Hi Ian, dmb,

> dmb says:
> It's actually a dispute about whether or not the term "free will" means 
> something so specific that we cannot rightly use the term while talking about 
> the MOQ's conception of one's freedom.

Steve:
This is a lie. I haven't insisted on any particular definition of free
will. In fact, I have been happy to let dmb offer whatever definitions
he can find from dictionaries. Rather what I have been doing is
arguing that "the capacity to respond to DQ" is incompatible with
those definitions. Following DQ is indeed a sort of freedom, but it
isn't "free will" by any common usage of the term most importantly
because following DQ doesn't necessarily include any willing.


dmb:
I don't even use the term all the much but Steve is quite insistent
about enforcing this ban all the same. I think this insistence is a
pointless distraction based on nothing but Steve's chip. You know, the
one he keeps on his shoulder. He is enforcing this ban against the
advice of the Stanford encyclopedia, which says...
>
> "It would be misleading to specify a strict definition of free will since in 
> the philosophical work devoted to this notion there is probably no single 
> concept of it. For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue 
> have been hunting for, maybe not exclusively, but centrally, is a feature of 
> agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their 
> conduct."
>
> In fact, Steve insists on defying both of these points. He insists on a very 
> strict definition, one that carries metaphysical baggage that's incompatible 
> with the MOQ and, against the second sentence, he insists that human agency 
> is NOT necessary for persons to be morally responsible. As you may have 
> noticed, Steve is unmoved by this sound and simple evidence against his 
> assertions.


Steve:
That is evidence that free will has been defined in many different
ways, and I completely accept that, but it is not a license to just
use the term to mean whatever you want it to mean and hope to be
understood. For example, it doesn't say that it is OK to use the term
"free will" to describe situations where there is no conscious willing
involved such as an amoeba moving away from acid or hopping off a hot
stove before you even become consciously aware of the low quality. It
seems quite reasonable to insist that "free will" must involve "will"
to make any sense.

And given the qualifiers "for the most part" and "not exclusively"
this quote does not support your claim that moral responsibility is
inextricably tied up with free will. In fact it implies that at least
some philosopher haven't taken it to be.

So no, this is not evidence against anything I've said.
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html

Reply via email to