way as for it > to apply to social and intellectual patterns, then yes it would be included > in both. I do, by the way, so I agree with you and Ian. I also further agree > with Ian (and this puts me at odds with Pirsig's MOQ) that "thinking" is most > valuably defined to include certain activities we experience in non-human > species (since I do not agree with Pirsig's restriction of the > social/intellectual level to just humans). > > But yes, the value of a definition is pragmatically valuable for its > usefulness in describing experience. For example, a neurobiologist may indeed > define "thinking" as the detectable firing of neurons in certain areas of the > brain, in which case our society holds this as having value in making > terminal decisions about brain-damaged or comatose patients. > > > > > > > > > On 8/3/11 2:04 PM, MarshaV wrote: >> Hello Arlo, >> >> On Aug 3, 2011, at 1:20 PM, Arlo Bensinger wrote: >> >>> [Marsha] >>> I agree that the concept of 'thinking' is an intellectual pattern. But I >>> thought it was stated, somewhere, that the activity of thinking indicated >>> the intellectual level. >>> >>> [Arlo] >>> How would you define "thinking"? Or, what "activity" would you witness and >>> point to and say "that's 'thinking'"? What has to occur to differentiate, >>> in your opinion, "thinking" from "not thinking"? >> Marsha: >> My point was that I thought someone (maybe Dan, maybe someone else) had >> stated that the Intellectual level was thinking. >> >> >>> As for a cultural, common use, I think we tend to use the term loosely to >>> refer to some degree of information processing embedded in some bio-neural >>> mass. It's outside the cultural norm, for example, to use "thinking" to >>> describe the activity of the sun, or a computer, or a tree. If I say, "that >>> tree is thinking about the next rainfall", would that make sense (within >>> the cultural use of the term)? What evidence would I point to in a tree to >>> differentiate a "thinking" from a "non-thinking" state? >>> >>> Granted, there is an inherent reductionism in defining "thinking" as the >>> firing of neurons in a brain mass, but this tends to be the evidence we >>> look for to support our shared cultural understanding of the term. >>> Interestingly, if we equate "thinking" in some way with neural activity, we >>> may have to grant that "computers think", since a similar "firing" of nodes >>> occurs within computer processors when it processes information. >>> >>> For example, if I ask the person sitting next to me "what is two plus two?" >>> and he responds "four", is that evidence of "thinking"? If so, why would I >>> not say my calculator was "thinking" as well when it gives me the same >>> answer? >>> >>> I've read some post-Peircian work that speculates that abduction (or >>> hypothetical inference, which ties into Pirsig's works) may be a >>> differentiator between human and machine information processing in >>> determining "thinking". So "thinking" isn't JUST the processing of >>> information, or inducing or deducing, or making input-output decisions, but >>> rests on the ability of the "thinker" to abduce, or hypothesize, or (maybe >>> too simplistically) the generation of something "new". >>> >>> What do you think? >> >> Marsha: >> I have the 'activity of thinking' connected to language, which would be but >> one type of mental fabrication within consciousness. That would be as' >> talking to another person' (an external experience), or 'talking to oneself' >> (an internal experience). There are all types of mental experiences that >> fall outside of this definition. Science of Mind and Philosophy of Mind are >> very active fields right now, with many diverse opinions. At the moment, I >> know very little of the current thought on the subject. Within the MoQ, I >> think 'the activity of thinking' included within both the social and >> intellectual levels. >> >> >> >> Marsha >> >> >> >> ___ >> >> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html >> >> > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
