Hi Mark,
Interconnected? Marsha On Aug 4, 2011, at 3:52 PM, 118 wrote: > There is a way to make this, understandable. Language results from thinking, > thinking results from awareness, awareness results from dualism, dualism > results from quality, quality results from Quality, Quality results from > language. > > Mark > > On Aug 3, 2011, at 12:25 PM, Arlo Bensinger <ajb...@psu.edu> wrote: > >> [Marsha] >> I have the 'activity of thinking' connected to language, which would be but >> one type of mental fabrication within consciousness. >> >> [Arlo] >> In your opinion, is language something we "think with", or is thinking >> itself the very use of language? >> >> [Marsha] >> There are all types of mental experiences that fall outside of this >> definition. >> >> [Arlo] >> Well, that was my question, a way to differentiate between "thinking" and >> "non-thinking" states, a definition that allows you to say "that is >> thinking, but this other thing is not thinking". >> >> You mention thinking being "connected" to language, I'm wondering if you >> could elaborate on the nature of that connection? Are they synonyms? Can you >> ever have one without the other? Can you have thought without language? What >> about language without thought? >> >> [Marsha] >> Within the MoQ, I think 'the activity of thinking' included within both the >> social and intellectual levels. >> >> [Arlo] >> Well this is definitional, if you define "thinking" in such a way as for it >> to apply to social and intellectual patterns, then yes it would be included >> in both. I do, by the way, so I agree with you and Ian. I also further agree >> with Ian (and this puts me at odds with Pirsig's MOQ) that "thinking" is >> most valuably defined to include certain activities we experience in >> non-human species (since I do not agree with Pirsig's restriction of the >> social/intellectual level to just humans). >> >> But yes, the value of a definition is pragmatically valuable for its >> usefulness in describing experience. For example, a neurobiologist may >> indeed define "thinking" as the detectable firing of neurons in certain >> areas of the brain, in which case our society holds this as having value in >> making terminal decisions about brain-damaged or comatose patients. >> >> >> >> On 8/3/11 2:04 PM, MarshaV wrote: >>> Hello Arlo, >>> >>> On Aug 3, 2011, at 1:20 PM, Arlo Bensinger wrote: >>> >>>> [Marsha] >>>> I agree that the concept of 'thinking' is an intellectual pattern. But I >>>> thought it was stated, somewhere, that the activity of thinking indicated >>>> the intellectual level. >>>> >>>> [Arlo] >>>> How would you define "thinking"? Or, what "activity" would you witness and >>>> point to and say "that's 'thinking'"? What has to occur to differentiate, >>>> in your opinion, "thinking" from "not thinking"? >>> Marsha: >>> My point was that I thought someone (maybe Dan, maybe someone else) had >>> stated that the Intellectual level was thinking. >>> >>> >>>> As for a cultural, common use, I think we tend to use the term loosely to >>>> refer to some degree of information processing embedded in some bio-neural >>>> mass. It's outside the cultural norm, for example, to use "thinking" to >>>> describe the activity of the sun, or a computer, or a tree. If I say, >>>> "that tree is thinking about the next rainfall", would that make sense >>>> (within the cultural use of the term)? What evidence would I point to in a >>>> tree to differentiate a "thinking" from a "non-thinking" state? >>>> >>>> Granted, there is an inherent reductionism in defining "thinking" as the >>>> firing of neurons in a brain mass, but this tends to be the evidence we >>>> look for to support our shared cultural understanding of the term. >>>> Interestingly, if we equate "thinking" in some way with neural activity, >>>> we may have to grant that "computers think", since a similar "firing" of >>>> nodes occurs within computer processors when it processes information. >>>> >>>> For example, if I ask the person sitting next to me "what is two plus >>>> two?" and he responds "four", is that evidence of "thinking"? If so, why >>>> would I not say my calculator was "thinking" as well when it gives me the >>>> same answer? >>>> >>>> I've read some post-Peircian work that speculates that abduction (or >>>> hypothetical inference, which ties into Pirsig's works) may be a >>>> differentiator between human and machine information processing in >>>> determining "thinking". So "thinking" isn't JUST the processing of >>>> information, or inducing or deducing, or making input-output decisions, >>>> but rests on the ability of the "thinker" to abduce, or hypothesize, or >>>> (maybe too simplistically) the generation of something "new". >>>> >>>> What do you think? >>> >>> Marsha: >>> I have the 'activity of thinking' connected to language, which would be but >>> one type of mental fabrication within consciousness. That would be as' >>> talking to another person' (an external experience), or 'talking to >>> oneself' (an internal experience). There are all types of mental >>> experiences that fall outside of this definition. Science of Mind and >>> Philosophy of Mind are very active fields right now, with many diverse >>> opinions. At the moment, I know very little of the current thought on the >>> subject. Within the MoQ, I think 'the activity of thinking' included >>> within both the social and intellectual levels. >>> >>> >>> >>> Marsha >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
